Conscientious objection and South African medical practitioners' constructions of termination of pregnancy and emergency contraception by Chiwandire, Desire
Conscientious objection and South African medical 
practitioners’ constructions of termination of pregnancy and 
emergency contraception 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 
 
 
MASTER OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 
 
 
Of 
 
 
RHODES UNIVERSITY 
 
 
By 
 
 
DESIRE CHIWANDIRE 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Professor Louise Vincent 
 
 
 
 
 
December 2014
ii 
 
Abstract  
 
Aim: The 1996 Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act decriminalized abortion in South 
Africa and the South African Medicines Control Council in 2000 approved the dispensing of 
emergency contraceptive methods by pharmacists to women without a doctor’s prescription. This 
legislation has been hailed as among the most progressive in the world with respect to women’s 
reproductive justice. However the realisation of these rights in practice has not always met 
expectations in part due to medical practitioners’ ethical objections to termination of pregnancy 
and the provision of related services. The aim of this study was to interpret the varying ways in 
which medical practitioners frame termination of pregnancy and emergency contraceptive 
services, their own professional identities and that of their patients/clients.  
 
Methods: Sample of 58 doctors and 59 pharmacists drawn from all nine provinces of South 
Africa. Data collected using an anonymous confidential internet-based self-administered 
questionnaire. Participants were randomly recruited from online listings of South African doctors 
and pharmacists practicing in both private and public sectors. Data were analysed using 
theoretically derived qualitative content analysis. 
 
Results: Participants drew on eight frames to justify their willingness or unwillingness to 
provide termination-of-pregnancy related services: the foetal life frame, the women’s rights 
frame, the balancing frame, the social justice frame, the do no harm frame, the legal and 
professional obligation frame, the consequences frame and the moral absolutist frame.  
 
Conclusion: Health professionals’ willingness or unwillingness to provide termination of 
pregnancy related services is highly dependent on how they frame or understand termination of 
pregnancy, and how they understand their own professional identities and those of their 
patients/clients.  
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Glossary of terms 
 
Abortion 
The World Health Organization (WHO) defines abortion as “the termination of an already 
established pregnancy (in other words, a method that acts after implantation)” (2003).  
Unsafe abortion 
Unsafe abortion is “an abortion taking place outside of health facilities (or any other place not 
recognised by law) and/or provided by an unskilled person” (WHO, 1992).  
Medical abortion 
Medical abortion is an alternative to traditional surgical abortion, in other words, it is the 
termination of pregnancy through the use of a drug or a combination of drugs which may include 
misoprostol or mifepristone (Bateman, 2011:304).  
Abortion on demand/request 
Abortion on demand or on request, also known as elective abortion is an abortion that is not 
justified by a matter of health, life or rape, but by the free will of the woman. 
Therapeutic abortion 
Therapeutic abortion, popularly referred to as abortion for medical reasons is an abortion induced 
when pregnancy constitutes a threat to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or if 
there is foetal malformation (ACOG, 2007).  
Maternal death or mortality (MM)  
MM is defined as “the death of a woman while pregnant or within 42 days of termination of 
pregnancy, irrespective of the duration and site of the pregnancy, from any cause related to or 
aggravated by the pregnancy or its management, but not from accidental or incidental causes” 
(Hurt and Ronsmans, 2005). Maternal mortality is measured using the ‘maternal mortality ratio, 
that is the “number of maternal deaths during a given time period per 100 000 live births during 
same time period” (Ronsmans and Graham, 2006:1190).  
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Chapter one: the study 
 
Following the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) held in Cairo in 
1994 and the Fourth World Conference on Women (FWCW) held in Beijing 1995, there have 
been tremendous efforts made worldwide for the development of reproductive and sexual rights 
for women, including abortion (Ngwena, 2004:708; see also Yanda et al, 2003:275). Both 
conferences contributed to the emergence of a dominant approach that equates the denial of safe 
abortion services on request to women with a serious human-rights violation. This approach 
gained hold after the 1994 ICPD in Cairo where nations agreed to the need for the classification 
of reproductive rights as a crucial element of human rights (United Nations, 1994, para. 7.3:40). 
According to Rebecca Cook who is the leading advocate of this approach, the application of a 
human rights framework can effectively reduce the burden of unsafe abortion as it seeks to 
ensure women’s rights to equal protection of the law and non-discrimination on the grounds of 
sex and race (2006:15-16). 
 
For Yanda et al, abortion is a ‘basic reproductive right’ that ought to be respected and promoted 
by governments (2003:276-277). Thus, in the event of an unintended pregnancy, every woman 
should be able to exercise full control of her body (Correa, 2010:112) and be able to make 
autonomous sexual and reproductive choices concerning  either to continue or discontinue her 
pregnancy (Yanda et al, 2003:277; see also Pearson and Sweetman, 1994:46). Thus, “if she 
chooses to terminate it, it is the responsibility of healthcare providers, and good government 
policy, to ensure her safety” (Yanda et al, 2003:277). 
 
The ICPD stressed the need to address unsafe abortion as a public health concern (Cook, 
2006:27) and acknowledged that women need sexual and reproductive health services to 
preserve their health and lives. From this perspective, good public policy is that which seeks to 
prevent mortality and morbidity from unsafe abortions especially in countries where these 
remain high (Berer, 2002:31). Several authors suggest that by investing in abortion safety and 
availability governments can feasibly lessen abortion related mortality (Okonofua et al, 1994; 
World Health Organization, 2004; Alan Guttmacher Institute, 1999 cited in Grimes et al, 
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2006:1916; Grimes, 2003:100; Fathalla, 2006; Fathalla, 2007). However, the provision of these 
services is contingent upon the availability of medical personnel who are willing to provide 
them. One of the obstacles to the provision of safe abortion services to women in some countries 
is the invocation on the part of medical personnel of their right to conscientiously object to the 
performing of medical procedures such as abortion. 
 
The post-apartheid South African government has an enviable international reputation with 
regards to enacting policies aimed at advancing women’s sexual and reproductive rights. To 
further promote these rights, the government has also ratified many international and regional 
treaties aimed at advancing women’s sexual and reproductive rights. However, the practical 
implementation of abortion and emergency contraceptive services has not yielded the expected 
results with respect to the unequivocal advancement of women’s reproductive rights, particularly 
the rights of the poor who rely on public sector health services, because both services fall into the 
category of controversial reproductive services which health professionals may legally 
conscientiously object to providing if doing so would conflict with their religious, ethical and 
personal beliefs.  
 
In the healthcare field, conscientious objection (CO) can be defined as an individual’s refusal in 
principle to perform a legally required or permitted practice (Boyd et al, 1997:54-55). Ethical 
guidelines which regulate the health professional/client relationship with regards to termination 
of pregnancy (TOP) and morning after pill (MAP) services in countries where these are legal 
include the doctor’s unconditional obligation to terminate a pregnancy in cases of emergency -- 
usually when continuation of pregnancy poses a serious danger to the life or health of the 
pregnant woman (Dickens and Cook, 2000:72). The right to CO is confined only to those who 
are directly involved in abortion procedures such as doctors and not nurses, hospital 
administrators and secretaries. In other words, staff indirectly involved in the provision of TOP-
related procedures such as delivering of pre-operative and post-operative care duties to patients 
should not invoke CO to deny patients access to care (McCafferty, 2010:8). These ethical 
guidelines are recognized by the South African Nursing Council (SANC) (Harries et al, 2009:2).  
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Moreover, the right to CO is a prerogative of individuals and not religious affiliated or any other 
health care institutions (Cook and Dickens, 2003:50). Medical personnel conscientiously 
objecting to performing abortions have an ethical and legal obligation to refer their patients to 
other non-objecting medical personnel (Cook and Dickens, 2009:108). The same also holds true 
for pharmacists’ duty to provide emergency contraceptive methods (Cantor and Baum, 2004 
cited in Card 2007:9).  And finally, medical students or trainees may only invoke the right to CO 
when they have been requested to participate in abortion procedures; they cannot conscientiously 
object to learning about abortion as an academic or scientific exercise (Dickens and Cook, 
2000:76).  
 
Despite the legality of abortion and emergency contraceptive methods under the South African 
legal framework, section 15 (1)1 of the South African Constitution protects health professionals’ 
right to CO to the provision of both services. Given this clash of women’s rights to access both 
legal services and health professionals’ rights to CO which is also protected under the South 
African Constitution, this study discusses the views of 117 doctors and pharmacists from across 
South Africa regarding the question of conscientious objection to the provision of controversial 
reproductive services, including abortion and emergency contraceptive methods particularly the 
morning after pill (MAP). Data were collected using an anonymous confidential internet-based 
self-administered questionnaire (SAQ). James Wolf has defined the latter as “a questionnaire that 
has been designed specifically to be completed by a respondent without intervention of the 
researchers (e.g. an interviewer) collecting the data” (2008:804). One of the advantages of using 
a SAQ, as Jennifer Egan points out is that it is “both economical and time-efficient by reducing 
travel costs and transcription time (as email transcripts are copied directly into data files)” 
(2008:244). 
 
A SAQ is ideal for reaching a large, geographically dispersed sample and is a particularly useful 
way of canvassing the views of those who might not wish to be questioned face-to-face (see 
Payne and Payne, 2004). Given that abortion and emergency contraceptive methods are sensitive 
topics, the use of a SAQ allowed health professionals to respond more openly than might have 
                                                 
1 Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion. 
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been the case if the study was conducted using face-to-face interviews. Moreover, given that 
doctors and pharmacists are busy professionals, a SAQ was deemed to be the most effective tool 
for collecting data as it gave them the flexibility to respond in their own spare time. Questions in 
both doctors’ and pharmacists’ SAQs were informed by the existing literature on the 
international debate on CO with respect to the provision of controversial reproductive services 
which for the purposes of this study included abortion and MAPs.  
 
The request to participate in the study was sent to health professionals randomly recruited online 
from various websites which provide comprehensive listings of South African doctors and 
pharmacists practicing in both private and public sectors. Doctors’ email addresses were 
retrieved from such search databases or websites as Map-A-Doc, Easy Infor.com and South 
African Medical Specialists. Pharmacists’ email addresses were retrieved from the Yellow Pages 
website which is the largest online database of South African businesses and services. While the 
study does not make any claim to the sample being representative of all pharmacists and doctors 
in South Africa there is considerable diversity in the sample such that it is able to provide insight 
into the possible ways of framing CO that circulate in South African medical practitioners’ 
abortion discourses. 
 
Ethical approval to conduct this research was granted by the Rhodes University Ethical 
Clearance Committee. The informed consent of the participants was obtained by way of a 
consent form which stressed the voluntariness of participation in the study and that answering 
and returning the SAQ served as adequate indication that the responding health professional had 
read and understood the aims and objectives of the research and had decided of their own free 
will to participate. The consent form stipulated that participants would not receive any form of 
incentive for participation in the research. Participants were assured that their responses would 
be anonymous in that all identifying information would be removed from their interview 
transcripts so that no particular response can be linked to a specific person.  Participants were 
instructed to feel free to leave answers blank if they felt uncomfortable with some of the 
questions. Data collection began on 22 August 2013 and ended on 30 July 2014 when, through a 
process of constant comparison of the emerging data, it became apparent that a sufficient level of 
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saturation had been achieved in the sense that no further themes were emergent from the 
responses being received. Theoretical saturation, as Margarete Sandelowski suggests “is the 
point in data collection when no new or relevant information emerges with respect to the newly 
constructed theory. Hence, a researcher looks at this as the point at which no more data needs to 
be collected (2008:875-876).  
 
Of the 2 292 SAQs emailed to practicing doctors, 58 were completed and returned. Of these 
responses, 15 doctors practice in the Western Cape Province; 15  in Gauteng; 10 in KwaZulu-
Natal; eight in the Eastern Cape; three in Mpumalanga; three in the Free State; two in the 
Northern Cape Province and two in Limpopo. Questionnaires were completed by 42 male 
doctors and 16 female doctors. Respondents’ ages ranged from 28 to 84 years and their duration 
of practice ranged from five to 52 years. Almost all doctors acquired their tertiary education at 
South African universities including the University of Cape Town; the University of KwaZulu-
Natal; the University of Pretoria; the University of Witwatersrand; the University of Limpopo 
(Medical University of Southern Africa (MEDUNSA); the University of the North West; the 
University of the Free State; Walter Sisulu University and Stellenbosch University. A minority in 
the sample acquired their tertiary education abroad, in Scotland, Canada, the United Kingdom, 
the United States, Zimbabwe and Nigeria.  
 
Of the 782 SAQs emailed to practicing pharmacists, 59 were completed and returned. Of these 
respondents 25 practice in the Western Cape Province; 18  in Gauteng Province; seven  in the 
Eastern Cape; six in KwaZulu-Natal ; two in North West Province and one in the Northern Cape. 
These included 43 males and 16 females. Their ages ranged from 21 to 66 years and their 
duration of practice ranged from one to 43 years. Almost all pharmacists acquired their education 
at South African universities including the University of Cape Town; the University of 
KwaZulu-Natal; the University of Pretoria; the University of the Witwatersrand; the University 
of Limpopo (Medical University of Southern Africa (MEDUNSA); the University of the North 
West; Walter Sisulu University; Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU); the 
University of the Western Cape; Stellenbosch University and Rhodes University. A minority had 
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studied abroad and some had acquired their pharmacy diplomas through the South African 
Pharmacy Council (SAPC) or through the Clicks Pharmacies Programme.  
 
Completed SAQs were returned by e-mail, processed, and analysed using qualitative content 
analysis. According to Cole, content analysis is a method used to analyse written, verbal or 
visual communication messages (1988). For Heidi Julien, “content analysis is the intellectual 
process of categorising qualitative textual data into clusters of similar entities, or conceptual 
categories, to identify consistent patterns and relationships between variables or themes” 
(2008:120-121). As Julien points out, content analysis can be used for “analysing a wide range of 
textual data, including interview transcripts, recorded observations, narratives, responses to 
open-ended questionnaire items, etc.” (2008:121). In health studies, content analysis has been 
widely employed in research on sensitive topics including abortion (Elo and Kyngas, 2008:114) 
 
In the present study, responses were coded using the ‘directed’ content analysis (DCA) approach. 
DCA aims to validate or extend a conceptual framework or theory and this is why it is used 
where there is already (incomplete) existing theory or prior research about a phenomenon which 
could benefit from further description (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005:1281). In this study, the content 
analysis was directed by a survey of international literature and comparative experience in 
countries where abortion and emergency contraceptive methods are legal. Having established the 
major themes and significant issues from that survey I sought to interpret my data in order to 
examine whether these same themes and/or different themes emerged in the South African 
context.  
 
In my analysis I employed the conceptual device of ‘framing’ as a way of understanding and 
grouping the themes that emerged in the data. Framing refers to the “way events and issues are 
organised and made sense of” (Reese, 2001:7). Gamson and Modigliani have defined a frame as 
a “central organising idea…for making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at issue” 
(1989:3). Framing analysis has been chiefly employed in describing how public opinion is 
shaped by media messages. But framing theory has not only been employed in the analysis of 
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media messages. Similar processes of selection and exclusion in order to achieve specified social 
agendas can be seen with regard to how some social movement organisations employ specific 
ways of framing an issue to suit their agendas (Rohlinger, 2002:479). This enables a social 
movement or organisation to control the terms of a debate and to win legitimacy for its cause 
(Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 1993; McCarthy and Mayer, 1994; Walgrave and Manssens, 2000; 
Meyer, 1995).  
 
For Kuypers, this is often achieved by “making some information more salient than other 
information” (2009:181). As Robert M. Entman points out, this process of selection of what is 
and is not most salient, acts to “promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, 
moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (1993:52). For Erving Goffman, frames 
play an important role in structuring which parts of reality become noticeable (1974). Reese 
highlights also the importance of ‘omissions’ in the production of frames which are ‘naturalised’ 
so that their exclusion seems logical and common-sensical (2001:11).  What is of particular 
importance from the point of view of the present thesis is the idea that frames “generally imply a 
policy direction or implicit answer as to what should be done about an issue” (Gamson and 
Modigliani, 1987:144). As Entman points out, frames play a fourfold role, defining problems, 
diagnosing causes, making moral judgments and suggesting remedies (1993 cited in de Vreese, 
2005:53; see also Kuypers, 2009:185). 
 
In the present study, doctors’ and pharmacists’ SAQ responses were analysed with specific 
attention to how they draw on various frames in invoking or not invoking CO to the provision of 
TOP and MAP services. As a starting point for data analysis I drew upon prior research by Myra 
Marx Ferree and her colleagues in their comparative study of abortion discourse in Germany and 
the United States (Ferree et al, 2002). In that study, these scholars grouped hundreds of different 
idea elements that came through in the way in which abortion was spoken about and referred to 
in the two countries by a variety of speakers, into eight frames (Ferree et al, 2002:106-107). 
These were: the foetal life frame (focuses on the sacredness of human life; sees the foetus as an 
unborn child and abortion as the taking of human life), the balancing frame (emphasis on the 
need to balance two rights that are in conflict with one another – that of the foetus and that of the 
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pregnant woman; neither is absolute and must be weighed as equally legitimate), the women’s 
rights frame (emphasis on the woman’s right to control her own body which affects other rights 
such as participation in the labour force and in political life), the individual versus state frame 
(emphasis on the importance of not allowing state intrusion into the private sphere – abortion is 
seen as a private not a state concern), the social morality frame (emphasis on the idea of moral 
decline and trend towards permissiveness in society – abortion seen as symptomatic of this 
overall moral drift), the effects on society frame (abortion seen as inevitably divisive and 
contested, no ideal solution is possible therefore it is necessary to compromise and find ways of 
defusing conflict), the pragmatic consequences frame (criminalising abortion does not reduce the 
number of abortions, but rather results in such negative social consequences as forcing women 
with unwanted pregnancies into obtaining abortions under conditions that greatly increase their 
health risks, both physical and psychological and this also increases social costs on the part of 
the public health system), and the social justice frame (emphasis on asking whether the costs and 
burdens of existing policies fall unequally on the poor and whether the ability to choose an 
abortion is unfairly dependent upon social location) (Ferree et al, 2002:106-107). 
 
Taking these frames as a starting point for data analysis I aimed to determine if my respondents 
drew upon these frames to frame their willingness or unwillingness to invoke CO to the 
provision of TOP and MAP services. Heidi Julien points out that “content analysis can be 
accomplished using very low-tech materials such as a pencil and paper, coloured sticky notes, or 
coloured felt pens” (2008:121). Following Julien’s suggestion, I did not use any advanced 
computer-assisted data analysis software to code my data.  Having printed all the doctors’ and 
pharmacists’ SAQ responses I first familiarised myself with the entire data set by reading the 
SAQs repeatedly to achieve a sense of the whole (see Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). In qualitative 
research this is referred to as the researcher’s immersion in the data (see Braun and Clarke, 
2006:84). I used eight different colour highlighters which were equivalent to the eight frames 
found by Ferree et al in their study. I then undertook line-by-line coding of all the SAQ 
responses to identify whether or not the responses reflected Ferree et al’s eight frames. My 
finding based on this initial line-by-line coding was that only four of Ferree et al’s frames were 
relevant to my data. These included the foetal life frame, the women’s rights frame, the 
balancing frame and the social justice frame.  
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Studies which apply a DCA approach have been criticised for the likelihood of encouraging 
researchers “to force fit observations into existing categories” (Benaquisto, 2008:89). To avoid 
running this risk I took a holistic approach by attempting to do justice to the entire data set and 
being open to accommodating responses which could not be coded in line with Ferree et al’s 
eight frames. For this reason, I undertook a second phase of data driven analysis: coding the 
responses using the method of conventional content analysis (CCA) (Kondracki and Wellman, 
2002) in order to allow for additional frames to emerge that differed from those identified by 
Ferree et al. Following this process four additional frames distinct from those found by Ferree et 
al emerged from the data. These included what I shall refer to as the ‘do no harm frame’, the 
‘legal and professional obligations frame’, the ‘consequences frame’ and the ‘moral absolutism 
frame’.  
 
My interpretation of the frames was aided by an understanding of how to analyse discourse 
drawing on the work chiefly of James Paul Gee. In his book, How to do Discourse Analysis: A 
Toolkit, Gee provides 27 tools for doing discourse analysis (2011). In the present study I drew on 
five of these including: the ‘why this way and not that way tool’ used to determine what the 
speaker is trying to achieve by using certain language “in the way in which he or she did and not 
in some other way” (2011:54), the ‘fill in tool’ used to determine what the speaker is assuming of 
listeners (2011:11-12), the ‘figured worlds tool’ which enjoins the discourse analyst to ask what 
figured worlds the speaker is assuming and inviting listeners to assume;  used to distinguish 
between what is regarded as ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’ (2011:168), the ‘deixis tool’ normally used 
in  research on racism and noticing for instance the use of such terms as ‘they’ and ‘us’ (2011:7) 
and the ‘subjects and predicates tool’ which enjoins the discourse analyst to “ask what socially 
recognisable identity or identities the speaker is trying to enact or to get others to recognise” 
(Gee, 2011:18). 
 
As defined by Gee, “discourse analysis is the study of language-in-use [or in other words] it is 
the study of language at use in the world, not just to say things, but to do things” (2011:ix). It 
follows from this that Gee enjoins the discourse analyst not to take for granted what people say, 
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rather he or she ought to go beyond the intention of what people say and resurface what they 
have not directly said in their communication. For this reason, in this study, I use Gee’s five tools 
to unearth hidden assumptions in what some of the participants have indirectly said or left unsaid 
in their SAQ responses which in turn plays an important role chiefly in determining their 
willingness or unwillingness to provide termination of pregnancy related services.  
 
In the chapters that follow I describe each of these frames in more detail and then, in separate 
chapters go on to show how the personal attitudes of health practitioners to their right (or non-
right) to invoking conscientious objection to the provision of TOP and related services is 
legitimized by how they choose to frame abortion, how they choose to frame their legal and 
professional identities and obligations, how they frame women’s rights (for example, as absolute 
or confined to certain circumstances), how they frame the nature of the foetus (for example 
whether or not foetuses are rights-bearing subjects and whether or not life begins at conception), 
how they frame who does and does not deserve these services (based for instance on moral 
attitudes towards promiscuity, teenage sexuality and the like) and so on. Having described each 
frame in more detail the individual chapters of the thesis draw on exemplars from the primary 
data to show how these frames are invoked in practice in the words of the respondents. While all 
South African women have the legal right to abortion on demand the right to the MAP without 
limitation based on frequency of request or the age of the requesting client, the thesis shows that 
these rights are severely restricted depending on how the nature of the right is constructed by 
those who are responsible for securing its provision in practice.  
 
Chapter two: approaches to the right to conscientious objection 
in medical practice 
 
CO and termination of pregnancy 
 
While supporters of the right to abortion on demand hold that women have the right to dispose of 
their bodies as they choose and that the unborn have neither rights no moral standing (van 
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Bogaert, 2002:139), the alternative view which supports the right of medical practitioners to 
conscientiously object to the provision of abortion and related services rests “its case on the 
inalienable right to life of the unborn; no right is granted to the woman” (van Bogaert, 
2002:139). The Roman Catholic Church upholds this view as its teachings associate abortion 
with murder because of the belief that the life of a human being begins at conception (Collins, 
2006:45; see also Deckers, 2010:1-2; Williams, 1958:181). In this respect, the Roman Catholic 
Church unconditionally opposes laws which legitimise abortion because under its teachings, it is 
a crime and thus, it enjoins its followers to invoke CO if requested to participate in abortion 
procedures (Whitcomb, 2010:772; see also Catholics for Choice, 2010:1). The origins of these 
teachings date back to 1869 when Pope Pius IX held that “abortion at any time during the 
pregnancy is punishable by excommunication” (Collins, 2006:45). To participate in abortion in 
any way, in this view, would be to collude with murder (Whitcomb, 2010:795). 
 
The right to CO has long been protected under several international human rights instruments, 
conventions and treaties as a component of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion (Catholics for Choice, 2010:2). Since it is acknowledged that some medical practitioners 
may subscribe to the view that life begins at conception and that participation in, or collusion in 
any way with, abortion is tantamount to murder, the right to CO is seen as a mechanism to 
protect medical personnel from being coerced into actions which violate their deeply held 
religious, moral and ethical beliefs (Collins, 2006:47). For instance, both the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights,2 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
protect an individual’s freedom of conscience3 (Ngwena, 2003:5). Similarly, on a regional level, 
the European Conventions on Human Rights4 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights5 also contain conscience clauses. 
 
                                                 
2 Article 18. 
3 Article 18. 
4 Article 9. 
5 Article 8. 
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There are scholars who defend medical professionals’ right to CO while not necessarily 
themselves taking the view that abortion is murder. They base their argument on the fact that 
medical professionals are individuals whose moral integrity deserves serious consideration 
(Wicclair, 2007:21; see also Wicclair, 2000; Brock, 2008 cited in Magelssen, 2012:18; Gerrard, 
2009 cited in Magelssen, 2012:19; Childress, 1979:327; Matheny Antommaria, 2011:82; Stein, 
2006). As such, they should not be forced to act against their conscience as doing so will be 
putting their moral integrity at stake. In sum, these proponents of conscience are strongly in 
agreement with the position that “the health care professional’s right to CO concerning abortion 
is never overridden by patient interests” (Stein, 2005 cited in Strong, 2007:32). Examples of this 
approach are the Mississippi Health Care Rights of Conscience Act 2004,6 and California’s 
Health and Safety Codes.7 Both these Acts allow health care professionals to subordinate the 
wishes of their patients to their own preferences (Dickens, 2008:1240-1241). 
 
Research in Africa and primarily in Sub-Saharan countries such as Zambia (Ngwena, 2004:714) 
and South Africa highlights the concern that where claims to CO are permitted as a reason to 
refrain from providing legal medical services, while empowering medical personnel this is at the 
expense of the interests of their patients and particularly of those who lack the economic means 
to secure private medical services (Harrison et al, 2000:429). In this context, while the right to 
freedom of conscience is protected under international law, some (see Whitcomb, 2010:773) 
argue that this right cannot be viewed as an absolute right. As such, to prevent the patient’s right 
to access to lawful abortion services from being jeopardised by the healthcare professional’s 
right to freedom of conscience, courts are now enjoined to impartially balance these competing 
rights (Dickens, 2006:515). 
 
The healthcare professional-centred approach is criticised by those who favour a professional 
ethics approach to CO. This approach is aimed at limiting health care professionals’ right to CO 
in order to ensure that women can have effective access to abortion services. Rather than making 
                                                 
6
 MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-1 (West Supp. 2005). 
7 Section 2595 allows health care workers to opt out of providing abortion services if they sign a written declaration 
stating they hold “a moral, ethical, or religious objection”. 
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the health care worker’s right to conscience pre-eminent, this approach emphasises limiting 
health care professionals’ right to CO to ensure the delivery of effective healthcare services in a 
way that is respectful of patient autonomy to choose legal services of their choice. This view 
advocates for medical professionals to place the welfare of their patients at the heart of their 
professional obligations (Wicclair, 2007:21; see also London and Baldwin-Ragaven, 2008; 
Brody and Miller, 1998; Dickens and Cook, 2006). 
 
Health care professionals’ obligation to prioritise patient care is thought, in this view, to be 
derived from the obligations that rightfully flow out of the nature of the professional-client 
relationship (Cannold, 1994:80; see also Emmanuel, 1991:14; Meyers and Woods, 1996). Some 
have argued, along these lines, that individuals not prepared to implement legal medical services 
on the grounds of CO should not be medical professionals (see Savulescu, 2006 cited in Curlin et 
al, 2007). Savulescu bases this strong view on the fact that claims of conscience are not always 
genuine and may be invoked to avoid disagreeable professional duties (2006:294; see also Cook 
and Dickens, 2009:108). Meyers and Woods advocate the need to distinguish genuine from not 
genuine claims of conscience (2007; see also Meyers and Wood, 1996).  They recommend “a 
system similar to that used for exemption from military service, one that incorporates a review 
board for evaluating claims of genuine conscientious objection” (Meyers and Woods, 1996:118-
119; see also Meyers and Woods, 2007:20). 
 
Those who express concerns about the invocation of CO by health care professionals on 
whichever grounds, argue that these practitioners illegitimately deny patients lawful medical 
services and as such violate their professional duty to respect the patient’s autonomy (Frader and 
Bosk, 2009:66). According to this view, “physicians who fail to act in their patient’s interests 
breach the fundamental duty of care of a physician” (Savulescu, 2007:22; see also Amado et al, 
2010:123, CEDAW, 1998; Cook et al, 2003). This is because given that women possess a 
positive right to abortion in countries where abortion is legal, as Savulescu further argues, 
“health professionals have an obligation to provide abortion services, irrespective of their 
personal views” (2006). Cook and Dickens add that medical personnel conscientiously objecting 
to performing abortion procedures violate women’s rights to reproductive health (2009:108). To 
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prevent this from happening, many authors have emphasised the need for human rights education 
regarding abortion which they believe would empower health care professionals to fulfil their 
legal responsibilities (Newman and Helzner, 1999:463; see also London and Baldwin-Ragaven, 
2008; Freedman, 1995:314).  
 
A somewhat moderated version of this approach attempts to take into account both the right to 
legal medical services on the part of patients and the right to act in accordance with deeply held 
ethical commitments on the part of medical personnel. While the right of medical personnel 
personally to conscientiously object to performing abortions is upheld, according to this position 
these medical personnel nevertheless have an ethical and legal obligation to timeously refer their 
patients to other willing or non-objecting medical personnel in order to ensure that their patients’ 
health is not jeopardised (Cook and Dickens, 2009:108; see also; Dickens and Cook, 2000:72;  
Card, 2007:13; McLeod, 2010:30; McCafferty, 2010:6-8; Berer, 2002:32; Wicclair, 2000:226; 
Charo, 2005:2471; Blustein, 1993). Mandatory referral is thus seen as central to the fulfilment of 
healthcare professionals’ obligations (Curlin et al, 2007:597) and as a reasonable and viable 
alternative to the outright denial of abortion services to women as a result of CO. 
 
This has become a popular approach to managing CO in medical contexts but some authors have 
criticised mandatory referral as ineffective from the perspective of women’s rights to 
reproductive health. Robert Card for instance advocates forcing health care professionals to 
provide abortion services irrespective of their personal or moral views (2007 cited in Strong, 
2007:32; see also Deckers, 2010:5; Charo, 2005; Savulescu, 2006; Cantor and Baum, 2004). 
Card blames referrals for causing delays to access to abortion care – and notes that such delays 
disproportionately negatively affect economically disadvantaged patients in particular and 
primarily those living in rural areas (2007:9-10). Savulescu points out that in many settings 
referrals compromise the quality, efficiency, or equitable delivery of a service to which women 
are legally entitled (2006:296).  
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The compromise position of referral is also rejected by those who support the absolute right to 
CO (see Edmund Pellegrino, 2008:297; John Peppin, 1997:40) and totally reject not only the 
actual performing of abortion procedures but also mandatory referral, and even the provision of 
information about TOP services. In this view, since abortion is thought to be murder, there are no 
moral imperatives to participate in any way in an act of murder, however indirect that 
participation may be.  
 
Conscientious objection and emergency contraception (EC) 
 
Until recently, much of the literature on CO has focused on medical personnel’s right to 
conscientiously object to performing or participating in any way in controversial procedures such 
as abortion and euthanasia. But pharmacists have not been exempt from the debate thanks to the 
increasing availability of EC. The construction of EC as an abortifacient emerges as a crucial 
definitional contention in the CO debate with conscientiously objecting pharmacists and judges 
joining forces with anti-abortion proponents to oppose the provision of EC on the grounds that it 
induces abortion.  
 
Post-coital emergency hormonal contraception (EC) also popularly known as “Plan B” or the 
“morning-after pill” (MAP) has clinically been defined as “the use of a drug or device as an 
emergency measure to prevent, or reduce the risk of an unwanted pregnancy” (Cheng et al, 
2004). Trussell et al, have defined ECs as “ordinary birth control pills containing the hormones 
oestrogen and progestin” (1998:52). EC works up to 72 (although most effectively up to 24) 
hours after unprotected sexual intercourse (Boonstra, 2002:10) by stopping ovulation or by 
decreasing the chances of implantation or fertilisation (Pope, 2010:67). Unlike oral or regular 
contraceptives, EC pills are often taken in one or two doses to prevent pregnancy as they 
normally contain large doses of oestrogen and levonorgestrel or a progestin congener (Wernow 
and Grant, 2008:1670). Although clinical trials of EC were first conducted in the 1960s, the 
medication first became available in 1970 in the form of the Yuzpe Regimen method which 
employed a combination “high-dose of oral contraceptive containing ethinyl estradiol, and 
levonorgestrel” (Mishra and Saxena, 2013:18). 
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Piaggio et al, have argued that EC is a safe means of preventing pregnancy following 
unprotected sexual intercourse or potential contraceptive failure (1999 cited in Weisberg and 
Fraser, 2009:160). EC has been evaluated and approved by international organisations like the 
WHO as safe and effective to dispense with written instructions only (WHO, 1996:31-36). This 
approval according to recent literature stems from the fact that ECs have minimal side effects 
which often resolve after 24 to 72 hours (these may include nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, 
fatigue, headache, dizziness and/or breast tenderness) (Glasier, 2013:309). This has led 
advocates of the medication to argue in favour of unrestricted access to EC dispensed over-the-
counter (OTC) on the grounds that minimal health risks are involved (Grimes, 2002:846). 
 
In pharmacy practice, pharmacists interact directly with the ﬁnal consumer of medicines 
(Wingfield et al, 2004:2384). For this reason, Sneeringer et al, refer to pharmacists as “first-line 
health-care providers” (2012:219-220). Literature in various settings (Nikajima and Steinbach, 
1997; Ramos et al, 2004; Garcia et al, 2003) confirms that pharmacists successfully facilitate the 
rapid dispensing of medications, medical information, client counselling and maintaining client 
confidentiality. Sneeringer et al, have applauded pharmacists for delivering “care related to 
stigmatised health conditions, including sexually transmitted infections (STIs), family planning, 
and EC” (2012:219-220). 
 
It is in this context that Heather Boonstra argues that making EC available OTC has enormous 
potential impact on advancing women’s reproductive rights by ensuring women’s easy access to 
ECs without having to obtain a doctor’s prescription (2002:10; see also Weisberg and Fraser, 
2009:160). However, in reality, this has not always proved to be the case. Even in those countries 
which have approved OTC dispensing of MAPs and where these are meant to be easily available 
and provided free of charge, many women still face numerous barriers to accessing ECs. 
 
For some pharmacists, as Wingfield et al, have noted, EC is a controversial drug regardless of its 
legality and for this reason “pharmacists may block the patient’s access to these [ECs] drugs” 
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(2004:2384). In many countries in which OTC dispensing of EC is legal, there is ample evidence 
of reluctance on the part of some pharmacists to fill prescriptions for ECs because of their 
personal belief that these are synonymous with abortifacients used to induce an early abortion 
(Cadwell, 2011). A proportion of these pharmacists take the view that the sanctity of human life 
begins immediately after conception, and for this reason they find the use of EC morally 
objectionable (Dresser, 2005:9). 
 
Pharmacists who conscientiously object to dispensing EC on these grounds, however, have been 
criticised by proponents of EC who hold that “it [EC] does not affect an existing pregnancy nor 
will it cause an abortion (Cockerill et al, 2004:71). Rather, EC prevents pregnancy by stopping 
or delaying ovulation or by preventing fertilisation (Collins, 2006:43; Feijo, 2005). 
Consequently, these authors view denial of lawful EC upon request as a strong violation of 
women’s reproductive rights (Weisberg and Fraser, 2009:160; see also Ramkissooni et al, 
2010:36). 
 
Proponents of CO argue for pharmacists’ exemption from professional duties which are contrary 
to their consciences. They base their argument on the fact that pharmacists are individuals whose 
moral or personal integrity must be respected (Wicclair, 2007:21; Wicclair, 2000; Deans, 2013; 
Brock, 2008 cited in Magelssen, 2012:18; Childress, 1979:327; Matheny Antommaria, 2011:82; 
Stein, 2006). Their argument is that to force pharmacists to act against their consciences is 
tantamount to compelling them to commit a moral wrong.  
 
Benn submits that forcing pharmacists to act contrary to their consciences has the potential to 
cause distress and anger (2007:345) whereas Beauchamp and Childress argue that to do so would 
be a serious violation of the pharmacist’s right to autonomy and self-determination (1983:390). 
Autonomy is a fundamental right in liberal democratic societies and refers to “recognising the 
importance of a person’s freedom to choose for himself the values in terms of which to structure 
and measure the worth of his own life” (Keller, 2009:258). For Mark Wicclair, forcing someone 
to act against their conscience results in significant loss of self-respect (2007:21). Martin 
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Benjamin contends that violating one’s conscience may not only result in loss of self-respect, but 
also in guilt and shame (2003:469). 
 
Between these two poles lies a more moderate view espoused for instance by Julie Cantor and 
Ken Baum (2004 cited in Card, 2007:9) who advocate for imposing on the objecting pharmacist 
an ethical and legal duty to timeously refer a woman requesting EC to another (non-objecting) 
pharmacist or a different pharmacy in order to ensure that the woman’s health and reproductive 
rights are not jeopardised (see also Lynch, 2008). Referral is seen by several commentators as an 
appropriate compromise which respects the autonomy of both the pharmacist and that of the 
patient. Kohm argues that a referral ensures that the pharmacist retains his or her autonomy by 
not being forced to directly participate in dispensing medication which he or she regards as 
objectionable but at the same time the patient’s access to reproductive justice is not undermined 
since she is given advice on how to access EC from another non-objecting provider (2007:802). 
In countries where EC is legally available it is a woman’s right to demand access to what the law 
provides. Referral is thus seen to play an important role in ensuring that the patient is not denied 
reproductive justice by being confronted with a conscientiously objecting pharmacist (Kelleher, 
2010:295; see also Deans, 2013:57).  
 
The contrary position is argued by Robert Card who argues that professional ethics imposes 
obligations upon pharmacists regardless of their personal beliefs, not only to refer clients to 
another pharmacist, but to actually dispense EC upon the provision of a valid legal prescription 
(2007 cited in Strong, 2007:32; see also Charo, 2005; Savulescu, 2006; Cantor and Baum, 2004; 
Deckers, 2010:5). Others criticise referral on pragmatic grounds. For them, given that EC is a 
time frame drug, that is to say, it is effective if taken within 72 hours of unprotected intercourse, 
referral might be impractical or might cause delays for economically disadvantaged patients 
living in rural areas or in small towns that effectively result in denial of the service to such 
women. As Teliska suggests, given the scarcity of pharmacists, “women who live in rural areas 
with only one available pharmacy should not be forced to go without contraception simply 
because the presiding pharmacist does not agree with the prescription” (2005:231; see also 
Dresser, 2005:9). 
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Others who oppose the right of pharmacists conscientiously to object to dispensing EC or 
referring patients to a willing provider base their views on the professional and ethical 
obligations imposed by pharmaceutical regulatory and professional bodies. As argued by Herbe, 
serving the best interests of patients must be the pharmacist’s primary commitment and concern 
in conducting his or her professional duties (2002:87). Likewise, as Brodsho avers “the needs of 
the patient must trump the pharmacist’s moral objection” (2005:331). For this reason, Lumpkin 
contends that “the pharmacist has a duty to the patient to provide all medications including EC” 
(2005:125). 
 
Wall and Brown similarly stress that pharmacists should be obligated to fill prescriptions for EC 
regardless of their personal values and opinions as failure to do so destructs effective delivery of 
medical care (2006:1148). Moreover, for Wall and Brown the primary consideration is to 
challenge the view that EC is an abortifacient in the sense that it “does not interfere with an 
implanted pregnancy and therefore does not cause abortion” (2006:1148-1150). On this view, 
even if one is morally opposed to abortion, dispensing EC does not conflict with an important 
moral standpoint. Wall and Brown thus conclude that surveillance systems should be employed 
to hold liable pharmacists who fail to fill legitimate prescriptions for all lawful medications, 
including EC (2006:1151). 
 
But referral is not only opposed by those who want to insist that pharmacists have a duty to 
dispense legally prescribed medications. Referral is also not an acceptable solution for those 
opposed to the provision of EC. They argue that referral would make the pharmacist morally 
complicit in the death of an innocent (Keller, 2009:259). Thus, pharmacists who object to 
personally dispensing EC on moral grounds often also object to referring their clients to other 
providers (Card, 2007:9; see also May and Aulisio, 2009 cited in Lewis and Sullivan, 2012:117). 
As Robert Card explicates, replacing a duty to dispense with a duty to refer “does not remove the 
pharmacist from the causal chain of events that leads to the use of EC, an act that is considered 
morally wrong by such objecting pharmacists” (2007:9). 
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Conclusion 
 
Pharmacists play a crucial role in any country’s reproductive rights regime particularly for 
poorer women who may not have ready access to other medical facilities.  But legal approval for 
OTC dispensing of MAPs has not resolved the tension between the right of the CO invoking 
pharmacist who sees dispensing MAPs as tantamount to colluding with abortion and the right of 
the woman seeking a medical remedy that science has described as preventing pregnancy rather 
than causing abortion. The medical definition notwithstanding, many pharmacists continue to see 
ECs as abortifacients and therefore as morally repugnant. So much so, that a proportion of these 
see even referring an EC-seeking patient to another willing provider as morally unacceptable.  
 
In the eyes of their detractors, medical practitioners who refuse to perform lawful medical 
procedures or to prescribe legal medication are violating not only professional but legal 
guidelines and are preventing women from accessing their lawful rights. Moreover, their CO 
does not affect all women equally but rather, differentially affects poorer women. While insisting 
on a duty to refer is seen by some as a moderate middle ground compromise position, some 
argue that professional and legal obligation outweighs any consideration of personal conscience 
or belief and that this extends to a duty to refer. For those who refuse even this minimal duty 
collusion in any form with an act regarded as immoral can never be required.  
 
Having traced the contours of the international conversation regarding the tension between 
medical practitioners’ right to invoke CO to the provision of termination of pregnancy and 
related reproductive health services such as the MAP, I turn now to examine these debates as 
they have played themselves out in practice in selected countries where these services are legal, 
before going on to describe the South African context for the debate in more detail.  
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Chapter three: medical practitioners and conscientious 
objection in selected countries where TOP and MAPs are legal 
 
At the International Conference for Population and Development (ICPD) or Cairo Conference 
states made a commitment to ensure that “in circumstances where abortion is not against the law, 
such abortion should be safe” (Kulczycki, 1996:1663). However, in reality, recent literature 
suggests that this ICPD recommendation has remained a reality only on paper and not in 
practice. The legalisation of abortion is still failing to give women full access to abortion in 
many different contexts (Wheeler et al, 2012:154). This is partly because the evolution of sexual 
and reproductive rights and the reforming of abortion laws in many countries has coincided with 
many medical personnel conscientiously objecting to providing these services (Heinonline, 
2002-2003:88). Despite it having been identified as being one of the most important Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), the promotion of the provision of safe abortion has hardly enjoyed 
universal support. Internationally, even in countries where abortion and related services are legal, 
there are many challenges with the successful implementation of abortion legislation and 
policies.  Religious leaders, politicians, pro-life movements and organisations, the general public, 
the judiciary and some medical professionals have challenged the idea that abortion on demand 
is every woman’s right. In many different contexts, as this chapter shows, the right of medical 
practitioners’ to conscientiously object to taking part in the provision of legal termination of 
pregnancy and related services has clashed with women’s legally enshrined reproductive rights. 
The international context shows also that poorer women are always most severely affected by the 
invocation of the right to CO on the part of state-employed medical practitioners.  
 
In countries such as Italy, the United States and Ireland, the Catholic Church has been 
particularly vocal and influential in supporting the right of medical practitioners to oppose the 
provision of legal termination of pregnancy services. The Roman Catholic Church 
unconditionally opposes laws which legitimise abortion because under its teachings, abortion is a 
crime and thus, it enjoins its followers to invoke conscientious objection (CO) if requested to 
participate in termination of pregnancy (TOP)  procedures (Whitcomb, 2010:772).  
 22 | P a g e  
 
The Catholic hierarchy through the Holy See and the Bishops in many 
countries want to end abortion and access to contraception by claiming 
that the consciences of medical professionals are routinely violated and 
by seeking to expand the number of services covered by these 
exemptions (Catholics for Choice, 2010:1). 
 
To participate in TOP services in any way, in this view, would be to collude with murder 
(Whitcomb, 2010:795). Endorsing the Roman Catholic belief that human life starts at 
conception, in 1869 Pope Pius IX argued that abortion at any time from conception is punishable 
by excommunication (Collins, 2006:46). This doctrine has remained unchanged. Given that these 
teachings are compulsory to all Roman Catholics, the church leaders in many countries with 
liberal abortion laws have in recent years become very influential mobilisers of people to oppose 
abortion (Dickens and Cook, 2011:162). These Catholic Church leaders include cardinals, 
bishops, and priests who have been at the forefront of challenging women’s reproductive rights 
including the distribution of emergency contraceptive methods, abortifacients and the provision 
of surgical abortion services. In some settings, the main targets are health care professionals who 
are then faced with the dilemma of whether or not they should provide elective abortions which 
their countries’ abortion laws oblige them to do but their church’s teachings oblige them not to 
participate in (Whitcomb, 2010:772). 
 
The United States of America (USA) 
 
In 1973 the United States Supreme Court ruling in Roe v. Wade legalised abortion by 
emphasising the concepts of privacy, liberty and a woman’s autonomy over her body (Grelewicz, 
2011:178). This decision subsequently saw the 1975 joint federal-state health care programme 
which provides the nation’s low-income population with basic health and long-term care 
coverage known as ‘Medicaid’ being extended to cover abortion care without restrictions in 
order to ensure that abortion services could also be accessible to indigent women who could not 
afford to pay for the services (National Abortion Federation, 2006). This progressive programme 
was however short-lived. As Yanda et al, have argued, “in the United States, over the past three 
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decades, state legislation and further court cases have narrowed the range of access to abortion, 
especially for poor women and adolescent girls” (2003:281).  
 
This process started almost immediately following Roe v Wade when, on September 30, 1973 a 
powerful politician in the House of Representatives, Representative Henry Hyde sponsored the 
Hyde-Weldon Conscience Protection Amendment, also known as the Hyde-Weldon 
Amendment, a legislative provision barring the use of certain federal funds to pay for abortion 
with the exceptions of pregnancies resulting from incest and rape (National Abortion Federation, 
2006). The passage of this legislation meant that women seeking elective abortions had to pay 
out of their own pockets for safe, legal abortion procedures.  
 
In the same year former Senator Frank Church proposed the Church Amendment, which would 
permit health care providers to conscientiously object on the grounds of religious or moral 
beliefs to performing or assisting with abortions or sterilisations (Gold and Sonfield, 2000). The 
Church Amendment also protected health care providers from being discriminated against for 
making such objections and by the end of 1974, more than half of the states had endorsed the 
Church Amendment (Gold and Sonfield, 2000).  
 
The first challenges to the Hyde-Weldon Amendment came shortly after its implementation in 
the form of two cases: Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) and Maher v. Roe, 423 U.S. 464 (1977). 
Both cases concerned indigent women who challenged their respective state laws for denying 
them state-funding to cover abortions which they claimed to be eligible to under the 1975 
Medicaid health programme which provides the nation’s low-income population with basic 
health and long-term care coverage (National Abortion Federation, 2006). In both cases the 
restrictive provisions of the Hyde-Weldon Amendment were upheld as constitutional with the 
courts ruling  that states participating in the Medicaid programme do not have the obligation to 
pay for abortions for indigent women  where the grounds are non-therapeutic or non-medical  
(National Abortion Federation, 2006). 
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In 1996 another influential American politician, Representative Dave Weldon proposed the 
Weldon Amendment which aimed at barring physicians and hospitals from performing abortions 
or sterilisations as a condition of receipt of federal funds (Dickens, 2009a:725). Shortly after the 
passage of the Weldon Amendment, a Californian Court challenged the provisions of the 
Amendment as unconstitutional on the grounds that it interfered with effective enforcement of 
California’s law providing for criminal and civil penalties against healthcare workers in some 
circumstances if they do not perform or refer abortions (Dickens, 2009a:725). In the 2008 case of 
State of California v. United States, the California federal Court judge, however, rejected 
California’s challenge to the Weldon Amendment. In that case, the Court upheld the provisions 
of the Weldon Amendment and ordered the state of California to refrain “from fining and 
criminally prosecuting health care workers and entities refusing to perform abortions” (Dickens, 
2009a:725). 
 
While the right to CO is recognised as a prerogative only for individual medical professionals 
and not health care institutions including religious affiliated hospitals, in practice, devout 
Catholics who hold top positions in Catholic-run hospitals are able to prevent women’s access to 
safe and legal abortions at these institutions (see Cook and Dickens, 2011:164-165). In an 
attempt to overturn legislation restricting abortion prior to foetal viability, the United States 
introduced the first version of the Freedom of Choice Act (FOCA) in 2008 which aimed at 
providing American women with a positive, statutory right to an abortion (Whitcomb, 2010:801-
802). The FOCA was subsequently challenged by Roman Catholic hospital management staff 
(Whitcomb, 2010:801-802). Some Catholic leaders threatened the closure of all Catholic-run 
hospitals if FOCA were to be passed. Among these was Bishop Thomas Paprocki of Chicago 
who in 2008 explained to a gathering of over 300 Church-leaders: “If Catholic hospitals were 
required by federal law to perform abortions, we’d have to close [them]” (Brachear, 2008). 
Given that a significant number of United States hospitals are owned by Roman Catholic 
authorities this is a serious challenge to the legal right of women seeking abortion procedures. 
 
The CO debate in the United States was extended to pharmacy practice when, on August, 24, 
2006 the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) announced the availability of EC over-the-counter, 
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without prescription to women of 18 years old and over. Following this approval, in many states, 
pharmacists began to turn away women trying to fill their EC prescriptions (Brock, 2008:187). 
As a result, some states enacted mandatory fill-in laws which obliged pharmacists to honour all 
valid and lawful prescriptions while others passed laws with ‘conscience clauses’ to protect  
pharmacists refusing to dispense EC on the grounds of conscience (Stein, 2012). 
 
The FDA’s approval of OTC sales of EC was not only challenged by registered pharmacists, but 
also by anti-abortion and ‘pro-family’ movements including the United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops, the Family Research Council and Concerned Women for America (Boonstra, 
2002:12-13). These movements reject the established scientific definition of EC as acting to stop 
ovulation (Pope, 2010:67), and insist instead that EC is effectively an abortifacient (Boonstra, 
2002:12). Opposition also came from some leading drug retailers specifically Wal-Mart which 
refused to carry ECs as part of their regular stock on the grounds that doing so would be 
tantamount to facilitating abortion (Boonstra, 2002:11). 
 
The more extreme end of the spectrum of CO to the provision of EC was illustrated by a 2004 
Texas case of three pharmacists who were subsequently fired following their refusal to fill a rape 
victim’s prescription for EC arguing that it violated their moral beliefs (New Practitioners 
Forum, 2007:139). A study which investigated the accessibility of ECs at hospital emergency 
departments by surveying staff at Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals in Pennsylvania, South 
Dakota, and Colorado found that staff at 42% of non-Catholic hospitals and 55% of Catholic 
hospitals admitted to objecting to dispensing EC, even in cases of sexual assault (Harrison, 
2005:108).  
 
In some cases pharmacists not only refuse to dispense EC, but also refuse to refer their patients 
to willing providers as required by the provisions of the American Pharmacists Association 
(APhA). A highly publicised case in this regard was that of a Wisconsin pharmacist who not 
only refused to ﬁll a prescription for EC, but also refused to return the prescription to the patient 
so that she could have it ﬁlled by a non-objecting pharmacist elsewhere (New Practitioners 
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Forum, 2007:139). A 2006 Californian case involved a young mother who was refused EC after 
failure of regular birth control. Despite the fact that she had a valid prescription from a medical 
doctor  the pharmacist on duty not only refused to fill the prescription, but also “refused to enter 
the prescription  information into the system so that it could be transferred elsewhere” (Morrison 
and Borchelt, 2007:6). 
 
The APhA recommends that conscientiously objecting pharmacists should always refer EC-
seeking women to willing pharmacists (Crary, 2004). However, states like South Dakota and 
Arkansas explicitly offer legal protection to pharmacists who refuse to fill prescriptions for EC 
(Fisher, 2005) if they believe it is an abortifacient and neither of these states’ statutes provide a 
referral provision (Afif, 2005:257). Mississippi’s law also contains conscience clauses which 
permit individual pharmacists and pharmacies to refuse to provide both EC and oral 
contraceptive services on the grounds of conscience (Collins, 2006:49). 
 
Idaho’s new Freedom of Conscience Act took effect on July 1, 2010. Under this law, “[n]o 
health care professional shall be required to provide [certain] health care service[s] that violate 
his or her conscience.”8 It defines a provider’s ‘conscience’ as incorporating “religious, moral or 
ethical principles sincerely held by the person.”9 In 2011, this conscience clause was extended to 
Idaho pharmacists, giving them the right to refuse to provide any health care service or dispense 
any drugs which violate their conscience including EC and other abortifacients (Alarcon, 2011).  
 
US case law on pharmacists conscientiously refusing to dispense EC reveals that many 
judgements have been handed down in favour of objecting pharmacists even in states whose laws 
and professional regulatory bodies legally oblige pharmacists to provide EC services.  For 
instance, on June 7th, 2007 the Washington State Pharmacy Board endorsed a new rule that 
would permit conscientiously objecting pharmacists to refuse to fill any prescription based on 
their personal beliefs on condition that they refer the patient to other non-objecting pharmacists. 
                                                 
8 Idaho Code § 18-611(2). 
9 Idaho Code § 18-611(1). 
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In March 2012, pharmacists successfully challenged this rule in the Washington District Court. 
Judge Ronald B Leighton ruled that it is unconstitutional to compel pharmacists to stock and 
dispense EC because conscience formed by “a sincere religious belief that EC terminates a 
human life” should be respected (Phillips, 2012). The judge who handed down this judgement 
referred to EC as an abortifacient in order to give precedence to these pharmacists’ right to 
religious beliefs-based conscience over their obligation to refer their patients to other willing 
providers. 
 
Unlike laws in Mississippi, South Dakota, Georgia and Arkansas which protect individual 
pharmacists’ rights to refuse to fill prescriptions (Alan Guttmacher Institute, 2005 cited in 
Collins, 2006:12), the 2005 Illinois bill requires a pharmacist to fill EC prescriptions against his 
or her conscience.  Following the enactment of this bill, the then governor of Illinois, Rod 
Blagojevich issued an emergency rule requiring pharmacists to provide EC without delay 
(regardless of their religious beliefs) upon receipt of a valid prescription (Collins, 2006:58). 
Blagojevich based his mandate on the grounds that Illinois’s ‘right-of-conscience’ law applied 
only to physicians and not pharmacists (Collins, 2006:58). Blagojevich’s statement marked the 
beginning of the pharmacists’ CO debate in Illinois. Illinois pharmacist, Luke Vander Bleek told 
the lawmakers that “I will not invest, and I will not practice in an environment in which we are 
legally obligated to be involved in the destruction of human life” (Ertelt, 2005). 
 
Likewise, Wendy Wright, a policy director for Concerned Women of America condemned 
Blagojevich’s mandate as insensitive to pharmacists’ right to follow their consciences and be 
exempted from performing activities that they believe are harmful to human life (Ertelt, 2005). 
Three pharmacists subsequently took the issue to court, suing the state to overturn the ruling 
(Ertelt, 2005; see also Maloney, 2005). The case lasted more than seven years until, finally on 21 
September 2012 an Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favour of the pharmacists and held that “the 
state cannot force pharmacists and pharmacies to sell abortion-inducing drugs in violation of 
their religion” (Gasser, 2012). Like the above Washington case, the Judge in this case also 
referred to EC as an abortifacient in order to put it in the same category with other controversial 
medical procedures to justify the ruling. 
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Among other professional obligations, the APhA enjoins pharmacists to place “the well-being of 
the patient at the centre of their professional practice” by promoting and respecting the needs, 
good, autonomy and dignity of every patient.10 In the light of this, Afif argues that legal 
protection for pharmacists who refuse to dispense EC is effectively “protecting one class of 
individuals at the expense of another” (2005:257). However, there are other instances where the 
US courts have played an important role in advancing women’s rights to access EC regardless of 
their age. In New Hampshire, Washington, California, Alaska, Hawaii, New Mexico, and Maine, 
pharmacists can distribute EC without a prescription from a physician (Miller, 2006:247). A 
current New York bill seeks to ensure the availability of EC to all women of child bearing age. 
The bill became law on 5 April 2013 following the US District Court Judge Edward Korman’s 
order (through the case of Tummino  v. Hamburg11) to the FDA to make EC available to women 
and girls of all ages without a prescription (it was previously available OTC only to women aged 
17 years and above) (Family Planning and Contraception Research, 2013). Once again the 
question of whether EC can be defined as an abortifacient emerged as a significant feature of the 
judgement. However, in this case drawing on careful examination of scientific evidence and in 
agreement with the conclusions of the experts at the U.S. FDA the judge was of the view that EC 
interrupts rather than aborts a pregnancy. Based on this the judge subsequently ordered the FDA 
to make levonorgestrel-based EC “available without a prescription and without point-of-sale or 
age restrictions within thirty days” (Ibis Reproductive Health, 2013).  
 
The United Kingdom (UK) 
 
The UK’s Abortion Act, 1967, includes England, Scotland and Wales, but not Northern Ireland. 
In 2008 the Northern Ireland Attorney General, John Larkin QC compared TOP for reasons of 
severe deformity as synonymous to “putting a bullet in the back of the head of the child two days 
                                                 
10http://www.aphanet.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Pharmacy_Practice&CONTENTID=2903&TEMPLATE=/C
M/HTMLDisplay.cfm. 
11 Tummino v. Hamburg, 2013 WL 1348656. 
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after it’s born” (BBC News Northern Ireland, 2012). Research shows that the UK as a whole is 
experiencing a massive shortage of younger generation obstetrician-gynaecologists willing to 
acquire the necessary skills to provide adequate abortion services in the future. Several studies 
have documented the substantially declining numbers of younger generation students wanting to 
study in the fields of obstetrics and gynaecology and this has negatively affected health care 
services’ ability to cope with rising demand for abortion services. For instance, a recent survey 
of students revealed that nearly half of the surveyed participants “believed in the right of doctors 
to conscientiously object to any procedure” on moral, cultural and religious grounds (Strickland, 
2012:23; see also Roe et al, 1999:97). Likewise, Laurance also reported the declining numbers of 
students opting for a career in obstetrics and gynaecology (2007). Additionally, the 2007 
statistics issued by the Department of Health revealed that although there are an increasing 
number of abortions taking place in the UK, fewer and fewer doctors are willing to perform them 
(Department of Health, Abortion Statistics, England and Wales, 2007). 
 
Pro-life organisations and movements in the UK such as the London-based Pro-Life Alliance 
have been highly influential in mobilising health care professionals and encouraging them to 
conscientiously object to providing TOP services (Zenith, 2007). In 2007 its spokeswoman Julia 
Millington celebrated declining abortion rates in public clinics when she noted: “We have been 
hearing for some time now that young doctors, in particular, do not want to work in this field. 
Those choosing to go into medicine presumably do so because they want to cure sickness and 
disease, not end the lives of innocent human beings” (Zenith, 2007).  
 
The so-called ‘Scottish Midwives case’ threw into sharp relief the clash between the medical 
practitioner’s right to CO (protected in the UK under the 1967 Abortion Act) and women’s right 
to termination of pregnancy (protected under the same Act’s provisions) in the UK.  The case12 
concerned two Roman Catholic midwifery sisters Ms Mary Doogan, from Garrowhill in 
Glasgow, and Mrs Concepta Wood, from Clarkston in East Renfrewshire, who were employed as 
labour or maternal ward coordinators at the Southern General Hospital in Glasgow (BBC News, 
2013). Upon entering into their profession, both midwives registered their conscientious 
                                                 
12 Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde Health Board [2013] CSIH 36. 
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objection to participation in pregnancy terminations under the United Kingdom’s Abortion Act 
of 1967. For this reason, they became concerned when all medical terminations were moved to 
the labour ward where they were in charge of delegating supervision and administrative duties to 
staff involved in TOP services  (The Courier, 2013). 
 
In the view of their employer, the Clyde Health Board, the midwives’ termination of pregnancy-
related duties were indirect and, thus not recognised under the Abortion Act of 1967 which the 
Clyde Health Board argued applied only to staff directly involved in the actual performing of 
abortions (McMillan, 2013). Both midwives argued in contrast that they were being forced to 
participate in abortions and that this violated their right to conscientiously object to participate in 
abortion on religious grounds, protected under both section 4(1),13 of the Abortion Act, 1967 and 
Article 9,14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (McMillan, 2013). Based on this, they 
maintained that whether their participation was direct or indirect they should be entitled to CO 
including delegating, supervising and supporting staff involved in TOP services (The Courier, 
2013). As a result, with financial help from the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children 
(SPUC), the midwives took their employer, NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board, to 
the Lower Court (McMillan, 2013). In delivering her ruling, Judge Lady Smith applied an 
ordinary or narrow interpretation of the term ‘participation in treatment’ and overruled the 
midwives’ objections as not covered by the CO clause in the 1967 Abortion Act (BBC News, 
2013). She argued that, ‘the nature of their duties’ did not “require them to …terminate 
pregnancies directly….nothing they have to do as part of their duties terminates a woman’s 
pregnancy…they are sufficiently removed from direct involvement as, it seems to me, to afford 
appropriate respect for and accommodation of their beliefs” (BBC News, 2013). She went on to 
rely on the UK landmark case of Regina v. Salford Area Health Authority (Respondent) ex parte 
Janaway.15 This case involved a doctor’s secretary who objected to signing an abortion referral 
letter on the grounds of conscience (Hill, 2010:2). The House of Lords overruled the secretary’s 
                                                 
13 Section 4 excuses a person from ‘participating in any treatment’ under the Act if they express a conscientious 
objection to abortion. 
14 Section 9 protects protection of “freedom of thought, conscience and religion” and right “to manifest” their 
“religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance”. 
15
 Regina v. Salford Area Health Authority (Respondent) ex parte Janaway [1988] 2 W. L. R. 442; HA [1988] 3 All 
ER 1079 249. 
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objection and held that typing a referral letter was not protected by the CO clause of Abortion 
Act 1967(McCafferty, 2010:11).  
 
In 2013, the midwives appealed against this decision. Unlike the Lower Court, the Court of 
Appeal’s three judges Lady Dorrian, with Lords Mackay and McEwan, applied a broader 
interpretation of the term ‘participation in treatment’. The court ruled that the 1967 Abortion 
Act’s ‘conscience clause’ protects health care personnel against any form of compulsory 
involvement in TOP, including any delegation, supervision or support with the exception of 
participating in TOP in emergency cases when the continuation of pregnancy may endanger the 
life of the mother (Catholic World News, 2013). The Court disagreed with the Lower Court’s 
interpretation of the term ‘participation’ in Regina v. Salford Area Health Authority 
(Respondent) ex parte Janaway and ruled that the midwives had the right to refuse any form of 
involvement in abortions: “In our view the right of conscientious objection extends not only to 
the actual medical or surgical termination but to the whole process of treatment given for that 
purpose” (BBC News, 2013). 
 
The most senior Catholic in Glasgow, Archbishop Philip Tartaglia, who is also president of the 
Bishops’ Conference of Scotland celebrated the outcome of the Court’s decision as “a victory for 
freedom of conscience and for common sense” (Carrell, 2013). He exhorted Catholic health care 
professionals to follow suit in the event of being forced to participate in TOP services: “I hope 
that many pro-life health professionals will take heart from this judgment and have the courage 
to express their own objections if and when they are asked to carry out tasks which are morally 
wrong and violate their conscience” (Carrell, 2013). For other commentators however, rather 
than balancing two competing rights, this judgment made freedom of religion an absolute right 
which does not need to be weighed against competing rights and as a result in practice leads to 
compromising women’s access to medically indicated and lawful care in ways that may 
jeopardise their health and wellbeing (see for example, Dickens and Cook, 2000:72).  
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The Appeal Court reached its conclusion without seeking the guidance of the United Kingdom’s 
regulatory bodies such as the British Medical Association (BMA), the Royal College of 
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG), or the National Health Service (NHS), all of which 
adhere to ethical guidelines which oblige medical personnel holding CO to abortion to timeously 
refer their patients to willing providers (McCafferty, 2010:8). Henderson notes that the Appeal 
Court’s broad interpretation of Section 4 of the Abortion Act is likely to result in these regulatory 
bodies having to change their ethical guidelines to incorporate also the right to refuse to refer 
patients to willing providers (2013).  
 
When it comes to pharmacy practice, in the UK, the code of ethics of the Royal Pharmaceutical 
Society of Great Britain (CE-RPSGB) (the regulatory and professional body for pharmacists) 
contains a conscience clause which allows pharmacists to conscientiously object to dispense 
certain medications including EC.16 Despite this obligation, however, the General 
Pharmaceutical Council (GPhC) imposes an obligation on pharmacists conscientiously objecting 
either on religious or moral grounds to always refer their patients to other willing providers.17 
 
In January 2001, the Prescription Only Medicines (Human Use) Amendment (No. 3) Order 2000 
(S.I. 2000, No. 3231) approved the OTC dispensing of EC (that is, without a prescription) to 
women aged 16 and over (Harrison-Woolrych et al, 2001). In order to increase the accessibility 
of EC, British law provides for the availability of EC free of charge from general practitioners, 
family planning clinics and hospitals (Marston et al, 2005:1). As noted by Anna Glasier, the 
deregulation of EC was aimed mainly at reducing the high rates of unwanted pregnancies in 
Britain (1993), particularly among teenagers (Lo et al, 1994; Wareham and Drummond, 1994) -- 
said to be among the highest in Europe18 (see also Schenk, 2003:35).  
 
                                                 
16 Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain. Medicines, ethics and practice-a guide for  
pharmacists. London: RPSGB, 1998. 
17 General  Pharmaceutical  Council  (GPhC)  Standard  of  Conduct, Ethics  and  Performance  2010.  
http://www.pharmacy regulation.org/pdfs/other/gphcstandardsofconductethicsandperflo.pdf 
Accessed 7 November 2013. 
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A study of pharmacists and general practitioners conducted a year prior to the deregulation of EC 
in the UK found that providers were prone to negatively depict women using EC as sexually 
irresponsible, whereas others felt that the removal of restrictions on the availability of EC would 
increase its potential abuse and promote promiscuity, primarily among teenagers (Barrett and 
Harper, 2000:205). Prior to its deregulation many pharmacists expressed their concerns and tried 
to block deregulation. This opposition was evident for instance in  letters written by pharmacists 
to the editor of the Pharmaceutical Journal indicating that they would not dispense EC if 
deregulation were to take place (Baker, 1995; Holmes, 1995; Jagger, 1995; McCrystal, 1996). 
Some pharmacists formed the organisation ‘Christians in Pharmacy’ to promote and defend their 
opposition to deregulation (Payne, 1995). 
 
The deregulation of EC in Britain saw the debate shifting attention to the morality of both the use 
and supply of EC and to the question of whether pharmacists should have the right to refuse to 
dispense EC on moral or religious grounds (Deans, 2013:49). At the centre of this debate was 
once again the controversy concerning whether or not EC prevents an unwanted pregnancy or 
acts as an abortifacient (Deans, 2013:49).  In this regard, in May 2001 (four months following 
the deregulation of EC), the Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child (SPUC) challenged 
the supply of EC Levonelle on the grounds that it was an abortifacient and therefore illegal under 
the 1861 Offences Against the Person Act, which prohibits the supply of any ‘poison or other 
noxious thing’ with intent to cause miscarriage (Mayor, 2002:995). The case was eventually 
dismissed by the High Court on the 18th of April 2002. 
 
In resolving this matter Mr Justice James Munby relied on several medical experts in the field 
and also focused on current scientific meanings of the terms ‘pregnancy,’ ‘miscarriage,’ and 
‘abortion’ in medical dictionaries. On this basis, he came to the conclusion that given that EC 
acts before implantation, this method does not constitute abortion under the terms of present 
legislation (Mayor, 2002:995). Judges in the British context have tended to emphasise the 
importance of the medical professional’s right to CO not jeopardising women’s reproductive 
health rights and well-being.  As Dickens notes, in Britain, a fair balance has been achieved 
between “the rights of healthcare professionals to respect their conscience so that they are not 
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customarily compelled to act against their religious convictions and the rights of patients to 
receive the medically indicated care” (2006:515). 
 
That is not to say however that all pharmacists support the definition of EC upheld in the courts. 
Some continue to object to dispensing EC on the grounds that it is an abortifacient (Barrett and 
Harper, 2000:201; see also Cadwell, 2011). In one prominent case, a nurse lost her job at a 
general practice because she refused to administer the MAP which was one of the requirements 
of the post (Burnell, 2001). There have also been cases of pharmacists refusing to refer patients 
to willing providers. An example is that of Ruth Johnson aged 33 who in October 2008 was 
refused the MAP by a supermarket’s duty pharmacist who argued that it was against his religious 
beliefs (Stokes, 2008). Pharmacy owners have, moreover, also strongly opposed the September 
2011 General Pharmaceutical Council (GPhC) stance that disciplinary action would be taken 
against pharmacists or pharmacies refusing to stock EC or to refer their patients to willing 
providers. These pharmacists argued that by obliging them to refer patients and always ensuring 
that they have ECs in stock the GPhC mandate effectively made them morally complicit in an  
action they believe to be morally wrong (Cadwell, 2011). 
 
Ireland 
 
In July 2013, the Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister), Enda Kenny spearheaded the passage of new 
abortion legislation, the Protection of Life During Pregnancy (PLDP) Bill, which partially 
liberalised abortion in Ireland by allowing doctors to perform abortions “only when a woman’s 
life is under threat if her pregnancy continues or if she is suicidal” (McDonald, 2013).  Despite 
the fact that the PLDP Bill is still restrictive in the sense that it did not legalise abortion even in 
cases of rape (McDonald, 2013),  the Irish Roman Catholic Church leaders condemned its 
passage as an attempt to “licence the direct and intentional killing of the innocent baby in the 
womb” (Steffan, 2012; see also McDonald, 2013). Some even threatened Enda Kenny with 
excommunication (Steffan, 2012; McDonald, 2013). Irish Catholic Church officials have 
expressed concerns over the passage of the PLDP Bill on the grounds that it imposes a duty on 
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faith-based hospitals to provide TOP services in violation of Catholic hospitals’ entitlement to 
act in accordance with the dictates of conscience (Hunter, 2013). For example, Fr Doran, who 
sits on the board of governors and the board of directors of the Mater hospital in Dublin, told the 
The Irish Times that the “Mater cannot comply with the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 
and cannot carry out abortion…. I would be very concerned that the Minister [for Health, James 
Reilly] sees fit to make it impossible for hospitals to have their own ethos” (Holland, 2013).  
 
Australia  
 
In the Australian state of Victoria, abortion was decriminalised by the Abortion Law Reform Act 
2008 (Vic) which came into force on 23 October 2008, permitting abortion upon request on the 
grounds of one doctor’s consent to the procedure, regardless of the interests of the foetus, up to 
24 weeks of gestation. The Act contains a clause which obliges a conscientiously objecting 
medical practitioner to refer a woman seeking an abortion to another non-objecting provider19. 
The Bill also imposes an obligation on all medical practitioners to assist in emergency 
treatment20. The Bill was widely criticised by Australian Catholic Church leaders for not 
accommodating doctors’ rights to CO. For instance, the Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne, 
Denis Hart stated that: “Catholic hospitals will not perform abortions and will not provide 
referrals for the purpose of abortion as this will be contrary to Catholic ethical codes” (Brennan, 
2008).  
 
Italy 
 
In Italy, the rise of illegal abortions and pressure from feminists and women’s groups positively 
resulted in the passage of Law 194, in 1978, which conditionally legalised abortion in that 
country (Connelly, 2013). Various Catholic groups protested for the overturning of this law, but 
were defeated by nearly 68% in a 1981 referendum (Connelly, 2013). In August 2009 following 
                                                 
19 8(1) (b) of the Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic). 
20 8(4) of the Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic). 
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the government’s legalisation of the abortion drug RU-486, also known as Mifepristone, 
heightened opposition again resurfaced with the President of the Italian Bishops’ Conference, 
Cardinal Angelo Bagnasco exhorting doctors to invoke their right to CO (Catholic News Agency, 
2009a). In that same year (2009), the President of the Pontifical Academy for Life, Archbishop 
Rino Fisichella also expressed concern over the government’s legalisation of the distribution of 
RU-486 arguing that the Church will never accept such an initiative on the grounds that abortion 
whether by surgical or medical methods is contrary to the Roman Catholic moral ethos of 
defending human life from conception to natural death (Catholic News Agency, 2009b). As a 
result many doctors in the public health sector have invoked their right to CO. Recent research 
indicates that women seeking abortion services in public health care facilities now face long 
waiting periods to obtain an abortion, leading to some arguing that “there is too much 
interference in public hospitals from the Vatican” (Connelly, 2013).  
 
Under these unfavourable circumstances, affluent women who can afford to travel abroad to 
countries such as Switzerland, Spain, France, the UK and the Netherlands for safe terminations 
do so while poorer women are not able to exercise this option (Connelly, 2013). The denial of 
abortion services in the public sector sees poorer women seeking illegal abortions through 
underground networks which, for instance, “smuggle Misoprostol from Latin America to Italy 
through the port of Genoa and then sell the drug at half the price it costs on the internet” 
(Connelly, 2013). A May 2013 report in La Repubblica (one of the largest circulation Italian 
daily general-interest newspapers) argued that conscientiously objecting doctors were forcing 
many poor “women into a shadowy world of illegal abortions,… the true figure of clandestine 
terminations was up to 50,000 annually, far above the official figure of 15,000” (Connelly, 
2013). Mirella Parachini, a practising gynaecologist and former president of FIAPAC, the 
International Federation of Professional Abortion and Contraception Associates confirmed this 
when she argued that  “women suffering from the after effects of illegal abortions – through 
Misoprostol use – are regularly presenting themselves for help at our hospital” (Connelly, 2013). 
 
The CO debate in Italy was extended to pharmacy practice when the distribution of EC was 
authorised in September 2000 with a decree from the then Minister of Health Umberto 
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Veronesi,21 which made EC a prescription drug that could be accessed only in pharmacies (Ceva 
and Moratti, 2013:139). Italian law does not recognise pharmacists’ right to CO. Rather, it 
requires all registered pharmacists to fill all valid prescriptions irrespective of their religious or 
personal beliefs (Jones, 2007). Nevertheless, research in Italy (Ceva and Moratti, 2013:140; 
Cooper et al, 2008; Wynn et al, 2007) indicates that some pharmacists continue to refuse to 
dispense EC. The Roman Catholic Church is very influential in Italy and its leaders have taken a 
frontline role in persuading pharmacists to object to dispensing EC on the grounds that it is an 
abortifacient. In November 2007 Pope Benedict XVI called upon pharmacists to conscientiously 
object to dispensing EC on moral and religious grounds (Daily Mail UK, 2007). The Pope went 
on to describe conscientious objection as a “right that must be recognised for your profession so 
you can avoid collaborating, directly or indirectly, in the supply of products which clearly have 
immoral aims” (Jones, 2007). 
 
However, the Pope’s statement was challenged by pharmacists who argued in favour of 
dispensing EC based on their professional duties and the legality of the distribution of EC under 
Italian law. In response to the Pope’s statement, Franco Caprino, head of pharmacists’ 
professional group Federfarma told Reuters Report that given that Italian law does not contain a 
conscience clause protecting pharmacists from refusing to fill prescriptions, “We can’t be 
conscientious objectors unless the law is changed” (Jones, 2007). In interviews conducted by the 
Italian Media with devout Catholic pharmacists, the majority of them prioritised their 
professional responsibilities over religious and personal beliefs with regard to prescribing EC. 
For the most part those who conscientiously objected to dispensing EC said they preferred to 
refer their patients to other willing providers (MailOnline, 2007). The Pope’s statement also 
prompted angry reaction from politicians (Daily Mail UK, 2007). In the daily Corriere della Sera 
newspaper, the Italian Health Minister Livia Turco exhorted pharmacists to ignore the Pope’s 
statement, arguing that the Pope had no right to tell pharmacists how they should conduct their 
professional duties:  “I don’t think his warning to pharmacists to be conscientious objectors to 
the morning after pill should be taken into consideration”  (Jones, 2007). 
                                                 
21 Ministerial Decree, 26 September 2000, no. 510. 
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Chile 
 
In Chile CO among pharmacists first became an issue in April 2004 when EC was included in 
the treatment protocol for rape victims and made available free of charge at all public health care  
facilities (Casas, 2009:82). The debate further intensified in March 2006 when Ms Michell 
Bachelet took office as the country’s first female President. Given that Bachelet’s main objective 
was to promote adolescent reproductive rights and equality between men and women in Chile, 
she was quick to further liberalise the country’s existing contraceptive policy and made EC 
available free of charge, on request at all state-run hospitals to women including girls aged 14 
and older, without parental notification (Rohter, 2006). In September 2006, the Health Ministry 
issued new fertility treatment regulations, which recognised CO to the provision of EC on 
condition that the objecting pharmacist refers the patient to another willing provider (Casas, 
2009:82). 
 
President Bachelet’s rationale for providing  unrestricted access to EC had its roots in research 
which showed that high rates of unwanted pregnancies among teenagers was a public health 
problem which needed urgent attention. For instance, government statistics found that Chilean 
adolescents have 40,000 unwanted pregnancies a year (Lynch, 2007). In addition to that, a 2003 
survey revealed that around 15 percent of all births in Chile were to teenage mothers 18 or 
younger, most without the means to afford quality care (Rohter, 2006). The survey further found 
that the proportion ranged from 22% in the poorest neighbourhoods of Santiago to just 1% in the 
richest. The reasons for this huge discrepancy ranged from underprivileged teenagers’ limited 
use of oral or EC, absence of sex education in schools, non-existence of AIDS 
awareness information and absence of condom-vending machines (The Economist, 2006).  
 
Chile’s policy on the provision of EC free of charge to all women of child-bearing age was 
vehemently challenged by the pharmaceutical company, Salcobrand as the owners raised 
concerns over the government’s initiative as a violation of their freedom of opinion about the 
drug which they regarded as having an abortive effect. One of the company owners was quoted 
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in the Associated Press as saying “We express conscientious objection to being forced to sell a 
product that can have that [abortive] effect” (Jones, 2007).  
 
Roman Catholic Church leaders in Chile were quick to condemn the OTC provision of EC on the 
grounds that it violated the right to life due to its abortive effect and they also expressed their 
concerns over EC’s potential to promote promiscuity among young girls (Rohter, 2006). One 
Chilean Catholic bishop vehemently attacked Bachelet’s family planning programme by 
depicting it as “policies imposed by totalitarian regimes to establish state control over the 
intimate lives of citizens” (Gallardo, 2006). 
 
Rape victims’ access to EC in health care facilities under their jurisdiction has been obstructed 
by some conservative Chilean mayors (Casas, 2009:82). In 2006 conservative mayors joined 
forces with conservative opposition politicians (Lynch, 2007) and the Catholic Archbishop of 
Santiago to challenge in court the Health Ministry’s directives for providing EC to adolescents 
aged 14 without parental consent (Casas, 2009:82). Conservative mayors have also challenged 
the distribution of EC at public clinics within their municipalities as a violation of their religious 
beliefs (Rohter, 2006). In 2008, conservative mayors and legislators requested the Constitutional 
Court to rule EC, copper and levonorgestrel based IUDs as well as adolescent contraceptive 
services unconstitutional. In April 2008, the Constitutional Court of Chile endorsed the 
conservative mayors’ request by banning the free distribution of emergency contraception 
through the public system as unconstitutional (Castellanos, 2009; see also Casas, 2009:82-83). 
 
Conclusion 
 
While the right to freedom of conscience is a universally accepted human right, globally, the 
invocation of conscience in relation to the provision of women’s reproductive health services has 
effectively meant that many women’s ability to access these services is dependent upon social 
position, such as race and class. Access to safe abortion is, in many contexts, a privilege for rich 
women who can afford to pay out-of-pocket for abortion procedures when these are difficult to 
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procure in the state sector, in part because health professionals invoke their right to CO which 
renders the existence of reproductive rights in law difficult to exercise in practice. Research has 
confirmed that “women most affected by lack of access to safe abortion care are those who are 
most vulnerable to unwanted pregnancy, in particular teenagers and poor women” (Ipas and 
IHCAR, 2002:8). CO on the part of health professionals is one of the many barriers that indigent 
women face when it comes to accessing lawful termination of pregnancy services. Health and 
even life-threatening unsafe, illegal ‘back street’ abortion (Dickens and Cook, 2000:72) 
differentially affects indigent women who are determined to terminate their pregnancies in these 
circumstances. Thus low-income women suffer an unequal burden of unsafe abortion because 
their governments’ legislative and policy mechanisms do not accord them the rights of full 
citizenship (Casas, 2009:79; see also Special Rapporteur Paul Hunt, 2004).  
 
In the context of the USA for instance, Susan Yanow has argued that, “the Roe v Wade decision 
made safe abortion available but did not change the reality that more than a million women face 
an unwanted pregnancy every year [and] forty years after Roe v Wade, the procedure is not 
accessible to many US women” (2013:14). Among other reasons, this is because the passage of 
the 1973 Hyde Amendment with its restrictions to funding non-medically necessary abortions 
“fell disproportionately on low-income women who have limited resources with which to 
overcome this obstacle” (National Abortion Federation, 2006). The Hyde Amendment 
restrictions differentially affect low-income women who cannot afford to pay for abortion 
services in the private sector and therefore may either resort to unsafe, illegal abortions from 
untrained practitioners or self-induce an abortion (National Abortion Federation, 2006). The 
finding of a 2012 survey of 639 women at six geographically diverse healthcare facilities in the 
United States found  that a significant number of low-income women “delayed or did not pay 
bills such as rent (14%), food (16%), or utilities and other bills (30%) to pay for abortion” (Jones 
et al, 2013:173). As noted by Yanda et al, in settings “where abortion is legal, safe and 
accessible, [it] has been impeded by political obstacles” (2003:277). In these settings, some have 
argued that government legislation and policies which deny women reproductive agency are 
tantamount to denying them their right to citizenship (Casas, 2009:83). Laws made by elected 
representatives through the appropriate democratic processes are thwarted because there is not 
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enough political will to ensure that the conditions are created for the effective implementation of 
the law.  
 
Chapter four: South African women and reproductive health 
 
Globally, high levels of unsafe abortions often occur in countries where there are restrictive 
abortion laws (Berer, 2004:1; see also Benson et al, 2011:1; Fawcus, 2008). The previous 
chapter argued that internationally, one of the unintended consequences of upholding the rights 
of medical practitioners to conscientiously object to the provision of termination of pregnancy 
and related services is the differential impact of CO on poorer women. In South Africa the post-
apartheid dispensation specifically set about trying to instantiate reproductive rights with a focus 
on poorer women. In the context of apartheid South Africa, the 1975 Abortion and Sterilisation 
Act promoted the assumption that ‘woman’ meant ‘white woman’ and this meant that poor 
African women were often forced to resort to unsafe backstreet abortions (Bradford, 1994:7). 
Research conducted prior to the introduction of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy ‘CTOP’ 
Act 92 of 1996 showed that approximately 425 women died each year in public hospitals as a 
result of complications associated with unsafe abortion (Rees et al, 1997:432-437). In Soweto 
alone, it was estimated that 2000 backstreet terminations took place every month in 1973 
(Bertrand, 1977:266). 
 
For this reason, “by 1994 unsafe abortions had become a long-standing and significant threat to 
women’s health in South Africa” (Rees et al, 1997; see also Jewkes et al, 1997). White middle-
class women were less likely to resort to unsafe abortion because they could afford to pay for 
abortion procedures in the private sector (Ngwena, 2004:714) and some even travelled abroad to 
terminate their pregnancies, usually in Britain where abortion was already legal (Bradford, 
1994:27).  
 
Annually, on average 1000 legal abortions were granted during apartheid, almost exclusively to 
white women (Rees et al, 1997). African women resorted to unsafe illegal ‘back street’ abortion 
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procedures to terminate their unwanted pregnancies because they could not afford the 
prohibitively high costs for abortion services in private clinics. It was in this context that the 
post-apartheid African National Congress (ANC) government made the provision of 
reproductive rights, particularly to poorer African women, a priority (Andrews, 2001:327; 
Mhlanga, 2003:117) and made termination of pregnancy part of its campaigning strategy for the 
1994 democratic elections. In its early policies such as the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP), the ANC promised that “every woman must have the right to choose whether 
or not to have an early termination of pregnancy according to her own beliefs” (Guttmacher et al, 
1998:193). The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy (CTOP) Act makes safe, legal abortion the 
right of every South African woman of reproductive age regardless of her race or class 
(Whitcomb, 2010:775; Andrews, 2001). 
 
The Act came into effect on 1 February 1997 with the aim not only of eradicating unsafe 
abortion-related mortalities (Jewkes et al, 2003:277-278), but also to enable women to exercise 
their sexual and reproductive rights to control over their own bodies (Potgieter and Andrews, 
2004:21; see also Dickson et al, 2003:277). It repealed the Abortion and Sterilisation Act of 
1975 with its restrictive provisions which for the most part criminalised abortion (Naylor and O’ 
Sullivan, 2010:8). Section 2 of the CTOP Act provides that a pregnancy may be terminated upon 
request of the pregnant woman during the first 12 weeks of gestation. During this period, the 
termination may be carried out by a medical practitioner, a registered midwife or a registered 
nurse who has completed the prescribed training course.22 From the thirteenth to the twentieth 
week of gestation the termination of the pregnancy must be approved by a medical practitioner,23 
and, after the twentieth week, two medical practitioners (or one medical practitioner and a 
registered midwife).24 The law also stipulates that the only consent required for abortion is that 
of the pregnant woman herself.25 With regard to minors, a medical practitioner or a registered 
midwife must advise a minor to “consult with her parents, guardian, family members or friends” 
but abortion is not denied if she does not consult with any of these people.26 In order to ensure 
                                                 
22 Section 2(2) of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. 
23 Section 2(1)(b) of the CTOP Act. 
24 Section 2(1)(c) of the CTOP Act. 
25 Section 5(1) of the CTOP Act. 
26 Section 5(3) of the CTOP Act. 
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that abortion services would reach the really poor the Act provides for the provision of abortion 
services free of charge at all designated facilities (Ngwena, 2004:715; see also Jewkes et al, 
2003:278). In terms of the Act it is an offence if any person prevents a lawful termination of 
pregnancy or obstructs access to a facility performing termination of pregnancies.27 Women’s 
reproductive rights are also constitutionally protected in South Africa. For instance, section 12(2) 
(b)28 of the Bill of Rights enshrines the right of every citizen to ‘bodily and psychological 
integrity, which includes the right: to make decisions concerning reproduction; to security in and 
control over the body.’ Section 27 1(a)29 stresses every woman’s access to reproductive health 
care as an important right as it provides that “everyone has the right to have access to health care 
services, including reproductive health care.”  
 
According to Ngwena, the early years of the passage of the CTOP Act specifically from 1997 to 
1999 witnessed an increase in women’s access to TOP services with figures increasing from 26 
401 to 39 328 between those years (2003:3). Jewkes et al, note that abortion-related deaths 
decreased “by as much as 90% in the years following legalisation of abortion” (2005b). For these 
reasons, the CTOP Act has been hailed by many authors as one of the most progressive pieces of 
women’s reproductive justice legislation in the world (Althaus, 2000:84; Naylor and O’Sullivan, 
2010:8; Cook et al, 1999; Whitcomb, 2010:775; Ngwena, 2003:2; Vincent, 2012:265).  
 
On paper this cannot be disputed if one takes into account the Act’s progressive provisions 
which surpass those of many other countries. However, the promise of the Act has yet to be fully 
realised. In South Africa, in the context of the transition from apartheid, the aim of the new legal 
framework was specifically to cater for the needs of those who had been denied rights under the 
previous dispensation. The South African government decriminalised abortion to end the burden 
of unsafe abortion among the majority disadvantaged African women in contrast to other settings 
where other goals predominated. For instance, the Indian government reformed its abortion law 
under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy (MTP) Act, 1971 to curb population growth 
(Dalvie, 2008:38). Unlike the United States’ legislation which justified a woman’s access to 
                                                 
27 Section 10(1)(c) of the CTOP Act. 
28 Section12 (2) (b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act No. 108 of 1996). 
29 Section 27 1 (a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act No. 108 of 1996). 
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abortion merely on the grounds of the right to privacy, the South Africa’s law takes a 
comprehensive, equality and autonomy driven approach to abortion which is more protective of a 
woman’s right to choose abortion and places the burden of responsibility on the state for the 
realisation of women’s rights through providing free elective abortion services in designated 
public health care facilities (Grelewicz, 2011:178). 
 
As was the case in other parts of the world, the legalisation of abortion through the enactment of 
the CTOP in 1996 has also been challenged in South Africa, with religious leaders and 
organisations featuring prominently in the opposition to legal abortion. The Christian Lawyers 
Association (CLA) is an association which encourages “members of the legal profession to 
develop and apply a biblical Christian world view in their world and in society” (Christian 
Lawyers Association, 2014). In the case of Christian Lawyers Association of South Africa v 
Minister of Health,30 the CLA sought a declaratory order striking down the CTOP Act in its 
entirety because they argued that the Act contravenes Section 11 of the South African 
Constitution, which guarantees the right to life, as human life starts at conception (Kruger et al, 
2010). The Court dismissed this case by ruling against the CLA on the grounds that the 
Constitution does not award legal personality to the foetus (Kruger et al, 2010).  
 
Opponents of legal abortion in South Africa have branded women seeking TOP services on 
demand as irresponsible for failing to use appropriate contraception. In 2012 the Health Minister, 
Aaron Motsoaledi released statistics in parliament indicating a 31% increase from 2010 to 2011 
in the number of abortions carried out in public sector health facilities (amounting to some 
77,771 legal abortions in 2011) (Sowetan Live, 2012). Joe Maila, the Health Ministry’s 
spokesperson expressed his great concern over these figures: 
We are very worried. Not only about the high statistics, but also about the 
fact that so many people are having unprotected sex... it’s clear that 
people are not using contraceptives like condoms, so they are exposing 
themselves to serious illnesses like AIDS (Sowetan Live, 2012). 
 
                                                 
30 1998 (11) BCLR 1434 (T), 1998 (4) SA 1113 (T). 
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Similarly, African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) MP, Cheryllyn Dudley said the  figures 
were a matter of great concern as they were an indication that “we’re moving in a direction 
where human life is being increasingly disregarded and treated with contempt” (Sowetan Live, 
2012). 
 
These figures notwithstanding, South Africa faces severe challenges when it comes to giving full 
effect to women’s reproductive rights (van Bogaert, 2002:176). Currently South Africa is 
severely affected by a ‘brain drain’ -- the massive immigration of large numbers of health 
professionals, primarily doctors and nurses to the UK and other countries (Padarath et al, 2004; 
Coovadia et al, 2009:830). This has proved detrimental to the provision of TOP services in 
public health care facilities (Chopra et al, 2009:1027) which are used by eighty-four percent of 
South Africa’s population (Grobbelaar, 2013). This sector is underfunded with government 
allocating sixty-percent of total health financial and resources expenditure to the private sector 
which only serves fifteen-percent of South Africa’s population (Chopra et al, 2009:1027; 
Sanders and Chopra, 2006:75). Since the majority of abortions take place in public health care 
facilities (McIntyre and Klugman, 2003:112), the implementation of the CTOP Act has been 
hampered by the extreme disparity in resource allocation between the public and the private 
health sectors. In KwaZulu-Natal province, for instance, only 30.4% of all public healthcare TOP 
facilities are functioning (Health Systems Trust, 2009). 
 
The provision of TOP services is further undermined by the increasing numbers of doctors, 
nurses and midwives who object to taking part in the provision of TOP services in designated 
public health facilities (Ngwena, 2003:4). In 2000 this challenge drew the attention of the South 
African health portfolio committee which indicated in parliament its concern about the 
preventable deaths of women from unsafe illegal abortions that continue to be carried out outside 
of designated TOP facilities (van Bogaert, 2002:137; see also Jewkes et al, 2005a:1240; Dickson 
et al, 2003:284; Meel et al, 2009). In that parliamentary session the Health Minister responded as 
follows: “Health care workers should place their duty before their beliefs”. Echoing this view, 
the Chief Director for Maternal and Child Health Services noted: “Health care workers should 
not use their beliefs to deny people access to service” (Bateman, 2000). 
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Nevertheless, the reality is that many health care providers in South Africa “refuse to undergo 
abortion training as they believe that once they are trained they will be forced to provide 
abortions” (Braam and Hessini, 2004). One recent South African survey of medical school 
students attending the University of Cape Town and Walter Sisulu University found that of 1,308 
students who participated, one-fifth of these students believed that abortion should not be 
allowed for any reason (Stephanie et al, 2012:154).  
 
Thus, as we have seen is the case in many other parts of the world, the legalisation of abortion 
alone “is not always sufficient to ensure women’s access to safe abortion services” (Fredrick, 
2007). In South Africa “translating new laws into service programs that make safe abortions 
available to all women continues to be a daunting challenge” (Singh, 2009:15). While the 
allocation of more funding to public health care facilities which cater mainly for low-income 
abortion-seeking patients might appear on the face of it to be the obvious solution, in reality no 
amount of money can solve the challenge posed by a lack of medical practitioners willing to 
perform terminations.  
 
One Western Cape study, found that fourteen percent of doctors opposed to abortion admitted 
“that they would not attend to women seeking abortion even in medical emergencies” (Ngwena, 
2003:4). Nurses willing to provide abortion face hostility from peers and members of their 
communities (Potgieter and Andrews, 2004:22; Mokgethi et al, 2006; Ngwena, 2003:4). Willing 
TOP services providers also face hostility from their high and medium-level hospital managers 
(Ngwena, 2003:4) who have often been reported for overlooking willing providers for promotion 
(Vincent, 2012:266). It has been noted that not only are medical professionals opposed to 
abortion, but abortion-seeking clients face hostility also from other layers of staff at designated 
facilities including cleaners, admissions clerks and administrative personnel. What this means is 
that through informal ways of negatively treating the abortion-seeking client these personnel all 
play a role in gate-keeping abortion services especially when it comes to poorer and younger 
women seeking access (Harries et al, 2009:5). Hord and Xaba’s study of 20 nurses found that 
75% of the nurses were against TOP and the majority of these nurses based their opposition to 
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TOP on their religious beliefs (2001:16). In relation to midwives, one study conducted in one of 
the rural hospitals in KwaZulu-Natal Province found that most of the midwives had a negative 
attitude towards the implementation of the CTOP Act (Harrison et al, 2000:429). Another 2002 
study revealed that health authorities throughout South Africa had difficulty in implementing the 
CTOP Act primarily because of many midwives’ reluctance to be trained to administer TOP 
services (Varkey and Fonn, 2000:6). 
 
In apartheid South Africa, abortion was a privilege only for the upper and middle class white 
women who could afford to abort in the private sector or to travel abroad to terminate their 
pregnancies (Bradford, 1994:27). Although it was hoped that this would change following the 
decriminalisation of abortion in 1996, in reality, this hope has not fully materialised. An 
increasing number of medical professionals invoke CO to the provision of TOP services in 
public sector health care facilities, threatening to once again make abortion a privilege reserved 
for higher-income women who can afford to pay for the procedure in the private sector. Recent 
research in South Africa has demonstrated the discontinuing of TOP services in many designated 
facilities because of the unavailability of medical personnel willing to perform TOP services 
(Varkey, 2000:87). The private sector has and still continues to profit from this through 
providing safe abortions to those women who can afford them – and also receives funding from 
the government’s annual budget for this purpose (Chopra et al, 2009:1027; see also Sanders and 
Chopra, 2006:75). 
 
Unlike public health care facilities, private TOP facilities are fully functioning with the benefit of 
the services of sufficient skilled and willing TOP services providers (Chopra et al, 2009:1027). 
They provide varied, client-centred services including abortion pills like mifepristone (National 
Abortion Federation, 2013) and South African women have reported preferring to terminate their 
unwanted pregnancies in the private sector because they find services in the private sector more  
“accessible, helpful, private, and having no waiting period” (Jewkes et al, 2005a:1241). 
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There are also reports of unethical practices on the part of medical practitioners who shy away 
from being seen to be providing termination services while at the same time prescribing 
misoprostol to abortion-seeking patients who are then advised to seek surgical evacuation in the 
public sector when they start bleeding in order to complete the abortion procedure (Jewkes et al, 
2005a:1241).  
 
In an attempt to overcome provider resistance to the provision of these services, the South 
African government has promoted values clarification workshops (VCWs) targeting all health 
professionals involved in TOP services (Healy, 2013:2; Turner et al, 2008:108; Harisson et al, 
2000:429). VCWs are aimed at promoting “tolerant attitudes among medical service providers, 
increased empathy and respect for women with unwanted pregnancies” (Berer, 2002:39; see also 
Cooper et al, 2004:76; Dickson-Tetteh and Rees, 1999) but there is little evidence to suggest that 
these workshops have successfully turned the tide of medical opinion in South Africa in favour 
of women’s reproductive rights in circumstances where those rights contradict the provider’s 
right to conscience. The tension is particularly acute in the case of second trimester abortion 
which is regarded by many as more morally troubling than first trimester abortion and the 
invocation of CO thus becomes more likely in the case of second trimester abortion. As a result, 
access to second trimester abortions remains poor: second trimester abortions account for only   
20% of all terminations in South Africa (Turner et al, 2008:113).  
 
A 2000 South African study found that “death due to pregnancy related sepsis, including septic 
abortion, was one of the top five causes of maternal death indicated in the first report on maternal 
deaths. The majority of those abortion deaths occurred in the second trimester” (Democratic 
Nursing Organisation of South Africa, 2000) leading Harries et al, to conclude that that “the high 
rate of death during second trimester abortion in South Africa is a public health concern” 
(2009:9). This is mainly because there are a limited number of doctors willing to provide these 
services (Bateman, 2011:304; Turner et al, 2008:108-113). A more recent study by Bateman 
found that most of women’s pregnancies developed to second trimester level because of the long 
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waiting lists that they encounter at public health facilities,31 and in the majority of cases these 
women are more likely to seek unsafe abortion procedures (2011:304). The fact that second 
trimester abortions remain unsafe was also confirmed by Jewkes and Rees who found that “all 
the abortion-related deaths in 2005 due to complications occurred in the second trimester” 
(2005:250).  
 
Their legal right to free abortion on demand notwithstanding, South African women continue to 
face uncommonly high levels of mortality and morbidity associated with unsafe illegal backstreet 
abortions (Pearson and Sweetman, 2007:50). Alongside this fact further fuelling the urgency of 
South Africa’s medical conscientious objection debate is the fact that women and adolescent 
girls in South Africa, as is well documented, face heightened levels of sexual violence which 
often makes it difficult for them to be in full control of their sexual and reproductive rights 
(Wood and Jewkes, 2001; see also Prinsloo, 2006). Women’s choices are limited by the fact that 
they are often disempowered in their sexual relationships, for instance in terms of negotiating the 
use contraception. A study conducted by Wood and Jewkes with pregnant teenagers in an 
African township in Cape Town for instance revealed the extremity of sexual violence against 
adolescents in South Africa (1997). This study reported widespread male coercion and violence 
within these sexual relationships. Teenage girls had little power to negotiate sexual contact and 
most participants reported being forced by their partners to have sex (1997:42; see also Buga et 
al, 1996; Jewkes and Abrahams, 2002; Richter, 1996; Vundule et al, 2001). 
 
A 1997 study exploring the personal experiences of African, Indian and Coloured women 
admitted to the six big public hospitals in four different provinces of South Africa found that 
disempowerment in relationships coupled with financial pressures constituted major reasons for 
why women terminate their pregnancies (Maforah et al, 1997:79). In another study, interviews 
with Black South African women seeking TOP services revealed disempowerment in their 
relationships which resulted in unwanted pregnancies (Orner et al, 2010).  Reported forms of 
disempowerment included the inability to negotiate condom use with male partners especially 
                                                 
31 In this context Bateman particularly refers to a six week waiting list for services at a major Cape Town hospital. 
 50 | P a g e  
 
among economically disempowered women who relied on their partners for financial support 
(Orner et al, 2010). 
 
Equally well documented is the fact that South Africa has among the worst rape statistics in the 
world – reportedly the highest number of reported cases of rape per female population in the 
world (Cooper et al, 2004). An estimated 1.3 million rapes take place annually in South Africa 
and a significant proportion of teenage pregnancy results from coerced sexual encounters (The 
Times, 1997 cited in Wood and Jewkes, 1997:43). The high incidence of rape in the country adds 
further urgency to the need for comprehensive abortion and EC service provision. It is in this 
context that a variety of commentators have called for more concerted efforts to protect South 
African women’s reproductive rights (see Harrison et al, 2000:430).  
 
In 2000 a further attempt to enlarge women’s access to reproductive choice was seen in the 
South African Medicines Control Council’s (SAMCC) re-classification and approval of the OTC 
dispensing of EC by pharmacists to women over 16 years old  without a doctor’s prescription 
(Blanchard, 2005:173). Those under the age of 16 years are required to obtain a prescription 
from a doctor in order to purchase ECs from any pharmacy (Vitacare, 2013). Two basic EC 
products were approved and are currently sold in South Africa by private pharmacies: E-Gen-C 
which is a combination of oestrogen and progestin and NorLevo which only contains progestin 
(Health 24, 2007). The SAMCC also approved the availability of ECs free of charge at public 
health care facilitates which include hospitals and clinics without any age restrictions, usually in 
the form of ‘cut-up’ regular combined oral contraceptives (COCs), that is prescribing to patients 
a higher than normal dose of birth control pills as ECs (Maharaj and Rogan, 2008:351; see also 
Myer et al, 2007:2). 
 
The 2000 SAMCC ruling concerning the availability of EC directly from pharmacies without a 
prescription was first challenged by a Johannesburg-based pro-life group called Doctors for Life 
on the grounds that it “was just another abortion technique with the potential risk of encouraging 
irresponsible sexual behaviour in the country” (Harvey, 2001). As is the case in other settings, 
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some opponents of EC equated these measures with abortifacients (Smit, 2001; McFadyen et al, 
2003; Moodley and Morroni, 2007; Myer et al, 2007). Others expressed concern that increased 
access to EC may encourage unprotected sexual intercourse – with the associated risk of 
contracting sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV -- or reduce routine contraceptive use 
(Blanchard et al, 2005:175). 
 
The latter are serious concerns in a country noted for its high prevalence of HIV/AIDS. The 2012 
Human Science Research Council Household survey estimated that 6.4 million people are living 
with HIV/AIDS and that the proportion of infected people increased from 10.6% in  2008 to 
12.3% in 2012 (van der Linde, 2013).  This survey further revealed that the HIV prevalence 
among unmarried persons is twice that of married persons: 19.2% compared with 9.8% (van der 
Linde, 2013). Given that EC does not protect against HIV/AIDS infection, these current high 
rates of HIV/AIDS have been said to have impacted negatively on pharmacists’ and providers’ 
attitudes toward the provision of EC as they fear that the easy availability of ECs easily can 
exacerbate the spread of HIV/AIDS. For instance, a study by McFadyen et al, found that many 
providers expressed concerns around women discontinuing more reliable methods of 
contraception in favour of using EC (2003; see also Blanchard et al, 2005:175; Maharaj and 
Rogan, 2011). Similar findings were reported in a 2005 by Blanchard and colleagues’ study 
which explored pharmacists’ knowledge and perceptions of EC in Soweto and the Johannesburg 
Central Business District. In that study numerous pharmacists vehemently condemned the use 
EC for increasing the spread of sexually transmitted diseases (STIs), including HIV/AIDS. As 
one participant expressed, EC “encourages people not to use precautions…[and to overlook] the 
spread of STIs like HIV/AIDS” (Blanchard et al, 2005:174).  
 
However, research in many settings (Marston et al, 2005:271; Glasier and Baird, 1998; Jackson 
et al, 2003; Raine et al, 2000; Raine et al, 2005; Lovvorn et al, 2000) has shown that expanded 
access to EC does not increase the rate of unprotected sexual intercourse nor does it change 
sexual behaviour. While the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS pandemic within South Africa cannot 
be doubted, the risk of HIV/AIDS cannot be used as a basis to deny women services to which 
they are legally entitled. Under the South African pharmacy practice laws and regulations, 
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registered pharmacists and assistant pharmacists can legally dispense EC and also counsel clients 
on all medications including ECs (Blanchard et al, 2005:173). In this context, given that condom 
use is generally low in South Africa (Ibis Reproductive Health, 2005) pharmacists can play an 
important role in raising HIV/AIDS awareness among women seeking EC. Given that 
counselling is a key component of EC provision as Harrison et al, (1989) and Gold et al, (1997) 
have concluded, pharmacists   have   an   important   opportunity   to counsel ECs-seeking clients 
on other aspects of reproductive health and to raise awareness concerning STIs and HIV/AIDS as 
well as to promote the use of barrier mechanisms among sexually active women seeking ECs as 
these are effective in preventing the transmission of HIV and STIs (Vitacare, 2013). However, 
this does not seem to be an opportunity that for the most part is being explored. A study 
conducted with pharmacists practicing in Kwa-Zulu Natal, Gauteng and the Western Cape 
provinces in 2003 reported that, despite their concerns that EC may discourage the use of regular 
contraception, pharmacists directed little attention to counselling clients about the risk of 
STI/HIV transmission after unprotected sexual intercourse (McFadyen et al, 2003). 
 
A recent study which explored attitudes towards EC among pharmacists working in private and 
public health facilities in Durban found that most pharmacists admitted seldom having 
opportunities to counsel women about EC because of time constraints (Maharaj and Rogan, 
2011). Research in other settings has reported similar findings. For instance, a study which 
evaluated the knowledge and EC services provided by pharmacists in Delhi, India found that 
most pharmacists rarely counselled their clients to use regular contraception nor advised them to 
use barrier methods such as condoms in order to prevent the spreading of HIV and STIs (Mishra 
and Saxena, 2013:19). 
 
It has been argued that barriers associated with the accessibility to EC in many developing 
countries (including South Africa) often force women to resort to unsafe abortions, which 
contribute significantly to maternal morbidity and mortality (Cheng et al, 2004 cited in 
Byamugisha et al, 2006:195). For this reason, it could be argued that easy availability of EC to 
these women would have saved at least some of their lives. This is because EC has the potential 
to reduce significantly the prevalence of unintended pregnancy and the consequent need for 
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abortion (Trussell et al, 1992) and therefore, lead to a reduction in both safe and unsafe abortion 
rates (Smit et al, 2001; Dickson-Tetteh et al, 2000). 
 
In South Africa, fertility is very high among adolescent black African women (Kaufman et al, 
2001 cited in Burgard, 2004:95). The age group between 15-24 years old has been reported to 
have the highest unintended pregnancy rates among all age groups (Ibis Reproductive Health, 
2005). It is estimated that up to 75%  of pregnancies in South Africa are unintended, with the 
highest proportion occurring among adolescents (Department of Health, 2001; Morroni et al, 
2006), and the incidence of sexual assault is also very high among this age group (Jewkes and 
Abrahams, 2002).  
 
It is for this reason that Blanchard et al, stress the prioritisation of timeous access of EC to all 
rape or sexual-assault survivors to prevent unwanted pregnancies (2005:175) and pharmacists 
have a significant role to play in making this possible. Pharmacists practicing in both private and 
public sectors play a key role in the dispensing of EC. To date, studies conducted with 
pharmacists have mainly focused on exploring their knowledge and attitudes towards the 
dispensing of EC. The limited literature that has been produced since the legalisation of EC has 
emerged from studies that have mainly been provincially-based and have been conducted only in 
the capital cities of these provinces. For instance, in KwaZulu-Natal province, two studies 
focusing on pharmacists were conducted in Durban (Maharaj and Rogan, 2011; and Hariparsad, 
2001). In Gauteng province, one study focusing on pharmacists was conducted in Johannesburg 
(Blanchard et al, 2005) and only one study has incorporated three provinces  including 
KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and the Western Cape (McFadyen et al, 2003). Little has been written 
about South African pharmacists’ rights to CO with respect to the dispensing of EC despite the 
fact that it is pharmacists who interact directly with women seeking EC and, as such, they are in 
a position to promote use of EC, and client awareness of its availability (Delbanco et al, 1997 
cited in Maharaj and Rogan, 2008:354). 
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An indication of the extent to which South African women continue not to have knowledge of, or 
access to, their legal right to these and other services, is the emergence of an underground market 
for abortion drugs as was reported in a 2009 article in The Sowetan, under the headline 
“Abortion For Sale”. The article stressed the prevalence of the sale of abortion pills outside of 
clinical settings, particularly Cytotec, also known as Misoprostol (The Sowetan, 2009). Of 
concern is the fact that low-income women buying these abortion drugs from illegal dealers 
would usually have little information on correct dosage and administering of the drug which can 
be harmful to women’s health if used improperly. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the high minded intentions of South Africa’s legal and constitutional protections for 
women’s reproductive rights, women continue to resort to unsafe abortion to terminate their 
unwanted pregnancies (Yanda et al, 2003:276-277; see also Millar, 1934 cited in David, 1992:1). 
While the minority high-income women  have easy access to safe abortions in the private sector  
the majority low-income “women put their health, social standing, future fertility, and lives at 
risk to end unwanted pregnancies” (Bernstein and Rosenfield, 1998) as they self-induce or 
consult with ‘back street’ practitioners to terminate their pregnancies.  
 
Not having the money to pay for an abortion or related service in the private sector should not 
disadvantage poor women from terminating their unwanted pregnancies or avoiding pregnancy 
through the use of the MAP. While Pearson and Sweetman suggest the need on the part of 
governments with liberal abortion laws to take a step further by making abortions safe, legal, 
accessible and affordable to all women seeking them (1994:48), this is difficult to do in 
circumstances where sufficient willing medical providers, whether doctors, nurses, pharmacists 
or other personnel working at medical facilities, support and believe in these rights. In the 
following chapters I discuss the ways in which the participants in my study either invoked, or 
rejected the right to conscientious objection – and the ways in which these approaches are 
influenced by how a person frames these questions. In the first instance I discuss how the idea of 
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‘rights’ is deployed to frame approaches to both the invocation and the rejection of CO, 
depending on whose rights are prioritised: the rights of the foetus, the rights of the pregnant 
woman or the rights of the medical practitioner. 
 
Chapter five: qualifying ‘rights’ 
 
Every individual has a freedom of choice. Moreover, women abort 
because they are disrespectful of human life; lack of precaution 
taken…abortion is not the solution (Doctor Thirty-eight).  
 
The WHO has defined reproductive rights as: 
…the basic right of all couples and individuals to decide freely and 
responsibly the number, spacing and timing of their children and to have 
the information and means to do so, and the right to attain the highest 
standard of sexual and reproductive health. It also includes their right to 
make decisions concerning reproduction free of discrimination, coercion 
and violence, as expressed in human rights documents (Report of the 
International Conference on Population and Development, 1994). 
 
The ICPD, also known as the Cairo Conference, held in Cairo, Egypt in 1994 and attended by 
over 180 nations, agreed on basic improvements and protections of women’s ability to control 
their reproductive lives through providing ‘universal access’ to sexual and reproductive health 
(Glasier et al, 2006:2). Chrisler and Garrett have pointed out that the Cairo Conference was a 
milestone event in the international women’s movement because it marked the first formal 
acceptance of women’s reproductive rights as basic human rights (2010:129). Corrêa and 
Petchesky define reproductive rights as women’s ability “to decide whether, when, and how to 
have children” – rights rooted in the claim to bodily integrity and sexual self-determination 
(2007:299; see also Cook and Dickens, 2009b:108). Ever since the Cairo Conference, the United 
Nations (UN) and other international assemblies have urged governments to safeguard women’s 
reproductive rights (Reproductive Rights Are Human Rights, 2014).  
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In the language of Ronald Dworkin (1984), rights are ‘trumps’, by which is meant that for a right 
to make sense it has to be considered as having special normative force overriding other possible 
considerations and social aims such as, for example, productive efficiency. While there is 
relative consensus concerning this normative priority that ought to be afforded rights over non-
rights considerations, left unresolved is how to settle disputes that arise from the clash of rights. 
While in some instances the clash is easy enough to resolve since some rights clearly outweigh 
others – freedom of speech for instance is thought to be legitimately abridged in cases were life 
is threatened – in other cases no such easy prioritisation is on offer. The right of medical 
professionals to refuse to provide medical services which they regard as tantamount to murder – 
which is the stance that some take with regard to abortion services – is a case in point. Here a 
serious and seemingly irresolvable tension arises between women’s reproductive rights and the 
right on the part of medical practitioners to conscientiously object to providing abortion services 
or services which they believe to be related to abortion. To complicate the matter further, a third 
rights-bearing subject often enters the debate in the form of the foetus whose purported claim to 
a right provides the grounds for the anti-abortion stance. However, what this chapter shows is 
that there are ways in which women’s reproductive rights can be narrowed and eroded that have 
nothing to do with serious and intractable clashes of this kind but have, rather, to do with 
imbalances of power between medical professional and patient which allow the medical 
professional to base their decisions and application of the law on their own particular moral point 
of view concerning, essentially, sexuality and what constitutes responsible and appropriate 
sexual behaviour. 
 
The right to CO is most often described as resting on the clash between women’s reproductive 
rights and health professionals’ right to  refuse to participate in TOP or services thought to be 
related to TOP (such as MAPs) on religious and moral grounds. While the CTOP Act allows 
every woman “the right to choose whether to have an early, safe and legal termination of 
pregnancy according to her individual beliefs” (Republic of South Africa, 1996a:1) this right 
may conflict with the constitutionally protected right to freedom of belief and conscience which 
may be interpreted as allowing for medical professionals to conscientiously object to providing 
TOP services.  
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Several participants in the present study argued that their constitutional rights were at stake when 
regulatory bodies attempt to put pressure on medical practitioners to comply with laws relating to 
women’s reproductive rights. As Doctor 53 put it: 
Medical professionals are also South Africans (most of them) first and 
foremost so which means that they should be afforded the ability to 
practice what is accepted within their religious and cultural beliefs.  
 
Similarly: 
It cannot be expected of a medical professional to perform a procedure 
against which he/she has a moral objection. We are supposed to live in a 
country with freedom of choice for everyone, not just the one party. 
Doctors should have the right to refuse to participate in all stages of 
terminations (Doctor Twenty-seven).  
Doctors have a right to conscientious objection to participating in TOPs 
(Doctor Twenty-five). 
Doctors morally opposed must have the right not to perform these 
procedures (Doctor Twenty-six). 
It is every doctor’s right to either accept or refuse a request to carry out 
an abortion.  I do not do abortions (Doctor Seventeen). 
 
However, opposition to abortion is only rarely stated in these terms. From the outset hierarchies 
of legitimacy and deservingness have pervaded the abortion debate. As James Wilce notes, 
discourse plays an important role in medicine, and medical discourse is “about healing, curing, 
or therapy…” (2009:199). “Since the 1950s, when abortion was widely legalised for the first 
time, the discourse of medical expertise pervaded the representation of abortion in public debate” 
(Dudova, 2010:946). Dudova further argues that this medicalised discourse surrounding the right 
to abortion served to delegitimise social conditions as grounds for termination of a pregnancy, 
leaving only “serious threat to health, cases of rape or incest and cases of foetal impairment as 
grounds for legal abortion” (2010:946). This gave rise to a hierarchy of acceptability in the 
exercise of women’s reproductive rights rather than these rights being seen as trumps. 
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For instance, the following doctor argues against abortion on demand, rather he encourages 
women to use various prevention methods in order to avoid the risk of falling pregnant as 
follows: 
…Any abortion due to a lifestyle choice is abhorrent-whether by clinical 
or chemical means…Recreational sex is a misnomer but it is 99% 
possible, with various methods, to not fall pregnant and have physical 
‘’intimacy’’. Abortion must always be seen as the very last resort and 
never a lifestyle choice (Doctor Forty-one). 
 
Here the idea of ‘balance’ is invoked: the need to balance two rights that are in conflict with one 
another – that of the foetus and that of the pregnant woman; neither is absolute and must be 
weighed as equally legitimate (Ferree et al, 2002:106-107). This doctor argues that women have 
the right to engage in sexual activities, but this right goes along with the responsibility to prevent 
pregnancy. However, if it happens that women fall pregnant, the right of the foetus should take 
precedence and ‘abortion should always be seen as the very last choice or resort’. This 
diminishes this doctor’s willingness to perform abortion on demand. For this doctor, it does not 
matter whether abortion is performed by surgical or medical methods; the bottom line is that 
abortion on demand is wrong.  
 
Chris Kaposy has argued that the notion of ‘life choices’ is often invoked by abortion opponents 
or health care professionals who seek to justify their right to conscientiously object to provide 
TOP services by claiming that “abortion is a medically unnecessary elective procedure. Very 
often they make two assumptions: (1) that medically necessary  care  is  care  needed  to  treat  
disease,  illness,  or  injury,  and  (2)  that pregnancy is not a disease, illness, or injury” 
(2010:25). Likewise, as noted by Charo some health care providers have conscientiously 
objected to perform certain medical procedures on the grounds that they view them as life 
choices, not treatments of diseases and these include: “birth control, abortion, and in vitro 
fertilisation…” (2005:2473). In the context of Canada for example, Kaposy has pointed out that 
the Canada  Health  Act emphasises the notion of life style choice as it provides public funding 
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only for medically necessary hospital procedures and New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island 
provinces have strictly enforced this requirement (2010:25). 
 
The urgency of the claim for the foetus to be regarded as rights bearing and more than this foetal 
rights to be seen to outweigh the rights of the pregnant woman not to be pregnant grows as the 
pregnancy advances, giving rise to nuances in the position taken by medical professionals to 
making available the conditions under which women’s reproductive rights can be realised. 
Sarkin-Hughes argues that abortion should be limited on ‘foetal viability’ grounds, which is said 
to occur at around 22 weeks of gestation (1993:89), because at this stage a “foetus should be 
capable of living independently of its mother if it is born, since all of its vital organs are 
developed and are able to perform their functions sufficiently” (Cohen and Sayeed, 2011:235). 
Some associate foetal viability with ‘quickening’, which is “when the woman first feels the 
movement of the foetus which usually occurs near the end of their first trimester of gestation” 
(Cook and Howard, 2007:1087). 
We are told that it is unethical to perform medical experiments on human 
embryos in the test tube, even though such experimentation could save 
countless lives and relieve huge sufferings. But we may physically 
dismember and pull apart (in late term “abortions”) children who are 
perfectly formed and in an environment conducive to full development. 
This is an extreme contradiction illustrating the total lack of logic in the 
arbitrary timing of the definition as to when life starts in utero (the cutoff 
point for legal abortions) (Doctor Forty-four). 
 
Framing the issue as one of protection of the rights of the foetus, Doctor 44 argues that late term 
abortions are as unethical as performing medical experiments on human embryos in a test tube. 
To frame the issue in this way is to arrive at the self-evident conclusion that ‘second trimester 
abortion should be illegal’. Foetal personhood and the idea of the foetus as a rights-bearing 
subject are invoked in Doctor 44’s language which refers to ‘children’ rather than foetuses. The 
idea of women’s right to abortion becomes irrelevant when the issue is framed in this way since 
the right to life typically takes precedence in cases where rights find themselves in tension with 
one another.  
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Foetal viability is also for example, placed at the centre of Doctor 7’s argument for the pre-
eminence of foetal rights. In this view second trimester abortion seekers are seen as delaying 
abortion for no good reason and therefore there is no pressing requirement to consider the rights 
of the pregnant woman above those of a viable foetus.  
I am against such late abortions, as there is no need to delay it to such a 
late gestational age. The exception would be maternal physical health at 
risk …. (Doctor Seven).  
 
The construction of the second trimester abortion seeker as undeserving is shared for example by 
Doctor 55: 
I am against them [second trimester abortion] unless there is a medical 
indication. Up to 16 weeks pregnancy it is still if necessary possible to 
perform an abortion especially if medically indicated. I would not 
perform an abortion over 16 weeks simply if the mother requested it. 
Only medical reasons for an abortion after 16 weeks would be 
considered. If a mother takes 4 months to decide if she wants an abortion 
or not, then she shouldn’t be having one! (Doctor Fifty-five). 
 
Rather than respecting the autonomous decision of a woman to exercise her legal right to a 
second trimester abortion, several respondents constructed this choice as ill-advised and saw 
themselves as having the responsibility to persuade these women to carry their pregnancies to 
term: 
Second trimester abortion carries more risk, patients must be informed, 
and encouraged to continue with pregnancy (Doctor Sixteen). 
 
Far from invoking CO as an absolute right then, these respondents take a selective approach to 
their disinclination to provide abortion services -- abortion is seen as acceptable in some 
circumstances but not others (Gustafson, 1987). Foetal viability plays a large role in their 
approach to the acceptability of abortion as does their conviction that women seeking second 
trimester abortions are guilty of tardiness and could have avoided doing so if they had only acted 
more responsibly. While these doctors acknowledge that women have the right to abortion, they 
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frame the right as limited for instance by gestational age. By failing to seek an early termination, 
women in this view are seen to effectively forfeit their right to reproductive choice as their right 
gives way to the right to life of the foetus which takes precedence from the second trimester of 
gestation.  
 
If second trimester abortion is considered the most morally troubling of circumstances in which 
abortion is sought, one might imagine that the least morally troubling would be its polar opposite 
– the client seeking the MAP. However, even in the case of this service, many participants 
express only qualified support for the MAP as a woman’s reproductive right. As Dworkin has 
pointed out, to qualify a right is to empty it of its force. Many participants, far from expressing 
unequivocal support for the right of patients to request lawful access to medication, drew a 
distinction between those whose need for the MAP is ‘legitimate’ and those whose request for 
the medication is constructed as ‘illegitimate’. These constructions in turn shape behaviour, 
informing decisions concerning whom to dispense to and under what circumstances. The appeal 
to conscience as a reason for refusal to comply with SAMCC policy is selectively invoked 
depending on the health professional’s own views regarding the circumstances under which a 
person might legitimately seek the MAP. These circumstances include: ‘mistakes’, ‘accidents’, 
‘rape’ and ‘regular contraceptive failure’. 
…not all patients abuse the emergency contraception and they use it 
because of a mistake such as a condom bursting during coitus 
(Pharmacist Thirty-seven). 
I see it as an emergency prevention after a mistake (Pharmacist Forty-
three). 
People can make a mistake (have a slip) and some sort of relief is needed 
(Pharmacist Fifty). 
 
Stenvoll points out that language, categorisations and problem definitions play an important role 
in mobilising people to provide solutions to how certain issues should be dealt with (2007:43). 
For instance, in the debate in Norway in late 1990’s concerning  emergency contraception  some 
groups which wanted to restrict access to IUDs did so on the grounds of equating them to 
abortifacients since ‘life starts at conception’ (Stenvoll, 2007:43). In the present study, in 
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contrast, many pharmacists expressed support for the 2000 SAMCC’s approval OTC dispensing 
of various emergency contraceptive methods, including the MAP to sexually active females aged 
14 year, referring to the initiative as a ‘good policy’. Yet closer analysis reveals that this support 
is in many cases carefully qualified, not because the MAP is regarded as an abortifacient but on 
other grounds. 
 
James Paul Gee argues that in analysing communication it is useful to ask why the speaker has 
built and designed a piece of talk in the way that they have and not in some other way – what he 
refers to as the ‘why this way and not that way tool’ (2011:54). Gee enjoins the analyst of 
discourse to always ask how else something could have been said and what the speaker achieves 
by saying something one way and not in other ways (2011:54). For example, some participants 
constructed the dispensing of the MAP as simply lawful medication which women have the right 
to request and to be provided with in accordance with the right to reproductive health enshrined 
in the Constitution32 which is very different in its effect to constructing the MAP as acceptable 
only in certain prescribed circumstances such as in the event of a mistake, accident and 
emergency. 
 
Gee’s ‘fill in tool’ helps one to think about what one needs to ‘fill in’ that is not explicitly said in 
the communication that is being analysed, based on what has been said and what one knows or 
can surmise about the context (2011:11-12). In constructing the MAP as an emergency remedy 
health professionals by implication construct repeated requests for the MAP as illegitimate. The 
portrayal of some patients as deserving the MAP and others as not deserving in turn results in 
particular treatment of the person who is doing the repeated requesting who is viewed as in need 
of ‘counselling’ or ‘correction’ of their behaviour which is deemed inappropriate.  
I feel it has a place for reducing unwanted/unplanned pregnancies in 
emergency situations i.e. the condom breaks or in rape cases. It is not 
meant as a generalised contraception, which is apparent when we counsel 
the ladies (Pharmacist Forty-six). 
                                                 
32 Section12 (2) (b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act No. 108 of 1996). 
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I am willing to dispense the emergency contraception tablet for 
“accidents”. I do not agree with giving the tablets to males, but prefer to 
counsel the women to try and ascertain that they are not using it “every 
second weekend” (Pharmacist Forty-six). 
The eminent scholar of discourse, Norman Fairclough has noted that some representations are 
‘naturalised’ as ‘common sense’ and once they are seen as ‘common sense’ they are no longer 
seen as questionable or subjected to scrutiny (1989). The naturalised reference to the MAP as 
‘emergency contraception’ is a case in point. To refer to something that is invoked only in times 
of ‘emergency’ immediately implies that it is by definition a rare occurrence – for many 
pharmacists ‘emergency’ means not just ‘rare’ but once and once only. The construction of the 
MAP as an ‘emergency’ remedy justifies a very qualified approach to compliance with the law 
and the constitutional protection for women’s reproductive rights.  
It’s for emergency only. Other forms of contraception are encouraged if 
repeats are seen (Pharmacist Fifty-two). 
I have no problem issuing the product once to a patient. I will ensure that 
I do proper counselling to ensure that the patient does get contraception 
from a clinic or prescribed by a doctor (Pharmacist Forty-eight).  
As a means to an emergency I will dispense it provided it is not abused 
and only used once or twice in a lifetime as emergencies don’t occur 
frequently! Patients also need to accept responsibility for their actions. I 
personally don’t equate it to an abortion pill as it is within 72 hours post 
coitus (Pharmacist Twenty-six). 
 
Rather than a generalised moral objection to the medication itself, for instance on grounds of it 
being an abortifacient, here the objection is a moral one which has to do with disapproval of the 
behaviour and moral probity of the patient who should be more ‘responsible’ rather than the 
health professional’s own conscience.   
Emergency Contraception is exactly what it says, in case of an 
emergency, which is necessary sometimes in case of an oral antibiotic 
that may cancel the normal contraception…it is an Emergency Pill and 
should be sold as that (Pharmacist Nine). 
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Regular contraceptive failure constitutes legitimate grounds for requesting the MAP but not 
‘irresponsible’ sexual behaviour which suggests that what constitutes ‘responsible’ sexual 
behaviour is sex with contraception. 
The naturalisation of the MAP as having to do with ‘emergencies’ is coupled then, with the idea 
that it ought properly to be seen as a ‘once off’ medication and not a  ‘quick fix’ or ‘regular 
contraceptive’ as the following participant explained:   
I think it was a good idea [that is, the selling of the MAP through the 
OTC method], however, have found it to be a “quick fix” in many cases. 
And people don’t understand you can’t it with a regular contraceptive 
(Pharmacist Thirty-eight). 
 
The idea that the MAP can be ‘abused’ and that it is the health professional’s role to prevent such 
‘misuse’ or irresponsible behaviour relies then on a set of assumptions about ‘proper’ use – 
proper use is once or twice in a life time and does not replace ‘responsible’ regular use of 
contraception. If use is improper according to this set of assumptions, then the health 
professional feels justified in refusing to provide the medication. This refusal is constructed as 
the ‘prevention of abuse’ and the promotion of responsible sexual behaviour rather than the 
denial of a right. In this sense the health professional takes it upon him or herself to decide what 
does and does not constitute ‘responsible’ sexual behaviour and the misuse of medication which 
in turn justifies who does and does not in practice have the right to be provided with the MAP.  
The construction of the MAP as for emergencies thus acts as a powerful tool for establishing 
what this pharmacist referred to as the ‘legitimate circumstances’ under which someone may 
request the MAP: 
People should be made aware that this is a form of emergency 
contraceptive provided if their circumstances are legitimate. It is 
unfortunately prone to abuse and that I do not approve of. Emergencies 
don’t occur 5 or 6 times or every weekend (Pharmacist Twenty-six). 
 
More than this the law providing for access to the MAP is seen as in danger of promoting 
irresponsible sexual behaviours since women may have unprotected sex  because they know that 
there is an easily available remedy in the form of the MAP. Given this, it is then seen as up to the 
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health professional to act as a bulwark against such irresponsible practices and to teach women 
who just do not seem to ‘understand’ that the MAP is not properly to be regarded as a form of 
contraception. The objection is not to the policy itself, but with women who are ‘taking 
advantage’ of this policy and seeking ‘quick fixes’ instead of behaving ‘responsibly’. Thus rather 
than this being an instance of the intractable clash between the fundamental right to the health 
professional’s freedom of conscience and women’s reproductive rights, what is really at issue 
here is the health professional’s personal disapproval of the sexual behaviour of some of their 
clients as these participants made clear:  
I have no problem dispensing it to woman after I have consulted them 
that they should not abuse this and they should be more careful next time. 
And I take their details so next time they come they show up on the 
system indicating how many times they have come for it and there is 
where I can stop the abuse (Pharmacist Thirty-seven). 
I see no problem in refusing emergency contraception if I know it is been 
frequently asked for…[this is because]…It is a problem as normal family 
planning stock is freely available, too  lazy to go to a clinic (Pharmacist 
Thirty-five). 
 
The implication is that in their interactions with their MAP-seeking patients, health professionals 
are acting appropriately if they take it upon themselves to explore the sexual behaviour of their 
patients and their reasons for requesting the MAP. Moreover, in the view of these participants, 
they are justified in making a distinction between behaviours that they regard as legitimate and 
those that they regard as illegitimate – and these in turn constitute grounds for agreeing or 
refusing to dispense a lawful medication. As one respondent put it, it is up to the pharmacist to 
‘spot’ women who request the MAP repeatedly and deal with them accordingly: 
…some may be abusing this medication and that is why it is our duty as 
pharmacists to spot these people coming into a pharmacy ever so often. 
Therefore, I support the policy provided pharmacists prevent it from 
being abused (Pharmacist Thirty-seven). 
 
This is a very different position to the invocation of conscience on the part of health 
professionals who regard the MAP as tantamount to abortion. The moral disapproval of patients’ 
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sexual mores and behaviours is framed as requiring the health professional’s intervention in 
order to ‘inform’ the patient that they are not behaving appropriately. 
 
Framing the MAP as an ‘emergency’ remedy and repeated requests for  the MAP as a 
consequence, as illegitimate, irresponsible, lazy and uninformed has concrete effects on how 
health professionals behave. This framing acts to legitimise refusal to dispense the MAP even on 
the part of those who do not regard it as an abortifacient. Pharmacists acting according to a 
naturalised set of assumptions about what does and does not constitute legitimate use of the 
MAP may for instance refer patients repeatedly seeking the MAP to a clinic or hospital to be 
prescribed regular contraceptives. Others advocate the need for strict monitoring and surveillance 
of women’s behaviour in order to ensure that only the deserving, legitimate MAP request is 
complied with: 
The emergency contraception should be what it really says emergency 
contraception not a monthly or weekly routine. A system should be set up 
to monitor the use of the emergency contraception by each patient 
(Pharmacist Thirty-six). 
 
While some participants acknowledged the role that the MAP plays in the prevention of 
unwanted pregnancy, they nevertheless insisted on the need for dispensing to take place under 
‘controlled circumstances’: 
Make these tablets available freely, but CONTROLLED and monitored 
(Pharmacist Forty-six; emphasis in the original). 
I believe in dispensing in a controlled manner because not everyone 
abuses it and it does do some good for people who are not ready to have a 
child (Pharmacist Thirty-seven). 
 
Yet clearly every woman who requests the MAP is doing so in order to prevent an unwanted 
pregnancy. It is important to ask then, what the circumstances of ‘control’ might constitute. In 
this instance the ‘control’ has to do with distinguishing those whose requests constitute ‘abuse’ 
and those for whom the medication would ‘do some good’. 
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Another participant explained that: 
I do find it troubling and therefore I stop it by explaining why and urge 
them to rather start using a prevention pill immediately (Pharmacist 
Forty-three). 
 
Asked specifically whether they equated the MAP with an abortifacient or not, many participants 
rejected this definition and insisted that they had ‘no problem’ dispensing MAPs as long as they 
were reassured that the medication was not being ‘abused’. Whether or not patients’ rights to 
reproductive health services are realised then turns on highly subjective accounts of abuse which 
have little to do with the health of the patient and everything to do with the provider’s own moral 
standpoint regarding appropriate sexual behaviour: 
I have no problem dispensing it to woman after I have consulted them 
that they should not abuse this and they should be more careful next time. 
And I take their details so next time they come they show up on the 
system indicating how many times they have come for it and there is 
where I can stop the abuse (Pharmacist Thirty-seven). 
 
Similarly: 
In my Pharmacy we provide State Family Planning but provide the 
Morning After Pill privately. All users of the Morning After Pill are 
counselled to get Family Planning if they are regularly active. Patients 
are educated that the Morning After Pill should not be a method of 
contraception. Statutory records are kept and monitored (Pharmacist 
Five). 
 
The framing of the health professional’s role as one of legitimately monitoring and controlling 
women’s behaviour appears also to influence decisions concerning whether or not to dispense 
the MAP to male partners. A 2011 Nicaraguan study which explored pharmacists’ knowledge of, 
and attitudes towards, emergency contraception found that 84 per cent of pharmacists in that 
country were willing to provide MAPs to men requesting the medication on behalf of their 
partners (Ehrle and Sarker, 2011:70). This finding is in stark contrast with the views expressed 
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by the participants in the present study. Monitoring and surveillance is justified in order to 
differentiate between requests for the MAP regarded as legitimate and those regarded as abusive.  
Male partners seeking the MAP are interpreted as illegitimately seeking to control their female 
partners’ bodies, choices and behaviours – a right that the health professionals reserve for 
themselves.  
Also I prefer to dispense to the woman because some men buy it in 
advance to give it to their women after coitus (Pharmacist Thirty-seven). 
Firstly I do not supply the morning after pill to any man requesting it for 
his wife or girlfriend. I insist on seeing the lady. She completes a 
questionnaire prior to me supplying the pill. It is her right to decide 
whether she wants to be pregnant or not (Pharmacist Thirty-three).  
I am willing to dispense the emergency contraception tablet for 
“accidents”. I do not agree with giving the tablets to the males, but prefer 
to council the women to try and ascertain that they are not using it “every 
second weekend”… I feel it is wrong to give to the male. Some men try 
to force the lady to not use protection and then they get emergency 
contraception for the lady. This I feel is wrong. The lady is the one who 
needs to be in control of her body, not the man. I prefer to interact 
directly with the lady to find out her views, feelings and if she 
understands what she is doing by repeatedly using the emergency pill. 
Also what risk she puts her body in by not using protection (Pharmacist 
Forty-six). 
 
The idea of women having the right to control their own bodies is thus selectively invoked – the 
right falls away when the pharmacist regards it as being exercised under illegitimate 
circumstances but comes strongly into focus when the pharmacist chooses to emphasise it. 
Closer inspection reveals that the invocation of the legitimising authority of the women’s rights 
frame here has much in common with the moralising prescriptions invoked by health 
professionals seeking to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate sexual behaviour. The 
participants who took this view referred for instance to their fear that men might buy the MAP in 
advance in order to convince women to sleep with them without the protection of a condom 
(Pharmacist 37). 
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Women’s rights are invoked as a means of legitimising refusal to dispense medication to male 
partners even when it is clear that the woman concerned would prefer to have this way.  
Women do not realise the legal ramifications and often send their male 
partners in to buy emergency pills. They must sign the form personally 
(Pharmacist Forty). 
 
Women thus do not have a ‘right’ to decide for themselves whether they wish to send their male 
partners to collect medication for them. Nor do women have the right to decide what to do with 
their own bodies if that includes repeatedly using the MAP, not using regular contraception, or 
succumbing to a male partner’s pressure for sex – since these are behaviours of which the health 
professional disapproves. What is objected to is the control of male partners over women’s 
bodies but not the control of medical practitioners over women’s bodies and choices, suggesting 
that what is really at issue is sexual behaviour regarded as undesirable rather than women’s right 
to autonomy and choice. 
 
In some instances this construction of women as in need of educating, counselling, control and 
protection on the part of medical practitioners rather than as autonomous, rights-bearing citizens, 
takes an explicitly racialised form: 
 I do not condemn women looking for the morning after pill but do advise 
them to consider alternate forms of contraception with less side effects 
especially the black ladies who because of cultural reasons can’t be found 
to be using contraception. But I get cross when they want to come in after 
every weekend for the morning after pill and have not gone to the clinic 
for permanent help (Pharmacist Twenty-nine). 
 
While explicit references to race are rare, the construction of the female patient as ignorant and 
lacking ‘understanding’ is not. Patients’ repeated requests for the MAP are regularly constructed 
as arising from their ignorance. As Gee points out, the use of language serves to build 
relationships and identities – chiefly through the ubiquitous mechanism of ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
(2011). In the participants’ talk, the construction of the patient as ignorant is often accompanied 
by a language of ‘them’ and ‘they’. In the South African context this language often acts as a 
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marker for race. It is thus not unreasonable to assume that what the speaker has in mind is 
black/poor women who are the ‘they’ and the ‘them’ who are ignorant of anatomy: 
It is not meant as a generalised contraception, which is apparent when we 
counsel the ladies. It is sometimes difficult to get them to understand that 
it is not in their interest to just keep getting the emergency contraception. 
They don’t understand the possible impact on their hormones, cycles and 
female anatomy (Pharmacist Forty-six).  
Very difficult to refuse but these woman need to know that this is 
emergency treatment and not normal contraception. Women become 
quite defensive if you ask any questions (Pharmacist Thirty-five). 
 
In contrast to the robust, rights-bearing subject imagined in liberalism’s cosmology, women 
seeking medical services are constructed as ignorant/illiterate, particularly regarding medication 
and its side effects. Rather than being autonomous choice makers, the expectation arises that the 
patients will listen attentively and not question -- any patient who questions medical authority is 
constructed as being defensive.  
 
This imbalance in power relations between the health professional and the patient is magnified in 
the case of younger patients. Although the law provides for patients of 14 years and older to seek 
the MAP, the in-practice realisation of the legal right is dependent upon the willingness of health 
professionals to comply with the prescriptions of the law.  
As far as age is concerned a 14 year old can purchase contraception but 
cannot be sexually active with consent until 16 which does not make 
sense. I believe a 14-16 year old cannot make correct decisions regarding 
these matters (contraception) however they are sexually active which is 
very worrying (Pharmacist Nine). 
 
Gee points out that “speakers choose subjects strategically to set up how listeners should 
organise information in their heads and how listeners should view whatever the speaker is talking 
about” (2011:18). As Norman Fairclough has pointed out, health care professionals are likely to 
use their power “to impose the discourse type upon patients, in the sense of putting pressure on 
them in various ways to occupy the subject position it lays down for patients, and so behave in 
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certain constrained ways” (1989:61). In South Africa, while the MAP has been switched to OTC 
status in order to widen its accessibility to sexually active women, in practice the availability of 
the MAP to teenagers is circumscribed by social mores regarding the appropriacy of being 
sexually active at a young age (SAQ, Pharmacist Forty-six). 
 
Although, as Weisberg and Fraser have pointed out, it is every woman’s right to have “rapid 
access to an effective method of emergency contraception if she believes she needs it” 
(2009:160), women seeking MAPs are not infrequently subjected to ‘intrusive questioning about 
their sex lives’. Younger clients, their legal rights notwithstanding, are often singled out for 
particular surveillance and disciplining. As one pharmacist explained: 
 If it is a teenager I refer her to our nursing sister to sit down and discuss 
the dangers of unprotected sex and diseases (Pharmacist Nine). 
There are too many girls wanting the morning after pill, they have no 
shame to come and get it with friends, and even come in their school 
uniforms and laugh about the whole situation among each other. They 
also want the pill often and if we say it is too often that they are taking 
the pill then they just get their friends to come get it; they are uneducated 
on the subject and are not interested to listening to us (Pharmacist Fifty-
four). 
 
Rather than a serious clash of the health professional’s right of conscience not to participate in an 
act interpreted as the equivalent of the violation of the right to life, here the denial or attenuation 
of women’s reproductive rights is based on a set of moral beliefs about teenage sexuality, the 
decision-making capacity of teenagers, and the right of teenagers to make decisions concerning 
their own bodies.  These patients are seen as in need of referral for counselling despite the fact 
that the law does not require such referral for those seeking the MAP.  
I am not happy with this policy, as it is against my religious beliefs and 
another reason also being that it encourages irresponsible behaviour. The 
majority of patients are teenagers and young adults (Pharmacist Twenty-
three). 
It encourages people to get involved in sexual activity even at a young 
age without worrying about some of the consequences as they can get rid 
of the possibility of falling pregnant quite easily (Pharmacist Thirty-six). 
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[The 2000 SAMCC policy] has led to greater freedom for women, 
[however, the MAP] should not be given to under 16s (Pharmacist 
Thirty). 
 
While the principle of autonomy that lies at the heart of the liberal democratic state’s individual 
rights regime affords any woman of reproductive age the right to exercise control over her own 
body (Jotkowitz and Zivotofsky, 2010:150), in these participants’ formulations, the age of the 
patient allied with normative assumptions concerning the illicitness of youth sexuality thus 
becomes further ground for qualifying women’s reproductive rights regardless of the law’s 
prescriptions. The MAP is seen as enticing teenagers to engage in sexual activity because it 
provides an ‘easy way out’ in the event of irresponsible behaviour leading to unwanted 
pregnancies.  
 
The principle of autonomy further dictates that parental consent is not mandatory for teenagers 
requesting the MAP but many participants considered it inappropriate to provide the MAP to 
minors without parental consent.  
Don’t agree with [dispensing] if under-aged, without parent’s consent. 
Same should apply with respect to other schedule 2’s…It is often used 
for under-aged children who are supposed not to have intercourse, and 
parents should be aware. It might be used inappropriately where a rape 
case should be opened (Pharmacist Five). 
 
The same approach to restricting the right to reproductive health services without parental 
consent is taken by several doctors with regard to termination of pregnancy.  
I had a patient who fell pregnant in Matric and requested an abortion. I 
knew the family well and convinced her to tell her mom. She was very 
terrified about her dad as they came from a very conservative Indian 
background. I told her that she needed her family support for this difficult 
situation. Her father was as expected extremely upset. Five years on and 
the little girl is now the pride and the joy of her grandfather. The mother 
of the baby reports the little girl and her grandfather are inseparable and 
the baby has brought so much joy into their home (Doctor Twenty-three). 
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Conclusion 
 
The participants whose views are cited in this chapter selectively uphold women’s reproductive 
rights – qualifying these rights in line with their own moral framework which, for instance, 
regards second trimester abortion, repeated requests for the MAP and teenage sexuality as 
morally illicit. What this results in is an effective narrowing of women’s legal rights to abortion 
on demand and other reproductive services such as the MAP.  
 
Rather than invoking CO to the provision of TOP and MAP services these respondents are really 
deciding on a case-by-case basis between those whom they regard as deserving their care as 
health professionals and those whom they do not regard as legitimately deserving their care. This 
selective recognition of rights empties the idea of a ‘right’ of its meaning. If rights are to mean 
anything as Ronald Dworkin has cogently argued, they must be trumps – violated only in the 
most serious of circumstances. It is this strength of the claim to a right that gives rise to 
intractable moral dilemmas. Where two rights clash a genuine dilemma only results when they 
seem to be of equal force, laying equally strong claims to our sense of the prioritisation of 
pressing human concerns. Where someone genuinely believes that abortion or the MAP is 
tantamount to murder of a human being such a dilemma arises. But such a belief clearly does not 
pertain in cases where a person is selectively willing to provide such services.   If rights are to 
give way on every occasion where they clash with a fellow citizen’s person belief system then 
the whole point of having ‘rights’ falls away. Vouch are precisely meant to protect citizens of 
democracies in cases where they require protection for instance because their choices are 
unpopular or controversial. While many would argue that women’s reproductive rights are 
hardly controversial, in South Africa they clearly are which makes it all the more important that 
they should be protected against being casually disregarded merely because they are not popular. 
 
In the following chapter, the precepts of the Hippocratic Oath are discussed in more detail, with 
respect to the question of ‘harm’. The chapter shows that appealing to the requirements of the 
Oath does not really solve the complex moral problems that controversial reproductive health 
services give rise to. While the invocation to ‘do no harm’ is ostensibly a clear guideline in many 
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instances of medical practice, in the case of termination of pregnancy and related services, this is 
not the case. 
 
Chapter six: ‘do no harm’  
 
At the time of being admitted as a Member of the Medical Profession: I 
solemnly pledge myself to consecrate my life to the service of humanity; 
. . . I will practice my profession with conscience and dignity; . . . I will 
maintain the utmost respect for human life, from the time of conception, 
even under threat, I will not use my medical knowledge contrary to the 
laws of humanity; I make these promises solemnly, freely and upon my 
honour… [T]he health of my patient will be my first consideration.33 
 
As noted by Dickens on graduation and admission to professional practice, many health 
professionals including medical personnel pledge themselves to comply with modern variants of 
the historical Hippocratic Oath (2009:98b). The cornerstone of this Hippocratic Oath is the 
bioethics principle of ‘do no harm’. According to Sweifach, this principle obliges health 
professionals not to inflict harm upon their patients and “it derives from the maxim primum nil 
nocere (first do no harm)” (2011:4). For the purposes of this chapter, harm refers to “significant 
bodily harm, such as pain, disability or death or a patient’s conception of well-being” (ACOG 
Committee Opinion, 2007:3). By pledging the Hippocratic Oath, health professionals accept a set 
of moral values and duties that are central to the medical profession (Brody and Miller, 1998). 
Among these are the ‘duty to treat’ through using their professional knowledge and skills to 
serve their patients’ interests (Sweifach, 2011:1-2), even in circumstances where the service 
demanded  may conflict with the health professionals’ personal or self-interests (Dickens and 
Cook, 2000). However, as the chapter shows, while health professionals all pledge the same 
Hippocratic Oath, their interpretation and application of the principle of ‘do no harm’ in the 
context of TOP services, is however highly dependent on whom they regard as their patient: the 
woman seeking care or the foetus and on what they regard as constituting the most serious forms 
                                                 
33  World Medical Association. Declaration of Geneva, (2006), http://www.wma.net/e/policy/c8.htm. Accessed 5 
May 2014. 
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of harm – for instance, harm to society, harm to the pregnant woman, harm to the unborn foetus, 
harm to the child arising from an unwanted pregnancy. The ‘do no harm’ injunction does not 
clarify which of these harms ought to take precedence when choosing a course of action. 
As the previous chapter argued, the duty to refer is seen by some as a useful compromise 
position which enables the practitioner who objects to the provision of controversial reproductive 
services to nevertheless meet his or her professional and legal obligation to respect the rights and 
autonomy of the patient. The obligation to refer is in line with the World Medical Association’s 
(WMA) provision which recognises health professionals’ right to conscientiously object to 
providing contested legal reproductive services such as abortion on condition that they refer their 
patients to willing providers.34 Likewise, the WMA’s Declaration of Lisbon on the Rights of 
Patients reinforces the duty of appropriate referral by stating that: “The patient has the right to 
self-determination…[and] to the information necessary to make his or her decisions”.35 
However, what this formulation of the health professional’s duty is not able to clarify is who the 
patient should be regarded as. In some instances, health professionals regard pregnant women as 
their patients. For this reason, they agree to honour their obligation to refer and also enjoin other 
health professionals with conscience-based objections to follow suit. When the patient is 
constructed as the pregnant woman, the violation of conscience that might be involved in the 
provision of referrals does not outweigh the health professional’s first duty which is to prevent 
harm to the patient. 
I think you should be obligated to refer to a willing provider.  It is not 
your job as a doctor to be the moral guardian of other people.  In 
addition, the patient may be desperate and end up having a second 
trimester abortion or illegal or unsafe abortion (Doctor Thirteen). 
 
For Doctor Thirteen, denying a woman timeous referral could not only result in her resorting to 
unsafe abortion, but could also delay her access to an early abortion and end up with her being 
forced to seek a second trimester abortion or an illegal abortion. Being forced to obtain a second 
trimester abortion is seen as another form of harm on the part of some medical practitioners 
because of difficulties in obtaining TOP services at later gestation stages in South Africa as 
                                                 
34 World Medical Association. Medical Ethics Manual. 40 (2005). 
35World Medical Association, 1981. Amended version. (Paragraph 3) (1992). 
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research shows that these services are highly stigmatised by health professionals (Jewkes et al, 
2005a:1241; Bateman, 2011:304). Other than constructing the denying of a referral as 
consequently resulting in the woman seeking an abortion procedure in the second trimester 
gestation as constituting harm, this doctor also emphasises the need on the part of medical 
practitioners to prevent “conditions that put women’s health at risk” (Ferree et al, 2002:106-
107). 
 
In other words, Doctor Thirteen thinks that objecting to provide safe and legal TOP services may 
cause harm on the part of patients because he believes that women denied access to safe 
abortions may be desperate to the extent of either self-inducing their pregnancies or resorting to 
illegal and unskilled TOP providers. This doctor’s interpretation and application of the principle 
of ‘do no harm’ is in line with O’Connell and Mistrot’s view that “in some cases failure to refer 
may result in harm on the part of the patient” (2007 cited in Matheny Antommaria, 2011:96). 
This harm results from the association of illegal abortions with higher complications than those 
provided by a skilled health care provider in a legal and safe environment. For Dudová, these 
complications may range from immediate symptoms, such as bleeding and inflammation as well 
as long-term effects such as infertility and in some cases death (2010:955). 
 
Referral as necessarily implied in the duty to prevent harm to patients as the medical 
practitioner’s first obligation, is taken a step further in cases of emergency care necessitated by 
incomplete abortion. From an ethical point of view, health professionals regardless of their 
religious and personal beliefs are obliged to provide care as a fulfilment of their professional 
duty not to abandon their patients (Berlinger, 2008:39). The WMA International Code of 
Medical Ethics provides that, “a physician shall give emergency care as a humanitarian duty 
unless he or she is assured that others are willing and able to give such care” (Dickens, 
2009b:98). For some health care practitioners, this implies an ethical obligation to provide 
abortion services in emergency circumstances for instance where the patient is a woman 
presenting with complications resulting from unsafe/incomplete abortion. 
This [refusing care in these circumstances] is illegal, from my 
understanding. Several occasions in the past, I have assisted patients, 
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especially after their visit to a ‘back-street’ provider, with resuscitation 
(Doctor Fifty-eight). 
If a woman has attempted an abortion herself she should be assisted to 
complete the process safely (Doctor Twenty-nine). 
 
Importantly, in this framing of the limits and extent of the obligation of the medical practitioner, 
a distinction is to be made between an obligation to provide abortion on demand and an 
obligation to provide emergency assistance to a patient even if this emergency assistance 
involves completing an abortion or treating a spontaneous abortion. This is a distinction clearly 
articulated by several participants: 
An abortion for non-medical reasons is not an emergency. If the patient 
has an emergency I will always help. I will help if the patient had an 
abortion and gets complications due to the abortion (Doctor Eighteen). 
Spontaneous abortion occurs naturally, and so patients must be helped 
when it is incomplete, or becomes a threat (Doctor Sixteen). 
I would not perform termination of pregnancy on request, but I would 
attend to medical emergencies. I would and have performed many 
evacuations for incomplete abortions, being aware of the fact that 
probably most of those had attended backstreet abortionists or used other 
questionably methods (Doctor Thirty-three). 
 
For these doctors, vulnerable women showing up at health care facilities with complications 
from unsafe abortion qualify to be patients whom health professionals ought not to harm. In 
these instances not harming the patient requires the doctor to assist with the completion of 
incomplete abortions even though the same doctor would not provide abortion services in non-
emergency circumstances.  
No patient should ever be denied attention in an emergency. I do not 
terminate pregnancies but would treat the aftermath (Doctor Thirty). 
 
However, for some doctors, it is not immediately apparent that emergency circumstances ought 
to be framed in terms of harm to the pregnant woman alone. For these doctors, the question 
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remains whether the emergency is constructed from the point of view of the foetus as patient or 
the pregnant woman.  
According to the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) 
no doctor may refuse to provide emergency treatment to a patient but 
when involving taking a life to save a life the doctor should be allowed to 
say no (Doctor Thirty-five).  
A study conducted in the Western Cape Province of South Africa shows that this view is not an 
isolated rarity. The study found that “14% of doctors who are opposed to abortion said that they 
would not attend to women seeking abortion even in medical emergencies” (Ngwena, 2003:4). 
As Fiala and Arthur have noted, “conscientious objection regulations also require objectors to 
provide emergency care, but some doctors will risk a woman’s death rather than perform an 
abortion” (2014:9-10). This is because, as Sweifach argues, in the view of these practitioners, 
“the principle of nonmaleficence (do no harm), can be viewed in abortion cases as doing no harm 
to an unborn child” (2011:4). Several participants in the present study took the view that abortion 
is harm to the foetus and that the ‘do no harm’ injunction therefore ought correctly to be applied 
from the perspective of the serious harm to human life caused by abortion which is equated with 
murder.  
From an ethics perspective, I have a dilemma of how a medical 
professional will apply the first rule of medical ethics “do no harm” as 
she/he will be taking a life.  Thus, personally, I cannot perform abortions 
(Doctor Twenty-one). 
In fact, abortion should not be part of the health system at all in my 
opinion. There could be a totally separate government department 
dedicated to abortions apart from the health department, with abortion 
technicians instead of nurses and doctors having to do the dirty work. 
Doctors and nurses professions developed out of the drive to care for 
people and they are being perverted and twisted into professions that kill 
people instead (Doctor Three). 
We study to help people and save lives, not to kill babies. The foetus is 
perfectly formed in a few weeks and there is a heartbeat and a life 
(Doctor Forty-three). 
We are raised to heal and save lives, not to play God and not to end 
innocent lives (Doctor Five). 
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These participants emphasise the personhood of a foetus which is referred to as a ‘baby’ or 
‘child’ (see also Scheidler, 1985:68) rather than, for example, as a foetus or ‘the product of 
conception’ which is more typical of those who are willing to countenance abortion on demand. 
This construction of the foetus as person then gives rise to the view that the foetus is the patient 
whom they should not harm. TOP is thus seen as ‘taking life’ from Doctor Twenty-one’s 
perspective, ‘kill[ing] people’ from Doctor Three’s perspective, ‘kill[ing] babies’ from Doctor 
Forty-three’s perspective, and ‘end[ing] innocent lives’ from Doctor Five’s perspective – 
because the foetus is constructed as a person/patient.  
 
Many (see for example Doctor Five) who adopt this position do so on  religious grounds – for 
example equating abortion even to provide life-saving emergency treatment to an adult woman 
with ‘playing God’ (see also Collins, 2006:45; Deckers, 2010:1-2; Hopkins et al, 2005). Griffith 
has argued that Christian doctors who invoke CO to the provision of TOP procedures fear 
punishment directly from God on judgment day (2000). When contrasted with the enormity of 
disobeying God’s commands this renders the consequences that might result from denying 
women safe abortion insignificant. 
 
Constructed in this way the medical profession’s obligation to do no harm is framed as aimed at 
saving and not ending lives of patients – and abortion ends the life of the patient that is the 
foetus. From Doctor Three’s point of view, abortion is therefore seen as ‘dirty work’ that doctors 
and nurses should not participate in because doing so would be tantamount to intentionally 
harming (killing) patients rather than prolonging their lives and caring for them. Since in this 
view, “embryos are persons from conception” the inevitable conclusion is  that “they should be 
granted the same prima facie right to life as all other human beings” (Deckers, 2010:1-2; see also 
Ord, 2008:12).  
 
Dickens and Cook have referred to health professionals who conscientiously object to providing 
TOP services on the above doctors’ grounds as prioritising “the perceived interests of embryos 
and or foetuses over the rights and interests of the pregnant women who bear them” (2011:164). 
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Such prioritisation emanates chiefly from the characterisation of the medical profession as 
striving to help, heal, promote, protect and prolong human life (Whitcomb, 2010:799) combined 
with the characterisation of foetuses as human lives with interests that cannot be thought to be a 
priori outweighed by the interests of the pregnant woman. When the foetus and the pregnant 
woman are constructed as equal rights bearing subjects with interests that are opposing there is 
no easy way to resolve the moral dilemma posed even by emergency procedures aimed at saving 
a woman’s life at the expense of aborting a foetus. In such cases there will be serious harm to 
one of two rights-bearing subjects, both of which are worthy of equal consideration and 
protection from harm. Abortion will cause serious harm to one (the foetus) while completing an 
abortion will prevent serious harm to another (the pregnant woman).  
 
This has been the position taken in a number of high profile cases in which medical practitioners 
have taken an absolute position against the provision of any services related to termination of 
pregnancy including emergency intervention and referral. A case in point is that of the two 
Scottish midwives discussed in chapter three who refused even to indirectly participate in TOP 
services on religious grounds and subsequently took their employer, the NHS Greater Glasgow 
and Clyde Health Board to court (BBC News, 2013). The Court of Appeal ruled in favour of the 
midwives, ruling that they had the right to refuse any form of involvement in the whole process 
of TOP including delegating, supervising and supporting staff involved in TOP services. In 
celebrating their victory in this case both midwives highlighted the ethical principle of ‘do no 
harm’ as one of the important objectives of the midwifery profession:  
In holding all life to be sacred from conception to natural death, as 
midwives we have always worked in the knowledge we have two lives to 
care for throughout labour: a mother and that of her unborn child (BBC 
News, 2013). 
 
While health professionals have an ethical obligation not to abandon their patients including 
those seeking contested reproductive services (Berlinger, 2008:39), the interpretation of the 
principle of ‘do no harm’ from the perspective of the foetus provides a justification for also 
objecting to terminate pregnancies in emergency cases where such a termination could save the 
life of, or prevent injury to, a pregnant woman. For instance, in a Polish case, “…doctors let a 
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woman die out of concern that treating her for her colon disease might harm the foetus” (Center 
for Reproductive Rights, 2010). Another illustrative example is the October 2012 highly 
publicised Irish case of Savita Halappanavar who died of sepsis after doctors refused to terminate 
her pregnancy on the grounds that her foetus still had a heartbeat despite the fact that her life was 
in great danger (Berer, 2013). Both cases reveal the extreme degree to which health professionals 
may be willing to exercise CO when their views are based on the construction of the foetus as an 
equal, rights bearing subject (Fiala and Arthur, 2014:8).  
 
This view as a basis for the right to CO has been challenged by Cook et al, who have argued that 
this amounts to health professionals imposing their beliefs upon patients and also denying them 
adequate and quality care, thus violating the bioethical principle of non-maleficence ‘do no 
harm’(2003 cited in Casas, 2009:78). In this view, medical personnel as members of the ‘helping 
professions’ are expected to subordinate their own interests and beliefs in order to provide 
comprehensive care to their patients (Dickens, 2009a:726). However this objection is somewhat 
disingenuous since it begs the question of who the patient is. The debate between those who 
argue for the right of medical practitioners to exercise this extreme form of objection – extreme 
in the sense that taken to its logical extremity it can and has resulted in cases where the life of the 
foetus is rendered more significant or deserving of care than that of the adult pregnant woman – 
arises then, not because these medical practitioners are impervious to the ‘do no harm’ 
injunction, but rather because of who they see as needing to be protected from harm. 
 
This has given rise to the argument, in some settings, that forcing health professionals to both 
provide or refer patients for TOP and emergency contraception services “violates the Hippocratic 
Oath, which strictly opposes the harming of human life” (Stein, 2005 cited in Card, 2007:9).  A 
case in point is that of Karen Brauer, President of Pharmacists for Life International (PFLI36), 
who, despite losing her job as a pharmacist for refusing to fill birth control prescriptions Karen 
Brauer has remained committed to her interpretation and application of the principle of ‘do no 
harm’. 
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While the above debate discusses the principle of ‘do no harm’ from an individual point of view 
– whether that of the individual pregnant woman or the individual foetus -- a different 
construction of harm is the association of the aftermath of unsafe abortions with negative social 
consequences. As is the case in many other developing countries, studies in South Africa have 
shown that the total annual costs of treating complications from unsafe abortion morbidity in 
public health care facilities far exceed the costs of providing legal safe abortion services (Kay et 
al, 1997 cited in Grimes et al, 2006:1914; see also Moodley and Akinsooto, 2003:35). Unsafe 
abortion thus has and continues to negatively impact on the already declining and overburdened 
government health sector.  
 
Taking these considerations into account, some argue that the interpretation of ‘do no harm’ as 
giving rise to an obligation to treat incomplete abortions is unsatisfactory and in violation of the 
1994 Programme of Action of the United Nations International Conference on Population and 
Development’s (ICPD) recommendation that health professionals practicing in countries with 
liberal abortion legislations should provide safe TOP services on demand (Girard and Nowicka, 
2002). 
 
Feminist scholars have argued for an understanding of the choice to seek an abortion as an 
attempt to avoid “a kind of hardship that would follow from the birth of a particular child” 
(Stenvoll, 2007:45). As pointed out by Fiala and Arthur, “the right to CO in reproductive 
healthcare is widely accepted, even though refusing to provide an abortion for a woman in the 
difficult situation of an unwanted pregnancy has adverse consequences for her, not the objector” 
(2014:4). For patients who find themselves in particularly impoverished or difficult family 
circumstances, avoidance of the hardships that would result from the birth of a child is so 
pressing a need that if denied safe, legal services as Doctor 39 reasoned, the likely outcome will 
be an unsafe, illegal abortion. The research literature backs up this conclusion, showing that poor 
and vulnerable women who are denied access to TOP services often opt for unsafe abortion as a 
last resort (Grimes et al, 2006; see also Fiala and Arthur, 2014:9-10; Erdman, 2012:85). In South 
Africa moreover, high levels of maternal mortality has been directly attributed to health 
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professionals’ assertion of CO. Due to CO by health professionals, the number of terminations 
performed decreased from 77 207 in 2009 to 68 736 in 2010 (Department of Health, 2010). The 
findings of a 2011 South African report states that more than half of facilities designated to 
provide abortion do not do so, partly because of CO, resulting in the persistence of widespread 
unsafe abortion, morbidity and mortality (Guttmacher Institute, 2012).  
 
For several participants, the South African context of high levels of poverty and inequality with 
multiple forms of disadvantage highly concentrated among black women of lower socio-
economic status gives impetus to the moral imperative to provide services to these women which 
the health practitioner might under other circumstances find morally repugnant. These 
participants take a wider view of the harm that would result from invoking CO given the 
particularities of the South African context. To describe these circumstances very briefly: in its 
assessment of poverty trends from 1996 to 2001, the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) 
found that an approximate of 57 percent % of individuals in South Africa were living below the 
poverty income line in 2001 and this had remained unchanged from 1996 (HSRC, 2004:1). As 
was the case during apartheid, the majority of the people who continue to suffer the brunt of 
poverty are those living in rural areas (Lund, 2008:67). This is evidenced by the fact that the 
greater proportion of rural households rely mainly on remittances and state social grants for 
income (Department of Welfare, 1997:3) with black people continuing to be the most affected 
(Woolard et al, 2010:03; Neocosmos, 2011:10). This is evidenced by research conducted in 2011 
which found that “…in terms of poverty share, more than nine out of 10 (94,2%) poor people in 
South Africa were black Africans in 2011, a proportion that increased slightly from 2006 (92, 
9%) and 2009 (93, 2%)” (Statistics South Africa, 2014:27). 
 
This leads to the conclusion that invoking CO to the provision of TOP and MAP in this context, 
given an awareness that many black South African women bear the brunt of poverty and 
inequality, would be ethically unwarranted. Knowing these circumstances, to force these very 
women who are the most disempowered and vulnerable members of our society to carry their 
unwanted pregnancies to term would be to cause them harm by worsening this burden as well as 
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placing at risk of poor life outcomes the unwanted children who would result from these 
pregnancies.  
I 100 percent agree with this policy. It helps in preventing a lot of 
unwanted pregnancies especially with regards to patients who are under 
financial constraints which is the case with many South African 
women…I [also] believe in dispensing emergency contraception as we 
are living in an impoverished society filled with crime. I believe in 
women’s choice as to whether to have the baby or not, the number of 
unwanted babies can be reduced (Pharmacist Fourteen). 
I believe the patient should be referred to a colleague that has no 
objections to dispensing the product. An unwanted pregnancy might have 
a very detrimental effect to their financial position in life (Pharmacist 
Forty-eight). 
Children obviously cost a lot of money and change your life permanently, 
[the dispensing of] emergency contraception would help make a 
difference (Pharmacist Forty-five). 
As a woman I would prefer to see women exercise responsible decisions 
regarding a future pregnancy. Teenage Mothers and Mothers who have 
no means of supporting their baby need to concentrate on education and 
work to support themselves (Pharmacist Forty-two). 
 
For Doctor 57, social harms (as opposed to physical or psychological harms) would include, for 
example, in the case of a pregnant teenager remaining permanently in poverty: 
[In cases where a]…15 year old daughter with exceptional grades, 
presents with an unwanted 21 week pregnancy. [The doctor has to 
consider]…an extra year of school fees and the costs of a new born baby 
makes the situation impossible. The opportunity for this young girl (and 
her potential new born baby) to get out of the poverty cycle will be lost 
perhaps forever. Often adoption is not an acceptable alternative to the 15 
year old and her mother (Doctor Fifty-seven). 
 
As Jessica Shaw has argued “it is critical that women are able to decide whether to have children 
only when they feel that they are able to meet their personal requirements of what is needed to 
raise a healthy and happy family” (2013:5). Wicclair adds that pharmacists who refuse to fill 
legal prescriptions or to refer a patient to a willing provider cause obstruction to the provision of 
health services to which women are lawfully entitled (2006:242). Ceva and Moratti also add that 
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pharmacists denying women timeous access to EC risk undermining women’s right to 
reproductive self-determination  (2013:139; see also Hepler, 2005 cited in Keller, 2009:263). For 
Keller, restriction of access to EC perpetuates the gender injustice that is committed when men 
contribute to pregnancy but “often see themselves as free to ignore their role in that outcome” 
(2009:263). Also arguing from a gender equality perspective, Rebekah Gee points out that 
“limiting access to contraception sets women back, threatening their rights to achieve equally in 
society by robbing them of options for planning for childbearing” (2006:2). Likewise, Carolyn 
McLeod suggests that the disappointment that a woman suffers after being denied lawful access 
to EC by a pharmacist constitutes harm in the form of hindering her from exercising her 
reproductive rights (2010:17-18). McLeod disputes the contention of some pharmacists who 
refuse to dispense EC to women, particularly teenagers on the grounds that the easy availability 
of these drugs is likely to promote irresponsible sexual behaviour or promiscuity (2010). She 
argues that these beliefs serve to restrict and stigmatise women’s legal access to EC by validating 
sexist prejudices which aim at continuing the oppression of women and disrespecting their 
choices by depicting them as incapable of making autonomous decisions regarding their 
reproduction (McLeod, 2010:18-19).  
 
For several participants avoiding the social harms that result from the birth of unwanted children 
outweigh other possible moral considerations surrounding for instance the OTC dispensing of 
MAPs as well as TOP.  
You might be morally against it [that is dispensing the MAP] but will 
you be prepared to bring up that unwanted child? (Pharmacist Forty-
three).   
I am prepared to be involved in TOP services…, if a woman really feels 
unable to raise a child; I have no right to force her to carry the pregnancy 
[to term]. That would be paternalistic, and I will not be there when the 
baby cries from hunger, or is abused. It is a huge responsibility to raise a 
child. In my view, all pregnancies should be planned so that it can be a 
joy to the parents as it was intended. Conscientious objectors [should 
refer their patients]. If a doctor refuses to refer, and the woman ends up 
giving birth to an unwanted child, who is going to raise that child? I see 
too many unwanted kids in the paediatric ward – with emotional neglect 
affecting their growth (Doctor Fifteen).   
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The claim that an unintended pregnancy in a younger teenager is more likely to result in adverse 
outcomes such as placing her at risk of educational underachievement and poorer long term 
economic outcomes is supported in literature (Boden et al, 2008).  Doctor Fifteen willingness to 
provide TOP services stems from her concern about preventing future negative consequences on 
the part of resultant unwanted children who might run the risk of being victims of poverty and 
abuse. Doctor Fifteen also interprets the harm that results from health professionals’ right to CO 
from the perspective of resultant unwanted children and for this reason, she enjoins 
conscientiously objecting health professionals to refer their abortion-seeking patients to willing 
providers. For Doctor Fifteen, health professionals’ invocation of CO risks significantly harming 
the resultant children born to parents who were denied TOP services. 
The world is overpopulated, with poverty and all the other social evils 
that go hand in hand with it. I support this policy (Pharmacist Fifty-
seven). 
I am not happy with the idea but then take the ladies into to consideration 
who could bring unwanted children into the world who will not be cared 
for and there are enough of those already (Pharmacist Twenty-nine). 
Our country is overpopulated, and more people and young children are 
having sex before marriage and before they are able to even support 
themselves so it [the MAP] does help with that…(Pharmacist Thirty-
seven). 
As a young idealistic doctor I was anti-abortion. I then watched real life 
situations which were too tragic. The tragedy of many unwanted 
abandoned babies I have seen flushed down toilets or thrown into long 
drops, the destruction of lives of young girls from unwanted pregnancies 
is overwhelming and these and other personal experiences made me 
change my mind. I applaud the ANC government for bringing in this law 
(Doctor Twenty-six). 
 
These views are supported by research findings which suggest that harms to children born as a 
result of unwanted or unintended pregnancies range from lifelong dysfunction, including child 
abuse or neglect, to emotional handicaps, and stunted intellectual and educational development 
(Arthur, 1999; see also David, 2011). Gipson et al, found that in low-resource countries 
unintended pregnancies negatively impact on prenatal care, breastfeeding behaviour, and child 
nutrition (2008). Foster et al, found that unwanted children whose mothers were denied access to 
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TOP services are likely to grow up in poverty or face health complications (2012). A 
longitudinal study in Prague, Czech Republic found that many children born to women who were 
refused abortion for unwanted pregnancies ran a greater risk of negative psychosocial 
development and mental well-being as adults (David, 2006; see also Dytrych et al, 1975). For 
these reasons, Weisberg and Fraser have pointed to the need to always take into account the right 
of the unborn child when considering EC because “every child has the right to be a wanted child 
and not enter this world because its mother was denied access to EC” (2009:162). 
 
While many participants cited the difficulty of reconciling provision of termination services with 
their own religious and moral beliefs, in some cases the predicted harm to children born of 
unwanted pregnancies were seen to outweigh their own religious views.  
I do believe in dispensing the emergency contraception because the 
implications of unwanted pregnancy are huge and far reaching and 
outweigh [the pharmacist’s] moral, religious and cultural beliefs 
(Pharmacist Ten). 
With reference to my comments regarding the fact that many unwanted 
babies are often abandoned and abused etc. and no doubt many on these 
could be avoided if the mother had been able to prevent the pregnancy, I 
do not let my personal feelings or religion interfere with the patients’ 
feelings. If the patient wanted this baby she would not be asking me as 
her pharmacist for the morning after pill (Pharmacist Forty-two). 
I am prepared to be involved in TOP services…I have agonised over this 
issue as a Christian, and came to the conclusion that my calling is to help, 
not to judge…because I know for many of the women choosing TOP as a 
last resort, if they had the means to look after a child they would have 
kept the pregnancy. And it is the woman who makes the decision, not me. 
I just facilitate it happening in a safe clinical environment, one of the 
main reasons for the law was the number of deaths from septic backstreet 
abortions (Doctor Fifteen). 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that the application of the principle ‘do no harm’ in relation to 
controversial reproductive health services leads to a divergence of possible practices ranging 
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from an injunction to provide abortion on demand to a refusal to treat even in cases of 
emergency when the life of the pregnant woman is in danger. Where the principle of ‘do no 
harm’ is interpreted from the perspective of the pregnant woman alone and the foetus is not 
regarded as having the status of a person deserving moral consideration, the likely outcome is to 
regard such treatment as required and morally permissible. But where the foetus is regarded as a 
person it is possible to argue that the requirement to act according to the obligations of the law is 
unthinkable because it is tantamount to requiring a physician to murder a patient. The latter view 
can be used to support even a refusal to refer a patient to a willing provider given that this can be 
equated to collusion with the deliberate killing of an innocent.  
 
A different interpretation of the ‘do no harm’ injunction goes beyond the narrowly constructed 
individual relationship between the physician and the individual patient (whether woman or 
foetus). A longer term social interpretation of the harms that follow from the lack of provision of 
termination of pregnancy and related reproductive health services is taken by those who include 
in their analysis of harm such considerations as the public health burden resulting from illegal 
abortion, the economic burden resulting from women having to leave education in order to take 
care of children and the harm to future children born to parents denied access to safe and timeous 
reproductive health services. 
 
Chapter seven: consequentialism  
 
Judging the morality of an act according to its consequences is a commonly employed and 
compelling form of moral reasoning. According to Frank Jackson, “consequentialism approaches 
the question of whether an action is right or wrong in terms of a comparison of the possible 
outcomes of the action with the possible outcomes of each available alternative to that action” 
(1991:462). For Dale Jamieson and Robert Elliot, “consequentialism is the family of theories that 
holds that acts are morally right, wrong, and indifferent by virtue of their consequence [and] 
right acts are those with good consequences” (2009:241). Consequentialism thus judges the 
ethical rightness or wrongness of an action based on the consequences that action has. While 
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there are many versions of consequentialism, for purposes of this chapter I confine my 
discussion to the earliest and most well-known consequentialist theory, which is hedonistic 
utilitarianism which holds that the goodness of an outcome is the total balance of happiness over 
suffering (Moore, 1912). Utilitarianism is an ethical doctrine that judges actions according to the 
number of people who are made happy by these actions with the aim of achieving the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number (Vincent et al, 2012:169). As John Stuart Mill famously 
expressed the doctrine, “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong 
as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness” (1863 cited in Vincent et al, 2012:149). 
According to Jamieson and Elliot, “hedonistic act utilitarianism hold that acts are right, wrong, 
or indifferent by virtue of the pleasure they produce; an action is right if it produces the 
maximum possible pleasure and wrong if it does not” (2009:242; see also Moore, 1912:19). 
 
Some have argued that consequentialism is fruitful in solving moral conflicts as it always 
provides an answer to hard moral questions (Bergström, 1996:77). When solving morally 
controversial disputes, Charles Goodman enjoins consequentialists to always “endorse rules that 
would produce the best consequences if everybody followed them; or merely if everybody tried 
to follow them; or perhaps if enough people tried to follow them” (2013:613-614). In this chapter 
I discuss the ways in which participants in the study employed various forms of consequentialist 
reasoning to negotiate their interpretation of the moral dilemma occasioned by the tension 
between women’s reproductive rights and the health provider’s right to conscientious objection. 
As the chapter illustrates, the difficulty with consequentialist forms of moral reasoning is that 
they can be employed to support diametrically opposing courses of action, given the complexity 
of calculating social outcomes with any degree of accuracy or impartiality. The consequences 
that are predicted to be the result of a particular action often say more about the ideological 
position, interests and identity of the speaker than anything else.  
 
Thus we see in the chapter those who allege negative long-term health consequences for women 
resulting from TOP and MAP citing these as justification for their right to CO. On the other hand 
those who cite negative and social individual consequences resulting from unwanted pregnancy 
see these consequences as justifying their conclusion that CO is not morally supportable.  
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 Consequentialist reasoning employed to justify non provision of termination 
and MAP services 
 
The ethical principle of ‘beneficience’ imposes on health professionals a moral duty to promote 
the welfare, health, and wellbeing of their patients (Beauchamp and Childress, 2001; see also 
Schroeter, 2008). Guided by this ethical principle, some participants justified their invocation of 
CO to the provision of TOP and MAP services as yielding the greater health promoting 
outcomes for their patients. Pharmacists argued for example that the negative health 
consequences of unrestricted distribution of MAPs include the spread of sexually transmitted 
infections (STIs) and sexually transmitted diseases (STD’s) including HIV and AIDS, the 
promotion of promiscuity, and even cancer and stroke.  
I find it troubling because the person is having unprotected sex which 
could be with one or many partners, and this leaves them at risk for any 
STDs/STIs. Pregnancy is not the only thing we worry about as health 
care professionals (Pharmacist Thirty-seven). 
I do find it concerning. Then there can also be increased risk to HIV, 
AIDS and STD’s if it is not in controlled relationship (Pharmacist Nine). 
The scary part is the risk of STI’s and AIDS. Very often women do not 
realise these dangers (Pharmacist Forty). 
It was a good idea to prevent unwanted pregnancies, but I see a lot of 
people using it in place of the pill or other forms of contraception without 
ever thinking that HIV could also be contracted and it becomes a life 
style, have sex get morning after pill (Pharmacist Twenty-nine). 
 
As is the case with other hormonal contraceptives, all emergency contraceptive methods provide 
no protection from STIs, STD’s, HIV and AIDS, rather abstinence or latex condoms provide the 
best protection against these diseases (Parker, 2005:4). The participants cited above construct 
their reluctance to comply with clients’ requests, especially repeated requests, for MAP resulting 
from their awareness of these consequences. However infused in these remarks are moral 
prescriptions and assumptions, 
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MAPs are suspected of enticing women to adopt a more promiscuous ‘lifestyle’; the idea of a 
‘controlled’ relationship suggests a distinction between approved of and not approved of 
relationship types and women are constructed as ignorant of how diseases are transmitted. It 
becomes clear then that these participants do not feel uncomfortable with the medication as such 
– for example because it is regarded as an abortifacient. Rather, their discomfort stems from 
disapproval of their clients’ lifestyles, relationships and choices.  
 
Similar findings have been reported in many other settings. In a 2011 cross-sectional survey 
conducted in Managua, Nicaragua which explored pharmacists’ knowledge of and attitudes 
toward emergency contraceptive pills (Ehrle and Sarker, 2011:72), the majority of study 
participants expressed negative attitudes toward emergency contraceptive pills. They were 
particularly concerned that the pills’ availability might encourage sexual risk-taking including 
lack of condom use which they feared would increase the transmission of HIV and other STIs 
(Ehrle and Sarker, 2011:72). Likewise, a study of emergency contraception providers in Jamaica 
and Barbados also found that many providers criticised OTC dispensing of EC as they felt this 
could encourage sexual risk-taking and lead to an increased incidence of STIs (Yam et al, 2007).  
Defending his principle of harm to others as the sole basis on which the freedom of choice of a 
person can legitimately be restricted, John Stuart Mill specifically excluded others deciding what 
is in our interests as grounds for preventing us from doing something.  
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant 
(Mill, 1806-1873:68). 
 
At the basis of many of these claims to be acting in the interests of their patients who are 
ignorant lies an infantilisation of women and a relationship of power between the health provider 
and the patient, particularly when that patient is poor, female and black.  
If used correctly [emergency contraception], there is a place for it in 
society, unfortunately it has resulted in too much promiscuity leading to 
STDs and HIV-taken too lightly (Pharmacist Sixteen). 
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I believe that it will promote promiscuity and expose people to dangerous 
health concerns. It is a concern (Pharmacist Forty-seven). 
I think that it was not a good policy because it just give women and men 
another reason to have unprotected sex when South Africa is already 
known as the country with the highest AIDS rate…I see it as an easy way 
out (scape goat), it is just another reason for people not to put their health 
first (unprotected sex) (Pharmacist Six). 
Yes, I find it [dispensing repeated requests for emergency contraception] 
troubling because it makes you wonder how many partners they have or 
if it’s some else’s partner (Pharmacist Six). 
 
In these participants’ comments, the concern about negative health outcomes is closely 
intertwined with the concern than unrestricted provision of MAPs will make women more 
promiscuous. Gee’s ‘figured worlds’ tool enjoins the analyst of discourse “to ask what typical 
stories or figured worlds the words and phrases of the communication are assuming and inviting 
listeners to assume” (2011:168). The figured world that Pharmacist Six is inviting listeners to 
assume can be understood by the distinction that he draws between what he thinks is normal and 
abnormal with regards to women requesting MAPs. From this, what Pharmacist Six regards as 
normal or good is for women to request MAPs once in their lifetimes as this shows that they are 
having sex with one partner and are also loyal to their partners and this is a normal and 
appropriate way of conducting oneself sexually. Normal and appropriate conduct in turn leads to 
the right to access the MAP. In contrast repeated requests for MAPs are an indication of 
abnormal or bad behaviour which includes either being unfaithful to one’s partner or having 
unprotected sex with many different men. The distinction in turn justifies refusal to provide 
MAPs for those who do not fit into the moral norms constructed as appropriate by the speaker.  
 
Given that there is scant evidence to suggest that availability of MAPs does actually increase the 
rate of STDs, HIV and AIDS, it is hard to resist the conclusion that the argument about negative 
health outcomes is acting as a Trojan horse. Raymond and colleagues’ randomised trial study of 
sexually active women in Navada and North Carolina, US between 2002 and 2005 concluded 
that better access to EC does not increase the acquisition of STIs (Raymond et al, 2006). In 
addition to that, other studies have also found that efforts to increase access to ECPs such as 
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providing women with EC in advance of need have not been shown to increase rates of 
unintended pregnancy or STIs (Gold et al, 2004; Raymond et al, 2006). Rather, in reality, a 
woman’s risk of contracting an STI depends on having unprotected sexual intercourse with an 
infected partner (Weisberg and Fraser, 2009:161).  
 
Nor is there evidence to suggest that claims about increased rates of cancer, stroke or loss of 
immunity have any basis. The fact that they are routinely cited by professionals trained in 
evidence-based practice suggests the need for an explanation as to why dire health consequences 
are invoked in the absence of evidence for such consequences.  
 
I caution them that it is now time then for a more permanent prevention 
and that the morning after is just a once-off help and that it can’t be used 
again and again, since it is dangerous and might lead to cancer if used 
often (Pharmacist Forty-three). 
I do find it concerning. Due to simple reasons i.e. risk of DVT and stroke 
as result of high dosage hormone in presence of various risk factors 
(Pharmacist Nine). 
I only prescribe the morning after pill once. It is not safe to repeat it more 
than twice because it messes up a woman’s immune system (Pharmacist 
Six). 
While each of these participants agrees that repeated requests for MAPs are problematic on the 
grounds that these result in adverse health consequences, they each have a different view 
regarding exactly what these health consequences might be. If there was clear evidence that these 
claims were based on them presumably all respondents would be making the same rather than 
different arguments about health consequences. 
 
Additionally, while negative side-effects of medication are a reason to provide information to a 
patient, it is unusual to see these as a reason to refuse to provide a legal medication. Studies have 
for instance shown that “having used birth-control pills elevates the risk of developing breast 
cancer nearly tenfold” (McGovern, 2014) but this has never been invoked as a reason to refuse 
women access to birth control pills. Westleya and Glasier have argued that emergency 
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contraceptive methods are safe and that “it has been clearly demonstrated through countless 
studies and many decades of use: no new research needs to be conducted” (2010:243). Research 
by the WHO has shown that repeat use of all forms of emergency contraceptive methods is safe 
and poses no health risks and for this reason, the WHO has placed repeat EC use in Category 1 
of its medical eligibility guidelines, indicating that there is no restriction for the repeat use of this 
contraceptive method (WHO, 2000). Moreover, the WHO guidelines on EC service delivery 
state that, “although frequent use of emergency contraceptive pills is not recommended, repeat 
use poses no health risks and [health risks] should never be cited as a reason for denying women 
access to treatment” (WHO, 1998a). 
 
These widely known conclusions make it all the more troubling that nebulous ‘health risks’ are 
cited as a reason for refusing or for stigmatising women who choose to request this particular 
medication. Some respondents reported that while they would not refuse repeated requests, they 
felt it important to counsel women making these requests about the possible effects on their 
hormonal cycle. It is unclear why this is regarded as a matter of such significance that it is 
invoked as a serious negative consequence when weighed up against the negative consequences 
of unwanted pregnancy not only for the pregnant woman. 
It works more like abortion before the implantation of the embryo or 
development, the women have to be aware how it affects their hormonal 
cycle and consequences such as infertility if used more often (Pharmacist 
Thirty-four). 
The emergency contraception tablets have high doses of hormones, and 
fluctuations in hormonal levels in the body are not healthy for extended 
periods. It is at this point where patients should be made aware of the 
monthly regimen which has a steady administration of hormones 
(Pharmacist Twenty-four). 
I also warn that constant and regular use of the emergency contraception 
could have negative effects on hormonal control (Pharmacist Forty-five). 
[I find repeated requests for the MAP troubling] I always try to take time 
and explain the negatives when used often especially regarding 
characteristic of the cycle changing (Pharmacist Nineteen). 
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Parker maintains that providers’ lack awareness and knowledge of the correct use of ECPs and 
often have biases and misconceptions, which pose significant barriers to potential ECPs users” 
(2005:6). One study of pharmacists in Jamaica and Barbados revealed that lack of specific 
knowledge about emergency contraceptive pills resulted in many participants overestimating 
their contraindications and side effects and this was then used as a justification for invoking CO 
(Yam et al, 2007).  
 
Isaacson has argued that “language has the power to reify mental constructs as concrete realities 
[especially with regards to] the use of medical terminology, as part of technical language 
belonging to an elite profession, enables physicians to define what significant categories of 
meaning are” (1996:462). The association of MAPs with abortion -- which is contradicted by 
medical science – serves to construct MAPs as much more controversial than they are, linking 
them to termination of pregnancy and thus to wider debates around the ethics of termination of 
pregnancy. Similarly, constant use of medical terms serves to underline the authority of the 
provider in contrast to the ignorance of the client.   
 
Also noteworthy is the fact the preferred advice cited by some participants is to counsel women 
to use regular hormonal contraceptives instead of repeatedly requesting MAPs – and there is no 
reference to the side effects and health risks associated with regular contraceptive use.  
 
The use of MAPs may result in minimal and temporary side effects which normally last between 
24 to 72 hours and these may range from nausea, vomiting, headaches, dizziness, cramping, 
fatigue, or breast tenderness (Glasier, 2013:309). A WHO study found that about 20 percent of 
women taking the combined ECP experienced vomiting and 50 percent experienced nausea, 
compared to only six percent with vomiting and 20 percent with nausea among those taking the 
progestin-only pill (WHO, 1998b). These short term side-effects aside, research has shown that 
repeated use of ECs does not pose any known long term health risks, apart from menstrual 
irregularities (WHO, 2012). Research has also demonstrated that women who used EC more than 
once in the same menstrual cycle have not reported serious adverse outcomes (Halpern et al, 
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2010). In this light, because of the health risks that pregnancy carries, taking EC is likely safer 
than carrying an unwanted pregnancy to term (FPCR, 2013). 
 
Based on the safety of emergency contraceptive methods, some countries have begun to take an 
expansive approach to providing women with MAPs in advance of need. For instance, in 
response to growing teenage pregnancy in the UK, in May 2014, the National Institute for Health 
and Clinical Excellence (NICE) “renewed its 2010 call for young people to be given emergency 
contraception to keep at home in advance of sexual intercourse in case they need it” (Donnelly, 
2014). Thus, under new guidance from the NICE teenagers under 16 years are now able to pre-
order emergency contraception including the MAPs and the IUD (intrauterine device, or coil) 
(Donnelly, 2014). Not only that, but the new guidance also imposes an obligation on public and 
high school pharmacists to provide EC to sexually active pupils in advance on request without 
requiring the authorisation or notification of their parents (Donnelly, 2014). Professor Mike 
Kelly, director of the Centre for Public Health at NICE, said the reason why NICE took this 
extraordinary initiative was primarily because: “evidence clearly shows that the availability of 
contraception reduces the rate of unwanted pregnancies” (Donnelly, 2014). 
 
Having discussed the deployment of consequentialist reasoning by pharmacists who are opposed 
to the unrestricted availability of MAPs to their clients, I turn now to the doctors in the study 
who employed consequentialist arguments to explain their opposition to termination of 
pregnancy. Many of these doctors referred to their belief that negative health consequences 
resulting from abortion including long-term psychological effects especially on the part of 
women who obtain second trimester abortions. 
The State must fund and promote adoption agencies for those unwanted 
babies. We need to get to the root of the problem and not provide a quick 
fix solution. Research has shown there are severe psychological 
consequences to both women who have abortions and their partners at 
some stage in their life i.e. post-traumatic stress disorder and 
depression… In my experience as a doctor I have always guided my 
patient to the preservation of life (Doctor Twenty-three).  
[For] many [women] abortions are requested for the wrong reasons – as 
admitted by the receivers thereafter. I have seen many patients become 
 97 | P a g e  
 
severely depressed post-abortion. I have never done one, but have 
worked with a colleague, who became extremely depressed while doing 
them. I have counselled quite a few potential “pro-choice” mothers, 
whom I have referred to appropriate centres – of those many have 
decided to not go through with the abortion. Knowledge of alternative 
choices to abortion is lacking in South Africa. I know of very few studies 
that have been done on the effects of abortion on the woman (Doctor 
Eight). 
I have been involved in the management of patients after they have 
aborted at home and those patients are so self-judgmental!  So sad and 
unhappy that they don’t need anyone else talking to them about how bad 
they are (Doctor Thirteen).  
 
For Doctor 23, abortion may seem like a ‘quick fix’ but in reality it results in negative long-term 
psychological consequences in the form of post-traumatic stress disorder and depression. Doctor 
8 sees women as often requesting TOP procedures for ‘wrong’ reasons and believes that this will 
lead to negative health consequences in the form of post-abortion depression, not only on the part 
of the patient but also on the part of the physician. Although this doctor has never actually 
performed an abortion procedure, he however bases his belief on the experience of a colleague 
experience whom he believes subsequently suffered severe depression as a result of performing 
abortions. Avoiding harm to self is, to say the least, a controversial justification for failure to 
fulfil a professional duty on the part of a medical practitioner. The remedy proposed by this 
doctor, moreover, reveals that his aim is to direct his patients to his preferred outcome rather than 
to whatever outcome is chosen by the patient herself. He refers his abortion-seeking patients to 
pro-life centres where they will be ‘counselled’ to carry their pregnancies to term rather than 
opting for abortion. Doctor 13 makes the oft-heard claim that women who undergo abortions 
suffer post-traumatic stress, depression and loss of self-esteem. It is worth noting however, that 
the empirical evidence in support of this claim is inconclusive.  
 
The ACOG Committee Opinion has forcefully argued that “refusals to provide abortion should 
not be justified on the basis of unsubstantiated health risks to women” (2007:4). Yet many of the 
doctors in the present study cited concerns about the future psychological effects on women as 
the reason why they are not willing to perform terminations or to refer patients to willing 
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providers. Several studies have however dismissed claims that women who have elective 
abortions will inevitably experience psychological distress of any kind as a result of the 
termination. For instance, Adler and colleagues found that there is no scientific “evidence that 
abortion is likely to be followed by severe psychological responses and that psychological 
aspects can best be understood within a framework of normal stress and coping rather than a 
model of psychopathology” (Adler et al, 1992:1194; see also Adler et al, 1990; Bradshaw and 
Slade, 2003; Dagg, 1991; Lewis, 1997; Romans-Clarkson, 1989; Turell et al, 1990; Zolese and 
Blacker, 1992; Vignetta et al, 2008).  
 
Yet participants routinely treated emotional trauma as an inevitable consequence of abortion, 
particularly in the case of second trimester abortion which, as we have seen, is a procedure that is 
more likely to be requested by the most disadvantaged and disempowered.  
Few doctors will do second trimester abortions. I strongly believe these 
procedures produce far more complications than what we think. It is very 
difficult to treat a patient that had an abortion done when she was 20 
years old and now presents with emotional issues when she is 40 years 
old (Doctor Fifty-one). 
This [that is, second trimester abortion] is even a more serious medical 
and emotional situation to cope with for patient and doctor. I see too 
many patients that had a TOP as a young lady and end up with problems 
of reproduction later and have serious emotional scarring!! (Doctor 
Twelve).   
If a second trimester abortion is done on clear medical/psychological 
grounds I have no problem. It is that abortion done on request which 
causes psychological problems later. …. It is patients’ psychological 
problems which helped me make up my mind to specialise in 
Anaesthesia (Doctor Thirty-seven).    
 
Doctor 51 justifies his non-involvement in performing second trimester abortions on the grounds 
of the resultant untreatable long-term emotional consequences for patients. Doctor 12 associates 
all abortions with subsequent negative psychological consequences both for the TOP service 
provider and the patient, but feels that these consequences are more severe in the case of second 
trimester abortions and particularly for teenagers.   
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Contrary to these claims, while abortions at later gestational ages including second trimester 
abortions are associated with greater risks of complications (Bartlett et al, 2004) as compared to 
first trimester abortions (Cook and Dickens, 1981:73), this does not however, mean that second 
trimester abortions are not safe. Dalvie argues that second trimester abortions can be carried out 
safely given appropriate operating facilities and facilities for blood transfusion, transportation, 
etc. (2008:39-40). A hospital-based South African study by Basu and Basu has also confirmed 
the safety and effectiveness of second trimester TOP using misoprostol drugs (2009:173).  
 
 Consequentialist reasoning employed to contest non provision of termination 
and MAP services 
 
While the legalisation of abortion in South Africa increased the number of abortions performed 
notable is the fact that this did not reduce abortion-related mortalities (Johnston, 2010), as many 
women continue to resort to unsafe termination practices outside designated facilities (Jewkes et 
al, 2005a:1240; Dickson et al, 2003:284; Meel et al, 2009). For instance, the 2005-2007 ‘Saving 
Mothers Report’ for the first time noted an increase in the number of avoidable deaths from 
abortion from 4.7% to 4.9% (Bateman, 2011:302). During 1997 alone, the Department of Health 
inquiry into maternal deaths revealed that 575 deaths resulted from pregnancy related unsafe 
abortions (Department of Health, 1997). The 1998 inquiry showed that 60.5% of early pregnancy 
deaths and 38.8% of deaths from pregnancy-related sepsis were due to unsafe abortions 
(Department of Health, 1998). 
Research further reveals that an increase of number of deaths by 20.1% in the triennium (2005-
2007) as compared with the previous triennium (2002-2004) was caused by complications 
resulting from unsafe abortions (NCCEMD, 2007:3). By the 2005-2007 period, annual abortion- 
related deaths accounted for only 3.3% of all maternal deaths (van Bogaert, 2002). In 2006, the 
South African triennium report found that, maternal death attributed 3.5% of the total maternal 
deaths directly to unsafe abortion (Department of Health, 2006). According to the 2012 Saving 
Mothers report, 23% of MM resulted directly from complications from unsafe abortion 
(NCCEMD, 2012). 
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The reason for high levels of morbidity and mortality rates from complications of unsafe 
abortion emanates from the lack of awareness about the legality of abortion particularly among 
the majority poor women. Following the decriminalisation of abortion, Varkey points out that, 
“at the community level, little has been done by health services to inform people of the [CTOP] 
Act” (2000:88), and this has resulted in almost a third of South African women believing that 
abortion is still banned, thus resorting to illegal abortions (van Bogaert, 2002). Likewise, one 
1997 study conducted in the Cape Metropolitan Region, for example, found that many women 
were poorly informed about their reproductive rights. Of 183 participants, more than 90% had no 
knowledge of the conditions under which abortion was legal (de Pinho and McIntyre, 1997). A 
2006 study found that an approximate 30% of the study participants believed that abortion was 
still illegal (Morroni et al, 2006:7). Additionally, a cross-sectional study among 831 sexually-
active women attending 26 public health clinics in one urban and one rural health region of the 
Western Cape Province conducted by Chelsea and colleagues also found that most women did 
not know about the legality of abortion in South Africa (Chelsea et al, 2006:3). 
 
As has been illustrated by the above figures, unsafe abortions are responsible for a significant 
proportion of maternal deaths in South Africa. This context was referred to by those participants 
in the present study who described non-involvement in the provision of TOP and MAP services 
as having the consequence of many women resorting to unsafe abortion practices. Employing 
consequentialist moral reasoning, these participants argued that reducing maternal and morbidity 
rates required medical practitioners to either provide reproductive health services themselves or 
refer TOP and MAP services-seeking patients to willing providers. Objecting to the provision of 
these services or to referral was rejected on the grounds of the disastrous consequences that this 
would have, putting patients’ lives and health at risk as a result of their opting for unsafe 
abortion.  
Yes they [the conscientiously objecting doctors] do [have an obligation to 
refer their patients to willing providers], otherwise their unwillingness to 
help the patient might lead to the patient choosing an unsafe alternative, 
thus making them [doctors] liable for any resulting mortality or morbidity 
on the side of the patient (Doctor Thirty-eight). 
 101 | P a g e  
 
The doctor has an obligation to refer if he/she does not support the Act. 
She will probably find a back yard person to perform it as well.  
Therefore, I think referring to a willing colleague provides for better care 
and less complications (Doctor Fifty-two). 
Yes, the patient must be referred. She might make use of unsafe 
procedures if not referred (Doctor Fifty-one).  
Of course, they must refer the patient. To deny referral is to endanger the 
requesting woman’s life and well-being (Doctor Fifty).  
I personally do not think abortion is right; but feel that every woman 
should have the right to decide according to her circumstances. It is better 
for women to have abortion in controlled and aseptic circumstances than 
being desperate and having it done by someone not qualified or doing it 
too late (Doctor Forty-nine). 
 
These participants agree that the adverse consequences of unsafe abortion can practically be 
prevented if all health professionals who assert their right to CO timeously refer their patients to 
non-objecting providers. In this view, an efficient referral system would have the positive 
consequence of saving lives. The negative consequences of unsafe abortion are seen to far 
outweigh any possible negative consequences of choosing to provide women with these services. 
Doctors who refuse to refer their abortion-seeking patients to willing providers are seen to 
directly contribute to these negative consequences.  
 
The insistence on the duty to refer is in line with the prescriptions of the CTOP Act which 
“allows for conscientious objection on the part of health care providers, [but] … also clearly 
states that if a woman requests a termination of pregnancy, she also has rights under the Act. If 
the health care provider cannot, or will not, provide an abortion, he/she is obliged to refer the 
woman to a health professional who is prepared to provide the service” (Dickson-Tetteh and 
Rees, 1999:191-192). Their reasoning is also confirmed by research which shows that women 
denied lawful access to TOP services are often exposed to negative consequences in the form of 
the serious health risks of unsafe abortion (Erdman, 2012:85; see also Fiala and Arthur, 2014:7) 
with an estimated 47, 000 women dying annually due to unsafe abortion-related complications 
(Shah and Ahman, 2010) and 8, 5 million are injured (Guttmacher Institute, 2010 cited in Fiala 
and Arthur, 2014:16). 
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Yes I believe they have to have information on proper and safe services. 
The patient will seek an abortion irrespective of what the doctor feels and 
she might end up with an illegal service provider (Doctor Thirty-nine). 
I am aware that patients will seek backstreet abortionists or alternative 
ways if legal ways are not available. A practitioner should not fail to treat 
a patient in need, whatever the cause of the need (Doctor Thirty-three). 
 
Dickson-Tetteh and Rees have argued that in South Africa, maternal deaths from complications 
of unsafe abortion “are almost all entirely preventable” (1999:190), and the same also holds true 
for other countries where abortion is legal (Grimes et al, 2006:1908) through improvement of 
family planning services and expansion of access to safe abortion services (Kulczycki et al, 
1996:1667). The importance of the need for health professionals to refer their abortion-seeking 
patients has been acknowledged by participants in the international medical CO debate.  Mark 
Wicclair, for instance, has stressed the necessity of referral on the part of conscientiously 
objecting health professional primarily on the grounds that to withdraw care “without facilitating 
a transfer would constitute abandonment” (2000:226), which is unethical both in medicine and 
pharmacy practice (Berlinger, 2008:39). As such, in Savulescu’s terms, this abandonment on the 
grounds of CO ought not to be accommodated because it compromises the delivery of quality, 
efficient, safe and legal TOP services for women (2006:296).  
 
Conclusion 
 
Consequentialism has been associated with several weaknesses by its several prominent critics. 
For instance, Germain Grisez, finds consequentialism rationally and morally unacceptable 
because it “implies that there are no intrinsically evil acts” (1978:24-25). The philosopher 
Bernard Williams for instance argues that the killing of innocent human beings is intrinsically 
wrong, and for this reason, he criticises the utilitarianism version of consequentialism for 
seeming “to imply that, under certain conditions, you ought to kill an innocent person in order to 
save several others” (1973:98 cited in Bergström, 1996:78).  
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Similarly, in his book, The Rejection of Consequentialism, Samuel Scheffler dismissed 
consequentialism as morally inferior as it permits an agent sometimes to behave partly in the 
light of what he or she naturally wants to do, even if this does not maximise utility (1982) – in 
other words, consequentialist moral arguments lend themselves to a selective appropriation of 
evidence to suit one’s existing convictions. This problem is exemplified in the present chapter 
which sees health professionals, particularly those who object to repeated requests for MAPs and 
those who object to later gestation abortions, referring to long-term negative health outcomes 
that are not confirmed by research. The exaggeration of negative health consequences appears to 
act to justify a pre-existing unwillingness to provide these services rather than being based on an 
impartial calculation of consequences. This is confirmed by Fiala and Arthur when they argue 
that “the misconceptions around abortion and the MAP turn CO into an attractive solution for 
individual healthcare providers (ironically reinforcing those negative attitudes and beliefs)” 
(2014:6). 
 
For Mill, “the principle of utility involves an assessment of only an action’s consequences, and 
not the motives or character traits of the agent performing the action” (1863 cited in Vincent et 
al, 2012:169-170). But as we have seen, those invoking consequentialist reasons for their 
unwillingness to provide women with reproductive health services are seldom able to make this 
distinction very sharply in practice.  
 
Consequentialist reasoning allows for the selection of which negative outcomes to emphasise and 
which to ignore. In this case negative health outcomes are emphasised but other consequences 
for patients denied care do not make an appearance in the moral calculation of the likely 
outcomes of refusing services to women or making access to such services more difficult.  
 
The chapter shows that diametrically opposed courses of action can be supported using 
consequentialist reason. Some participants argued that they are justified in refusing to provide 
TOP and MAP services because they believe that the easily availability of these services result in 
long-term negative health and psychological consequences on the part of requesting patients. On 
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the other hand participants in favour of these services referred to current high levels of maternal 
morbidity levels resulting from unsafe abortions in South Africa justifying their decision to 
provide these even when their own religious or moral framework is not in favour of them. 
Consequentialist forms of moral reasoning appear to be readily cut to suit the coat of the speaker 
thus rendering women’s reproductive rights vulnerable to the personal views of some health 
providers who may draw selectively and partially on the available evidence and in foregrounding 
their own moral views neglect to consider a wider set of consequences for their patients and for 
society.  
 
Chapter eight: moral absolutism  
 
In many ways the reverse of consequentialist forms of moral reasoning, moral absolutism is a 
philosophical ethical concept which is usually traced to the moral absolutist philosopher 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and it holds that “certain actions are morally impermissible simply 
by virtue of being members of certain identifiable kinds of action, such as lies, acts of adultery, 
and deliberate killings of the innocent” (Anscombe, 1958:10; see also Geach, 1969:124-125; 
Nagel, 1979; Kant, 1797). This stems from the fact that such acts are categorically prohibited by 
divine law (Anscombe, 1958:10; Geach, 1969:124-125). Moral absolutists define murder, as the 
deliberate killing of the innocent (Anscombe, 1961), as such, they view murder as one of the acts 
that one must never do to secure any good or avoid any evil (Geach, 1969:120). Other than the 
wrongfulness of the deliberate killing of an innocent person, Elizabeth Anscombe has also 
applied the moral absolutist position in the judicial system and argues from a justice point of 
view that it is always wrong to knowingly punish the innocent person even if that will bring 
about greater good (1981:39-40). From this, it is evident that moral absolutism is the opposite of 
consequentialism which judges the rightness or wrongness of an action based on the 
consequences that action has especially its utilitarianism version which “judges actions 
according to the number of people who are made happy by these actions” (Vincent et al, 
2012:169). 
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Those conscientiously objecting health professionals who adopt a moral absolutist position to the 
provision of TOP and MAP services thus think that their right to CO should always take 
precedence over any other consideration including the requirements of law. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, some conscientiously objecting health professionals object even to referring 
patients to willing providers as they associate such referral as tantamount to the actual provision 
of such services which result in serious harm to innocent human life. In this chapter I discuss the 
views of those who argue that their religious-based CO should always take precedence because 
the provision of TOP and MAP services is against the commands of their deity.  
 
One’s conscience or beliefs would depend on religious 
laws/commandments. World laws are developed from religious laws so I 
do not think we should be forced to override beliefs or conscience 
(Pharmacist Forty-six).  
No they are not obliged to do so [that, is referring patients]. I would very 
gently explain my objection to the patient and explain also to her that I 
cannot refer her – asking her to understand that this is how I manage to 
live with who I am as a Roman Catholic, just as she has to manage her 
life and circumstances. If she indicates that she would like to discuss 
alternatives to abortion (I would not force this on her) I would be able to 
refer her to for example the Catholic Life Centre (Doctor Forty).  
If it is due his/her religious beliefs then he/she should advise the patient 
according to his beliefs (Pharmacist Twenty-eight). 
This policy is not right because by the right of my religion it is wrong for 
a female to use emergency contraception before marriage. By using 
emergency contraception it can also be harmful to your body. Due to my 
religion rights which is Islam and by rights of the Islamic law women 
should not harm their bodies (Pharmacist Six).  
I don’t think abortion should be legal and refuse to provide…Pretty anti-
abortion and always will be on Christian moral grounds. I did a 
presentation in parliament before legalisation went through but it was a 
mockery of the process! (Doctor Eleven). 
We are pharmacists ‘yes’, but we are also normal human beings with 
values and virtues and we practice with these personal values as a guide. 
Hence, I believe we should do as we think is right to us as long as we live 
with it (Pharmacist Twenty-one). 
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I do not support ‘abortion on demand’ – for personal reasons and 
religious…Of greater concern is the need to be more active in prevention 
of unwanted pregnancies (Doctor Thirty-one). 
Yes, they should have the right to refuse due to religious reasons 
(Pharmacist Twenty-eight). 
 
Some participants whose conscientious objection is religiously based are only willing to provide 
TOP procedures in exceptional circumstances where the life of the pregnant woman is in serious 
danger while others absolutely invoke CO to the treating of women with incomplete abortions 
including in cases of emergency. Some object only to the provision of second trimester abortions 
as they equate these with murder. 
Advocates of health professionals’ right to CO such as the philosopher and theologian James 
Franklin Childress has defined conscience as “personal and subjective; it is a person’s 
consciousness of and reflection on his own acts in relation to his standards of judgment” 
(1979:318). Childress goes further to explain that “in appealing to conscience I indicate that I am 
trying to preserve a sense of myself, my wholeness and integrity, my good conscience, and that I 
cannot preserve these qualities if I submit to certain requirements of the state or society” 
(1979:327). Because, in this view, conscience is so central to personhood it is not morally 
permissible to expect someone to compromise their conscience even if to achieve some other 
pressing social good such as a patient’s welfare. 
Pharmacist’s right to practice according to her conscience [should take 
precedence]…It must stay the choice of the pharmacist; you cannot force 
somebody to dispense anything if they are not comfortable with it 
(Pharmacist Twelve). 
They should not be forced; they can do so if it is their choice and if they 
are comfortable with doing it (Doctor Forty-nine). 
 
For these participants, the health professional should only have to participate in procedures that 
they are ‘comfortable’ with. Failure to respect their choices is equated with being forced. Here 
being comfortable with providing TOP or MAP services is constructed as the yardstick by which 
to determine the health professional’s obligations. Echoing this stance, Beauchamp and Childress 
equate forcing conscientiously objecting health professionals to provide contested reproductive 
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services against their consciences with a serious violation of their right to autonomy and self-
determination (1983:390). Lawrence and Curlin argue that this will result in the health 
professionals experiencing “considerable distress for having acted contrary to who[m] they 
perceive themselves to be” (2007:12). 
 
As Doctor three argued,  
I do feel that doctors should have the freedom not to get involved in 
abortion in any way at all if they feel that it is against their conscience. 
There should be freedom of conscience as a right to protect health 
providers if there is going to be freedom of choice for abortion for clients 
(Doctor Three).  
 
Doctor Three constructs the health professional’s non-involvement in TOP services as a way of 
achieving a reasonable balance between the doctor’s right to not provide TOP services on the 
grounds of CO (which he associates with the doctor’s absolute freedom of choice as emphasised 
by the terms “in any way at all”) and the patient’s right to access a TOP procedure.  
 
I do not do abortions without medical indication. I believe there will 
always be doctors that are willing to do abortions, maybe the 
Government can find out which doctors and pay them for non-medical 
abortions. On the other hand, it is legal to build a big ship, but it is your 
own problem to pay for it and to find someone that has the know-how 
and that wants to do it, you do not have the right to force me to neither 
build a ship (even if I could) nor to do non-medical abortions (Doctor 
Eighteen).  
 
Doctor Eighteen upholds a moral absolutist stance towards performing elective TOP procedures 
and in so doing he challenges the CTOP Act framework which provides for publicly funded TOP 
services free of cost in designated public health care facilities. It is important here to elaborate on 
Doctor Eighteen’s parable of what he refers to as a ‘big ship’ in order to justify his invocation of 
CO to the provision of elective abortions. It follows from this parable that while this doctor 
agrees with the legality of the government’s initiative of taking an expansive approach of 
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legalising abortion with the objective of making such services to be accessible to the majority of 
women, this doctor however blames the government for failing to come up with a feasible way 
of ensuring a comprehensive access to elective abortions. To achieve this, this doctor suggests 
that the government should employ specific non-conscientiously objecting health professionals 
who specialise in performing elective TOP procedures in return of monetary incentive. In light of 
this, Doctor Eighteen therefore justify his right to CO by arguing that the government should 
neither expect nor force him to provide elective abortions against his conscience. 
 
The health professionals whose views are cited below take a moral absolutist stance towards 
referring for TOP services and they frame and justify their invocation of CO as consistent with 
the current South African law. In other words they argue that they should not be held legally 
liable for not referring their abortion-seeking patients to non-objecting health professionals. 
No, constitutionally they are not obligated [to refer]. Also a patient does 
not need a referral. They can simply ask another health provider 
themselves. A doctor or nurse should not be a portal of entry for an 
abortion system. It is not a doctor or nurse’s job to help take life (Doctor 
Three).  
 
Doctor Three cites the South African constitution to reinforce his view that conscientiously 
objecting health professionals do not have an obligation to refer their patients to willing 
providers and to also argue that patients are less likely to be inconvenienced by this because they 
can on themselves easily find another non-objecting health professional elsewhere without even 
having a formal referral letter. The philosopher Toby Ord claims that like adult human beings, 
embryos,37 have full moral status from the moment of conception (2008:12). Likewise, drawing 
upon this foetal life frame, Doctor Three sees himself as having legitimate grounds for refusal to 
perform abortions. For him, TOP procedures are not part and parcel of doctors and nurses’ 
professional duties as providing these services is tantamount to intentionally killing foetuses 
which is clearly immoral. 
                                                 
37 Ord uses “the term embryo to refer indiscriminately to the zygote, morula, blastocyst, embryo and foetus” 
(2008:12). 
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The law allows health professionals (including doctors) not to take part in 
any way in abortions. For me, this includes not referring patients to 
health professionals who will do an abortion. I (and other doctors who 
believe as I do) have to take a stand on this ‘exception clause’ in the law 
(Doctor Forty). 
Doctor Forty invokes CO to both the provision of TOP services and referring abortion-seeking 
patients on the grounds that the law allows him to do so as he constructs the law as not imposing 
any obligation on health professionals to provide these services. For him, there is therefore, ‘no 
dilemma’.  
No dilemma, whilst the law says that every woman has the right to TOP, 
an objecting doctor also has the right to refuse to perform a TOP 
procedure and let those doctors who agree, let them terminate 
pregnancies. I agree with TOP, I would not terminate a pregnancy 
(Doctor Thirty). 
For Doctor Thirty while South African law recognises a woman’s right to access a legal and safe 
abortion procedure at the same time the law also recognises the health professional’s 
constitutional right to refuse to provide these services on the grounds of conscience. For this 
reason, Doctor Thirty frames his invocation of CO to perform abortions as something that is 
legitimately grounded in the current South African constitutional order. 
No person should be forced by law to either perform this procedure or be 
forced to refer a patient for this procedure.  The Department of Health 
should identify persons willing to do the procedure, make venues 
available, and make these available to potential users through media, 
hospital information desks, etc. as the departments deems fit, if they think 
that such a choice (TOP) should be made available [to every woman] 
(Doctor Twenty-two). 
 
For Doctor Twenty-two, legally conscientiously objecting health professionals have no 
obligation to either perform or refer for TOP services. For this reason, Doctor Twenty-two 
argues that there is a possibility that some health professionals will not provide TOP services on 
the grounds of conscience. As such, the government ought to open separate private health care 
facilities and employ non-objecting health professionals dedicated to provide these services as 
this is a more feasible way of realising a comprehensive or universal provision of these services 
than forcing conscientiously objecting health professionals to perform or refer for these services. 
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If the law forces me to refer the patient to someone willing to perform the 
procedure ([that is] killing the baby), then the law strips me of my human 
right to live according to my conscience. That violates and criminalises 
my human rights (Doctor Forty-four). 
 
Drawing on the foetal life frame, Doctor Forty-four associates performing an abortion procedure 
with intentional killing of a foetus and this acts as legitimate grounds for invoking CO. Central to 
this doctor’s grounds for invoking CO is the personal cost she fears would incur should she be 
forced to violate her conscience by providing a TOP service. Doctor Forty-four frames the 
performing of an abortion procedure as tantamount to committing a crime – to do so would be to 
do wrong and it can never be morally required of a person that they do wrong.  
Every doctor should be allowed to choose whether he/she wants to 
participate irrespective of the “law of the land” (Doctor Thirty-five). 
 
While Doctor Thirty-five acknowledges the legality of abortion in South Africa, he however 
believes that it should always remain in the doctor’s discretion to either provide or not provide a 
TOP service. 
Many University lecturers, Professors, senior doctors, hospital managers 
spread the myth that the Constitution of South Africa requires that a 
doctor refer a patient to another doctor, even if they do not want to be 
involved in the abortion. This is a lie. The only thing stated in the CTOP 
Act is that no-one should “obstruct access” to an abortion facility to 
prevent people from entering. This was put in place to stop people from 
holding marches that physically prevented access to facilities. It is a very 
different thing from a doctor wanting to hold to his conscience by not 
getting involved in abortions, and so also not wanting to refer for 
abortions.  Many doctors would feel that referring patients for this is also 
getting involved and being part of a murder. Patients do not even need a 
referral from anyone to access care anyway. This constitutionality has not 
been tested in court up to now, but it is clear that the meaning of the 
phrasing does not refer to doctors referring. But the fact that many senior 
professionals try to force the idea that it does, dishonestly, is enough to 
threaten many junior doctors to get more involved than they would like to 
out of fear. So their freedom of conscience is not upheld (Doctor Two). 
“I do not agree morally with abortion and so will not assist you in this 
matter. Please find yourself another doctor”. This is what these 
[conscientiously] doctors should tell the patients. They normally feel so 
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strong regarding this that they would struggle to refer the patient. The 
patient must then go elsewhere to seek assistance (Doctor Twenty-six).  
You may refuse to give it because you think it is wrong. If you do, then 
you should not recommend the lady to a pharmacist who is willing. She 
may on her own accord choose to look elsewhere for assistance 
(Pharmacist Forty-six). 
The pharmacist should not have to refer, but the patient should decide 
where to go (Pharmacist Three). 
We are not allowed to judge people on their choices, but just do not want 
to be accomplices [by referring] (Doctor Eight).  
The pharmacist in this case cannot refer, as they will be in effect allowing 
the morning after pill still to be used, when they don’t believe it to be 
correct (Pharmacist Thirty-two).  
I agree referring makes one feel complicit (Doctor Eleven). 
 
In their discussion on ethics of referral from a medical ethical principle of beneficence38 point of 
view, Frank Chervenak and Laurence McCullough have argued that every conscientiously 
objecting health professional has a beneficence-based ethical obligation to make a direct or 
formal referral to another non-objecting health care provider in order to ensure that the patient 
receives a TOP procedure at the end of the day (2009:46). Not only that, but both scholars 
further argue that “direct referral is ethically required, because simply providing patients with 
referral information (which is the definition of indirect referral) does not ensure that the referral 
will be accomplished and the patient’s clinical needs will be met in a timely and effective 
fashion” (2009:46). For this reason, some proponents of the efficient referral system such as 
Charo have criticised health professionals who object to make formal referral to willing 
providers as abusing their right to CO and this makes them fail to fulfil their profession’s 
covenant with society (2005). 
 
The conscientiously objecting health professionals whose views are cited above however 
challenge this form of formal referral requirement chiefly on the grounds that they “see any 
                                                 
38 Chervenak and McCullough define beneficence as “the medical ethical principle that takes an evidence-based, 
clinical perspective on the patient’s health-related and other interests” (2009:46). 
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assistance in securing the service as complicity in immoral behaviour” (Dresser, 2005:9; see also 
Curlin et al, 2007 cited Frader and Bosk, 2009:66). Complicity is a principle often invoked by 
Catholic devotees as the grounds for conscientiously objecting to refer their TOP and MAP-
seeking patients under the belief that doing so would be equivalent to doing the actual 
procedures themselves (Fiala and Arthur, 2014:3). Proponents of health professionals’ right to 
CO like Edmund Pellegrino (2008:297) and John Peppin (1997:40) approve the notion of 
complicity as they believe that to participate in abortion in any way, including referring a patient 
seeking abortion is as good as directly providing the procedure. 
 
Those who take this view therefore dispute the provision of the CTOP Act which, while 
recognising a health care provider’s right to conscientiously object to perform an abortion, 
nevertheless obliges an objecting healthcare provider to refer his or her patient to another 
healthcare provider or facility (Harries et al, 2009:2). Doctor Two disagrees with this CTOP Act 
provision and argues that senior doctors take advantage of it to force conscientiously objecting 
junior doctors to refer their abortion-seeking patients against the dictates of their consciences, 
which is particularly damaging to those junior doctors who endorse the notion of complicity and 
might regard referral as tantamount to committing a murder. 
 
This is a position that has been taken in a variety of other contexts. For example the pharmacist 
and president of the US-based PFLI Karen Brauer has argued that “physicians are not required to 
refer for abortion, nor should pharmacists be required to participate in this activity by giving a 
referral” (Stein, 2005) [because] “a patient who’s ambulatory can locate a willing provider of 
these services without the help of a pharmacist” (Dakks, 2005). Similarly, the Canadian anti-
choice pharmacist Durad who objects to making referrals for emergency contraception 
prescriptions is quoted as arguing that “I will not direct people to a source of life-taking 
medicine. I cannot collaborate in the modern Holocaust…a pharmacist cannot dispense 
medication for the purpose of terminating a pregnancy” (Grady, 2006). While several 
participants in the present study similarly justified their invoking of CO including their non-
compliance with the CTOP Act’s obligation to refer on the grounds that it is easy for patients 
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denied care to independently locate non-objecting providers, as will be seen in the following 
chapter, some have refuted this claim given social circumstances in South Africa.  
 
The justification of non-involvement in contested reproductive services as part of exercising the 
individual right to act as autonomous moral agents according to their deeply held religious 
beliefs (Wicclair, 2000; Chervenak and McCullough, 2002; Curlin et al, 2007) was thus cited by 
several participants as the reason for their refusal to comply with what others have argued are 
their legal and professional obligations. Their argument is grounded in the claim that “freedom to 
practice one’s religion trumps one’s obligation as a professional to provide services to the 
patients who come to them” (Frader and Bosk, 2009:63).  
 
In some cases the prescriptions of the health provider’s religious convictions extend to the 
prohibition of all forms of birth control including MAPs. Roman Catholic Church teachings for 
example promote the belief that “the act of sex between married partners has a two-fold purpose 
that cannot be separated: it brings the couple together in an act of love symbolising their depth of 
feelings for one another (unitive purpose) and it provides an opportunity to bear children 
(procreative purpose)” (Fox, 1995:75-76 cited in Spota, 2003). According to this view, not only 
is abortion murder, but “actions to oppose it are imperative” (Fiala and Arthur, 2014:2). The late 
Pope John Paul II was quoted in 1995 as saying “abortion and euthanasia are thus crimes which 
no human law can claim to legitimise, there is no obligation in conscience to obey such laws; 
instead there is a grave and clear obligation to oppose them by conscientious objection” (cited in 
Fiala and Arthur, 2014:2).  
 
Seen from this light, Doctor Forty as a Catholic devotee confirms these teachings as he argues 
that he cannot provide or refer for TOP services and he simply expects his patients to understand 
this when he explains the importance of upholding his religious beliefs even in his professional 
practice. He refers his patients to the Catholic Life Center where they will be counselled not to 
terminate their pregnancies, but to carry them to term. 
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Operating from a different religious stand point, Pharmacist Six reaches a similar conclusion. A 
devout Muslim, she finds the provision of MAPs morally objectionable. She sees herself as 
guided not by legal prescriptions but by Islamic law which requires her not to dispense MAPs to 
unmarried women. 
 
Adrienne Asch has argued that in order to preserve their moral agency, health professionals must 
act conscientiously, rather than slavishly follow patients’ dictates (2006 cited in Frader and 
Bosk, 2009:64). As argued by Cannold, this is because given that “autonomy and choice are one 
of the partially defining features of a profession,” for this reason, everyone, including abortion-
seeking patients have a moral obligation to also respect the health professional’s autonomy 
(1994:82). Both Asch and Cannold views are in line with that of Beauchamp and Childress who 
similarly stress the importance of respecting conscientiously objecting health professionals’ 
autonomy and right of self-determination on the grounds that “health care providers are 
individuals and as such, have the same moral claim as other individuals to having their autonomy 
respected [thus] conscientious action is a person’s legitimate exercise of his or her autonomy” 
(1983:390).  
 
According to Thomas Cavanaugh, the philosophical Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), also 
known as the Thomist DDE or the principle of double effect “plays a role in anti-consequentialist 
ethics (such as deontology), in hard cases in which one cannot realise a good without also 
causing a foreseen, but not intended bad effect (for example, killing non-combatants when 
bombing a military target)” (2006:97). Likewise, for Elizabeth Anscombe, “this principle is 
meant to explain such things as why it is wrong to intentionally target civilians in war, even 
when doing so is expected to produce a much greater good; yet it is not wrong in the same way 
to attack military targets, even when doing so can be expected to cause some civilian casualties 
as a side effect” (1981:66; see also Quinn, 1989:336). This principle holds that “it is always 
wrong to intentionally harm the innocent, regardless of the benefits that could be produced by 
doing so, but [however] it is not always wrong to harm the innocent as a foreseen but not 
intended side effect of an action aimed at some desirable end” (Nagel, 1986:179-185; see also 
Aquinas, 1920; Anscombe, 2001; Quinn, 1989; Boyle, 1991; Davis, 2001; Marquis, 2001). 
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St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) is credited for first formulating the original theory of DDE 
when he applied it in his discussion of the morality or permissibility of killing in self-defence by 
arguing that “killing an assailant is permissible as long as one does not intend to do so, but only 
to defend oneself” (Summa Theologiae, 2a-2ae, Question 64, article 7 cited in Quinn, 1989:334; 
see also Aquinas, 1920). Catholic moral theology teachings draw heavily upon the DDE in order 
to allow for “procedures that achieve abortion indirectly [but] are primarily geared to save the 
life of the [pregnant] woman concerned” (Naylor and O’Sullivan, 2010:19; see also Boyle, 1980; 
Cataldo and Moraczewski, 2002).  
 
Often the justificatory grounds for performing a TOP procedure by conscientiously objecting 
health professional in such circumstances stem from the fact that the procedure is constructed or 
“regarded as an indirect termination” on the grounds that in this case the death of the foetus is 
not directly intended. Rather, the intention is to save the life of the woman whose life would be 
endangered by the continuation of the pregnancy (Glackin and Mills, 2013:80-81). This alone 
distinguishes the procedure from any primary intention to terminate foetal life (Foot, 1985). A 
noteworthy example which often provides for the permissibility for life-preserving interventions 
under the DDE is the termination of an ectopic pregnancy (Boyle, 1980 cited in Cook and 
Dickens, 1999:85). As defined by Glackin and Mills, an ectopic pregnancy arises “when a 
fertilised embryo implants somewhere other than the uterus, typically (but not always) in the 
fallopian tube. There is no possibility of the embryo’s survival in such a scenario; but if the 
pregnancy is allowed to continue it presents a severe risk to the mother’s life via the likely 
rupture of the fallopian tube and consequent internal bleeding” (2013:80-81). In simpler terms, 
an ectopic pregnancy is a misplaced pregnancy which occurs outside the uterus or womb. 
Several participants invoked this form of reasoning to explain why the only circumstances under 
which they would participate in abortion would be ‘imminent danger’ or ‘true emergency’.  
Personally and professionally: [I am] totally against abortion on request. 
Only possible exception: life of the mother is in true imminent danger in 
the opinion of more than one expert. Every individual has freedom of 
choice…I will never participate in the act of abortion (Doctor Thirty-
eight). 
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The doctor has the right to refuse, but if it is truly an emergency (e.g. 
mother’s life is in danger) the doctor must make suitable arrangements 
for urgent referral to someone qualified to do a termination (Doctor 
Twenty-seven). 
I don’t do terminations on demand. I think every person (not only doctor) 
has a right to decide if they want to be involved with it. I will do 
terminations for medical reasons (Doctor Nine). 
They are obligated to care for the patient, especially under emergency 
circumstances, and if they are not able or prepared to provide the 
necessary assistance directly, they should give the patient sufficient 
information about the alternatives, including other agencies that do 
TOPs, for her to decide (Doctor Twenty-five). 
I understand the need for terminations in exceptional circumstances - 
such as when the mother’s life is in danger or perhaps when a child has a 
very severe congenital abnormality-although I personally would not 
perform it. However in South Africa terminations have become a form of 
contraception, raising serious ethical issues for the staff who have either 
to carry out the procedure or assist with it. Fortunately as a Neurosurgeon 
these are not issues which affect my daily practice (Doctor Twenty-
seven). 
 
These doctors agree that it is ethically wrong to provide elective abortions, however they appeal 
to the principle of double effect to allow for some exceptions, particularly in emergency cases 
where the pregnancy may endanger the health or life of the pregnant woman. Central to these 
doctors’ willingness to provide TOP services in cases of emergency is the emphasis they place 
on the need for apparent compelling evidence proven beyond reasonable doubt that such a 
pregnancy may pose a great danger to the health or life of the woman and as such require these 
health professionals to compromise their right to CO. 
Personally I would not even consider this unless it is absolutely the last 
resort to preserve the life of the mother (Doctor Forty-one). 
 
While Doctor Twenty-seven expresses concerns about many South African women using 
abortions as a form of standard contraception, he however feels that health professionals should 
provide TOP services regardless of their consciences especially in emergency cases where the 
pregnant woman’s life is at risk or where there is a serious foetal malformation, although this 
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doctor admits that he personally would still not perform abortions in such cases. Other 
participants shared the view that ‘serious foetal malformation’ provides adequate ‘medical’ 
grounds for the moral permissibility of abortion.  
This is murder and I will never do it, except if there is a very good 
medical indication (Doctor Forty-three). 
This should not be done in normal foetuses, except in abnormal ones 
(Doctor Thirty-two). 
To do abortions after 16 weeks pregnancy without a very definite 
indication is totally wrong (Doctor Fifty-one).  
 
I am against it in other ways. That child has a right to live and there are 
many other parents hoping to adopt (Doctor Five). 
The South African legal system rejects the recognition of foetuses and embryos as persons as 
was dealt with at length  in the case of Christian Lawyers Association of South Africa v Minister 
of Health,39 where the High Court held that the South African Constitution does not award legal 
personality to the foetus (Kruger et al, 2010). This position was contested by some participants, 
especially in relation to foetuses that are in the second trimester of gestation. Doctor Five, for 
instance paints a picture of a foetus in the second trimester of pregnancy as equal to an infant or 
child ready for adoption. In this view, the personhood of the pregnant woman in whose body the 
foetus exists should not be prioritised as a justification for obtaining an abortion (Cherry, 
1999:247-248).  
 
While some participants rejected the possibility of participating in second trimester abortions 
altogether, others said they would be willing to provide such abortions in exceptional cases 
especially for purposes of saving the pregnant woman’s life. However, they were concerned to 
draw a distinction between ‘genuine’ emergencies and those which they perceived to be 
manufactured.  
There is a situation that often arises where a private General Practitioner 
would give a patient tablets of Misoprostol to insert in their vagina to 
initiate an abortion. Then they tell the patients to report themselves to the 
                                                 
39 1998 (11) BCLR 1434 (T), 1998 (4) SA 1113 (T). 
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hospital when they start bleeding. When they do report themselves, they 
will often keep quiet about the fact that a General Practitioner has 
initiated an abortion. So the doctors who receive them at the hospital 
would end up scraping the womb and finishing the process without even 
knowing it was an abortion they were completing. This also violates their 
choice to not get involved in abortions. To protect the rights of doctors’ 
consciences and their right not to get involved in this manner would 
mean going after General Practitioners who practice in this way and 
putting them in jail in order to deter this practice (Doctor Three).  
 
Doctor three thus cautions against the abuse of the emergency injunction which could lead to the 
violation of doctors’ right to conscience.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that health professionals who hold the moral absolutist position invoke 
CO to the actual and referring for TOP and MAP services and some of them also conscientiously 
object to treat emergency abortions. This is because they have framed the provision of these 
services as morally impermissible because they facilitate the intentional killing of the innocent.  
 
While these participants equate abortion with murder, they however feel that abortion is 
permissible under limited exceptional circumstances. Their argument is based on refuting 
women’s reproductive rights as overriding the right to life of the foetus. It is only when two 
rights regarded as equivalent clash, and the women’s life is itself in danger, that a true dilemma 
arises which must be resolved by sacrificing either one or the other life. Similarly, the foetal 
malformation argument has to do with the anticipated quality of life of the unborn rather than 
weighing maternal rights as a serious consideration in the moral equation.  
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Chapter nine: legal and professional obligation 
 
According to John Simmons political obligations are “general moral requirements to obey the 
law and support the political institutions of our own states and governments” (2002:17 cited in 
Vincent et al, 2012:171). For example, while a citizen may disagree with a particular law in a 
democracy, the general legitimacy of the system as such, is thought to give rise to an obligation 
to obey the law even in those cases where one disagrees with particular laws. To do otherwise 
would be to undermine the legitimacy of the system itself.  In Kurt Baier’s terms, “obligations 
are tasks which one has come to have as a result of one’s entering into certain sorts of relations 
to others, of which the prime examples are someone’s doing something for one, or one’s doing 
something to someone” (1970:128). Building on John Simmons (2002), this chapter discusses 
health professionals who frame their willingness to provide contested reproductive services in 
terms of fulfilling their legal and professional obligations and they exhort other health 
professionals to also follow suit. Health professionals who agree to provide TOP and MAP 
services on grounds of obligation argue that their legal and professional obligations to do so 
merely emanate from the lawfulness of these services under the South African legal system. 
Health professionals who agree to provide TOP and MAP services on professional grounds 
typically cite the Hippocratic Oath as the source of their professional obligations. For these 
participants, legal and professional obligations override health professionals’ right to CO. Or, in 
other cases, legal and professional obligations imply the minimum requirement of referral.   
 
In his prominent (1961) book, The Concept of Law, the influential British legal philosopher 
Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart argued that everyone has a prima facie legal obligation to obey the 
government of the territory in which he or she resides because the state has political authority in 
its entire jurisdiction (1961:88). This reasoning has been applied to the debate concerning health 
professionals’ legal obligations to provide lawful (albeit contested) reproductive services. In 
contributing to this debate, Fiala and Arthur have for instance argued that “…doctors who 
exercise CO within the law are arguably unsuited for their position because they are 
demonstrating an inability to perform their job -- that is, they are allowing religious beliefs or 
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some other personal issue to interfere with their job performance to the extent of negating their 
professional duty to patients” (2014:8).  
 
It has been on this basis that courts in some contexts have taken disciplinary actions against 
health professionals who invoke CO on religious grounds and refuse to provide legally permitted 
controversial reproductive services. A noteworthy example is the European Court of Human 
Rights’s (ECOHR) judgment in the 1999 case of Pichon and Sajous v. France.40 In that case, 
two French pharmacists claimed that their right to CO on religious grounds was violated by 
French authorities who convicted them for refusing to dispense oral contraception to three 
female customers (Catholics for Choice, 2010:4). In ruling against these pharmacists’ grounds 
for invoking CO, the ECOHR emphasised that “as long as the sale of contraceptives is legal and 
occurs on medical prescription nowhere other than in a pharmacy, the applicants cannot give 
precedence to their religious beliefs and impose them on others as justification for their refusal to 
sell such products, since they can manifest those beliefs in many ways outside the professional 
sphere” (Catholics for Choice, 2010:4).  
 
The participants whose views are cited below take a similar stance to the legal approach adopted 
by the judge in resolving the Pichon and Sajous v. France case. By framing the right to CO as 
secondary to their professional obligations – with the latter overriding the former -- these 
participants rule out the possibility of CO to the provision of TOP and MAP services because 
they view themselves as having prima facie legal obligations to provide these services which 
cannot be ignored.  
I do not feel it needs negotiation. We are obliged, 1) to follow the law 
and; 2) to respect the rights of patients to make informed decisions 
(Doctor Forty-two). 
Everyone is bound by the law of the land, including doctors, so moral, 
religious or cultural reasons against abortion is secondary (Doctor 
Sixteen). 
                                                 
40  Pichon and Sajous v. France, App. No. 49853/99, Decision of 02 October 2001, ECHR 2001‐X, available at 
www.echr.coe.int, p. 4. 
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If the patient consents to the obtaining the pill then pharmacists must 
carry out their legal obligation and provide the pill regardless of their 
religious, ethical, personal and moral beliefs (Pharmacist Two). 
Due to the fact that you are not breaking any laws, I don’t think it’s right 
for any pharmacists to refuse giving it because of religious beliefs… 
(Pharmacist Twenty). 
I dispense as per legal requirements and where required… I act without 
moral judging as long as law is abided (Pharmacist Four). 
It is law, so dispensing should take place… (Pharmacist Six). 
 
For most of these participants, CO on the grounds of religious belief is inconsistent with the 
requirements of South African law. This is because, TOP and MAP services are legal under the 
South African legal system, in contrast to some Latin American countries such as Chile and El 
Salvador, where abortion is legally prohibited altogether and as such health professionals who 
illegally perform these procedures are charged with legal misconduct and may be incarcerated 
(Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, 1998). The argument from political obligation is that 
all health professionals have a general (content-independent) legal obligation to obey the law. 
Therefore where these services are legal, their professional and political obligation is to render 
these services accordingly. 
 
Contrariwise, health professionals who refuse to provide these services are seen as violating their 
legal and professional obligations to act within the framework of the law and the requirements of 
their profession(s).  As one doctor put it (Doctor 42), the law must be obeyed ‘because it is the 
law’. And as another pointed out, like all other South African citizens, health professionals have 
a prima facie legal obligation to obey the laws of the state regardless of their conscience (Doctor 
16). South Africa’s CTOP Act confirms these legal obligations by attaching legal consequences 
to them in the event of any attempts to prevent a lawful termination of pregnancy or obstructing 
access to a facility performing termination of pregnancies.41 
 
                                                 
41 Section 10(1)(c) of the CTOP Act of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. 
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Pharmacist Two argues that pharmacists’ legal obligations to honour their patients’ requests for 
MAPs stem from the South African legal system which. Given the controversial nature of these 
services in the South African context it is possible to interpret these participants’ insistence on a 
rigid interpretation of the law as providing a legitimising narrative to explain why they are 
prepared, public and peer disapproval notwithstanding, to provide these services. These 
participants are thus able to shift the responsibility for choosing to provide these services away 
from themselves and to construct their actions as arising not from their own agency but from the 
requirements of law.  
Well, pharmacists practice according to the Law and we are in no 
position to deny patients’ rights to access to medication despite whatever 
my beliefs are (Pharmacist Twenty-seven). 
The pharmacist still has the legal obligation to provide the morning-after-
pill on request from the patient, regardless of how many times the 
patients makes the request …I believe in dispensing it for the simple 
reason that it effectively reduces the number of unplanned pregnancies 
and as custodians of medicines, pharmacists have a legal obligation to 
dispense the morning after pill in a lawful manner (Pharmacist Two). 
Pharmaceutical care is a concept which involves providing the best 
known pharmaceutical advice to patient within a pharmacist’s scope of 
practice. This involves taking each patient as unique and addressing 
issues in an appropriate manner. The pharmacist’s discretion should 
always be in favour of the patient’s health within the legal framework 
(Pharmacist Twenty-four).  
 
At the heart of the idea of political obligation lies the idea, expressed by these participants, that 
in circumstances where the legitimacy of the law-making body is not in dispute, a content 
independent obligation to obey the law arises which cannot give way merely because of 
individual belief or conviction. Were the latter to be regarded as morally permissible the entire 
edifice of the law would crumble. 
 
Globally, most countries with liberal abortion laws have stressed health professionals’ legal 
obligation to refer as a viable solution to the problem of the provision of contested reproductive 
services such as abortion and the MAP on the part of health professionals who object to such 
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services on grounds of personal conscience or deeply held moral conviction. Cook and Dickens 
argue that conscientiously objecting health professionals have a legal duty to refer patients to 
providers who do not object to delivering the services to which the patients are legally entitled 
(2009:108). In South Africa, while the CTOP Act recognises a health care provider’s right to CO 
to performing an abortion, it however, imposes an obligation upon that provider to refer his or 
her patient to another non-objecting healthcare provider or facility (Harries et al, 2009:2). The 
legal obligation to refer patients was pointed to by several participants as part of the professional 
obligation of health care providers. For these participants, the idea of CO extending to the right 
not to refer does not have legitimacy.  
Induced Abortion requests come from many various reasons, the law has 
it that any female above age 12 can request for, therefore the doctor 
practicing in South Africa is legally bound, if unable to perform the 
procedure for any reason, the doctor is obliged or must refer 
appropriately (Doctor Sixteen).   
Legally abortion can be demanded and if one cannot provide the service a 
doctor should be obliged to refer (Doctor Nineteen). 
To give effect to the law, it is mandatory for conscientious objectors to 
refer in order to allow the woman’s right to access care to be realised 
(Doctor Fifteen).  
Yes to refer to a willing provider, it is legally available and the patient 
has a right to get it provided it has been within the 72 hour time frame 
(Pharmacist Fifty-four). 
 
In some cases, participants pointed to the obligation to refer as an obligation which they 
themselves felt obliged to meet, despite their own unwillingness to perform abortion.  
I myself do not do any abortions. I refer all patients to other centres. 
Because it is a law the doctor cannot refuse to refer the patient (Doctor 
Forty-seven). 
 
For these participants, CO does not pardon doctors from their legal obligations to their abortion-
seeking patients, including minors. In cases where a doctor’s own conscience does not permit 
provision of the service, legal and professional obligations are met through referral which results 
in the realisation of women’s rights to access desired care within the legal framework of the land. 
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While for some, CO extends to the right not to refer, Marge Berer argues that, “a health care 
professional could be said to be exercising true conscientious objection if he or she makes a 
timely referral of abortion-seeking patient to non-objecting providers” (2002:32). Pharmacist 
Fifty-four’s grounds of providing the MAP as her legal obligation is in line with Berer’s 
aforementioned view. This pharmacist equates true CO with referring the MAP-seeking patient 
within the 72 hours’ time frame within which following unprotected sexual intercourse, 
emergency contraceptive methods including the MAP can reduce the risk of pregnancy by at 
least 75% (Boonstra, 2002:10). It is this limited time frame which make a timeous formal referral 
in order to prevent the possibility of the woman falling pregnant so pressing – and failure to refer 
of such significance. 
 
In the philosophy of political obligation, the most prominent theory of an individual’s political 
obligation to the state is offered by the contract theorist John Locke in the form of consent theory 
(1689). According to Locke’s consent theory, political obligation arises from what he refers to as 
an individual’s ‘direct consent’ to be bound by particular obligations (1689).  By this he means 
that special obligations in a political society come about only when one voluntarily undertakes 
them chiefly in the form of a social contract. In Locke’s terms, it follows that the obligation to 
keep a promise or fulfil a contract, for example, arises only when one has done something that 
generates the obligation-made in the form of a promise or signed a contract (1689; see also 
Simmons, 2002:33 cited in Vincent et al, 2012:171).   
 
Although Locke’s consent theory focused specifically on direct individual consent on the part of 
individuals to the authorities of their political societies, Locke’s line of reasoning could also be 
applied to how health professionals are formally admitted into the health care community. In 
South Africa and elsewhere, on their graduation ceremony, all health professionals graduating 
from schools of medicine, pharmacy and nursing are formally required to swear to a professional 
oath known as the Hippocratic Oath. This Hippocratic Oath is taken to mean the solemn 
pronouncement by which these graduates promise to obey their professional and ethical 
obligations towards their patients when they start practicing. As argued by Ogunbanjo and van 
Bogaert, the Hippocratic Oath “consists of components of good practice of medicine physician-
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patient relationships” (2009:30). The participants whose views are cited below draw on the 
Hippocratic Oath to justify their reasons for their involvement in the provision of controversial 
reproductive health services. In their view, health professionals’ voluntary consent to the 
Hippocratic Oath automatically gives rise to professional obligations towards their patients:  
As a medical professional you took an Oath and I do not think you 
should judge people. You should help them to the best of your ability 
(Pharmacist Thirty-eight).  
The day you became a pharmacist, you waived your right to let religious 
believes rule your business. It is not against your beliefs to cheat the 
medical aid out of money or to overcharge a patient, or to sell stolen or 
state stock. But you have a problem supplying the emergency 
contraceptive! What morals, ethics and religion are we talking about???? 
(Pharmacist Thirty-three). 
 
Given that health professionals voluntarily enter the health care profession, it follows that they 
should also provide contested reproductive services in contexts where those services are legal, 
particularly TOP, and regardless of their consciences. Their obligation arises from their direct, 
freely-given consent to participate in profession of which these services and procedures are a part 
(Brody and Miller, 1998; Meyers and Woods, 1996; Brock, 2008:198; Anderson, 2005 cited in 
McLeod, 2008:35). As Cannold asserts, health care professionals should honour their 
professional obligations to patients as part of “the set of obligations that rightfully flow out of the 
professional-client relationship” (1994:80).  
 
Conscious of the possible stigma associated with services such as emergency contraception, 
Pharmacist 38 invokes the Hippocratic Oath in order to justify provision of a potentially 
controversial service as arising out of professional obligation rather than implying his own 
particular moral approach. In this way, participants who wish to provide these services are able 
to shift agency from their own moral decision-making to describing themselves as professionally 
bound to prioritise their patients (rather than their own conscience). Thus these health care 
providers are able to frame their willingness to provide a controversial and potentially 
stigmatised service to their patients as merely arising as a logical extension of their consent to the 
requirements of their profession as well as their legal obligations.  
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[In the pharmacy practice the pharmacist’s professional role in patient 
care (through the lawful distribution of emergency contraception) should 
take precedence because]…the patient’s health and well-being is the first 
priority (Pharmacist Eleven). 
 
Refusal is in turn framed as unprofessionalism rather than a legitimate invocation of conscience. 
In the same way as Locke’s direct consent theory is the basis on which political obligation is 
typically justified in its purest form, here the participants argue that by taking the Hippocratic 
Oath, health professionals are giving their direct consent to the dictates of their profession and 
are thus professionally bound not to invoke CO to the provision of TOP and MAP services. 
 
While for some the actual provision of these services is every practitioner’s obligation, 
regardless of personal views, for others the obligation is the more minimal one of referral.   
I have no objection to this policy…I think ethically the woman should be 
referred to another provider…[because] we have an obligation to our 
profession, for patients’ well-being [and] patient’s care should not be 
compromised because of conscience (Pharmacist Eight). 
I believe the patient should be referred to a colleague that has no 
objections to dispensing the product. In the end, the patient and their 
well-being should still be the deciding factor (Pharmacist Forty-eight). 
Yes, I believe that the patient is your ethical responsibility and that you 
should formally, after counselling, refer the patient (Doctor Two). 
 
Some advocates for referral have argued that “accepting a collective obligation does not mean 
that all members of the profession are forced to violate their own consciences. It does, however, 
necessitate ensuring that a genuine system for counselling and referring patients is in place…” 
(Charo, 2005:2473). Referral is thus seen as consistent with the provisions of the Hippocratic 
Oath which require health professionals to act so as to benefit the sick and keep them from harm 
primarily through protecting their patients’ well-being and placing the latter above their personal 
interests (Mappes and Degrazia, 2006:59).  
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Some participants included respect for patient autonomy as a further value embedded in the legal 
and professional obligations of health professionals.  
Women must have a right to choose whether they want a child or not and 
the South African law allow abortion to be provided by trained 
individuals and [doctors] should therefore be obliged to assist either by 
performing or referring for the service (Doctor Nineteen). 
The pharmacist professional role in patient care [takes 
precedence]…because as pharmacists we are here to provide a service 
and we are not allowed to judge or put our personal feelings into our 
work as we are professionals expected to act professionally. And it is the 
patient’s decision to take it or not (Pharmacist Thirty-seven).  
 
Doctor Nineteen confirms the principle of respecting the patient’s autonomy as one of the 
important health professionals’ legal obligations that medical personnel should honour regardless 
of their conscience. From a legal obligation point of view, respecting the patient’s autonomy in 
this doctor’s opinion is respecting the patient’s final decision regarding how she wants to deal 
with the fate of her pregnancy. Using terms as “women must” this participant underlines the 
view that under the South African legal system, women have an absolute right to access TOP 
procedures. Given the lawfulness of abortion and the significance of rights in the post-
democratic legal system, doctors’ legal obligation to provide the service arises. And in 
Pharmacist Thirty-seven’s view, the principle of respect for patient’s autonomy is the 
cornerstone of pharmacists’ professional obligations towards their patients. This participant 
associates genuine respect for the patient’s autonomy with readily dispensing the MAP upon 
request, as failure to do so on the grounds of conscience amounts to being unfairly judgmental, 
thus violating pharmacists’ professional obligations. 
 
While respect for patient autonomy is one of the guiding principles in the practice of medicine, 
in sexual and reproductive health services where moralising discourses concerning sexual and 
lifestyle choices are prone to influence how patients are treated, this is a particularly important 
norm. The principle of ‘patient’s autonomy’ holds that persons should be free to choose and act 
without controlling constraints from others (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986). Respecting the 
‘patient’s autonomy’, in Faden and Beauchamp’s terms is respecting the patient’s capacities and 
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perspectives including her right to hold certain views, make certain choices, and take certain 
actions based on certain values and beliefs which may well differ from those of the health care 
provider (1986). Respecting the ‘patient’s autonomy’ also involves respecting decision-making 
rights and acting in a way that enables patients to make choices for themselves rather than acting 
in such a way as to oppose those choices on the patient (ACOG Committee Opinion, 2007:3; see 
also Frader and Bosk, 2009:66). Doyal argues that while respect for ‘patient’s autonomy’ may 
not imply an obligation to actually provide legal services, however, conscientiously objecting 
health professionals have an ethical and legal obligation to refer their patients if they themselves 
are unwilling to provide a service, and that this obligation emanates from the principle of respect 
for patients’ right to self-determination and autonomy (1994). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Health professionals discussed in this chapter frame the provision of TOP and MAP services as a 
matter of discharging their legal and professional obligations. As such, they advocate for an 
approach which elevates abiding by one’s legal and professional obligations in medicine and 
pharmacy practice above any invocation of the right to CO to the provision of controversial 
reproductive health services. South African abortion law and the professional obligations 
outlined in the Hippocratic Oath are here invoked as overriding conscience. It may be argued, 
however, that the invocation of legal and professional reasons for overriding conscience may be 
as a result of these particular practitioners not having particularly strong views against the law in 
the first place. For those who find themselves at one with the law it then becomes possible to 
insist on its precedence as a way of acting in accordance with their own conscience while 
framing these actions as merely being law abiding or professionally diligent and thus avoiding 
possible social sanction or stigmatisation.  
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Chapter ten: social justice  
 
The preceding chapters have outlined the varying ways in which prominent ways of framing 
termination of pregnancy and related services in contemporary South African medical 
practitioners’ discourse have in practice for the most part been unable to resolve the tension 
between the claimed right to conscientious objection on the part of providers and the 
reproductive rights particularly of poorer women. In this chapter I outline an alternative way of 
casting this debate – as one not of ‘rights’, ‘choice’, ‘consequences’ or ‘obligation’ but one of 
justice. Although the participant who chose to frame the issue as one of social justice was the 
rare exception, I argue that a social justice framing offers fresh insights into ways of reframing 
the debate with the potential for successfully traversing the current impasse.  
 
Jost and Kay view an unjust society as that which has a social system “that fosters arbitrary or 
unnecessary suffering, exploitation, abuse, tyranny, oppression, prejudice, and discrimination” 
(2010:1222). On the contrary, John Rawls points out that a society could validly be described as 
just if “all social values -- liberty and opportunity, income and wealth...are distributed equally 
except where an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values works to everyone’s 
advantage” (1971:62). 
 
The concept of ‘social justice’ originates in the philosophical discourse. While there are many 
theorists of social justice, I draw heavily on one of the most influential political philosophers of 
social justice, John Rawls. I will place particular emphasis on Rawls’s application of social 
justice principles which emphasises the distribution of material and non-material goods among 
members of the society (1971). A distributive paradigm defines “social justice as the morally 
proper distribution of social benefits and burdens among society’s members” (Young, 1990:15). 
In his theory of social justice, Rawls discusses two important principles of social justice. The 
first one involves ‘the priority of liberty’ and the second principle involves process of fairness 
through demanding that ‘positions and offices be open to all’ (1971). It is important here to 
explain Rawls’s notion of prioritarianism - that is to say, which principle gets priority and in this 
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regard Rawls argues that social inequalities are to be tolerated only to the extent that they benefit 
the least well off in society (1971:303).  
 
It should be further argued that Rawls also conceptualises ‘justice as fairness’ in the context of 
equitable distribution of material and non-material goods by prioritising the less advantaged 
members of society (1971). Rawls conceptualises justice as “providing in the first instance a 
standard whereby the distributive aspects of the basic structure of society are to be assessed” 
(1971:9). The main objective of this assessment is to achieve the reforming or abolishment of 
unjust state laws and social institutions regardless of how efficient and well-organised these may 
be (Jost and Kay, 2010). Rawls was critical of the utilitarianism account of justice as being able 
to be used to justify the concentration of goods in the hands of the few, benefiting the privileged 
classes of a society on the basis that this state of affairs is ultimately for the greater good (1971). 
 
Among Rawls’s followers, Runciman points out that justice could be achieved in a society if 
there is an ethical criterion which constantly assesses the distribution of social goods for 
purposes of ensuring that these goods also reach the disadvantaged groups of people (1978:37). 
Likewise, William Galston’s work also builds upon Rawls’s theory of distributive justice with 
regards to both material and non-material goods (1980). Galston notes that “issues of justice not 
only involve the distribution of property and wealth, but also such non-material goods as 
productive tasks, opportunities for development, citizenship, authority and honour” (1980:6). 
 
Plantenga and Hansen have also built on one of Rawls’s concept of access to ‘equal 
opportunities’ with regards to fundamental goods in a society in order to ensure equal starting 
points for all members of the society (1999). Plantenga and Hansen have applied this concept in 
their work on the labour market to call for the prioritisation of women employees in the equal 
distribution of opportunities in the form of “material equality, e.g. an equal distribution of work, 
care tasks and income” (1999:352-353). Likewise, Rubery has also applied the concept of equal 
opportunities in the work environment context (1999). However unlike Plantenga and Hansen 
who confined its application only to women employees, Rubery broadened Rawls’s concept of 
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access to ‘equal opportunities’ with regards to paid and unpaid work to both women and men 
employees (1999:7).  This is because he believes that the ultimate goal of this concept is to bring 
about change in all employees’ lives regardless of their sex (Rubery, 1999:7). 
 
Some scholars have sought to assess education systems through applying Rawls’s principles of 
social justice (Jencks, 1988:518).  In the context of South Africa, Mafumo’s work has looked at 
the concept of equitable distribution of opportunities with specific focus on institutions of higher 
learning (2011). He argues that “social justice implies the participation of all groups in an 
education system that is mutually shaped to meet the needs of all students irrespective of their 
culture, race, language, sex, financial background and political affiliation” (Mafumo, 
2011:1554). 
 
Most of Lee Anne Bell’s work on social justice in education has also drawn heavily on Rawls’s 
conceptualisation of ‘justice as fairness’. For instance, in Bell’s terms, social justice constitutes 
the right to fairness and equity in the distribution of available resources in order to avoid the 
concentration of these in the hands of a privileged few members of a society at the cost of the 
majority of disadvantaged people who might be in great need of these resources for the 
betterment of their lives (2007).  
 
David Miller has argued that unfavourable social conditions which produce inequalities in a 
society can effectively be redressed by an inclusive and “fair distribution of benefits or resources 
amongst members of various associations, that is, members from different racial, cultural, 
linguistic, sexual, and financial backgrounds or who may be disabled” (1999:2; see also Miller, 
2001). Like Miller, King Davis’s definition of social justice takes an inclusive approach which 
challenges any form of unfair discrimination on the grounds of one’s status and he also views 
social justice as the ultimate goal a democratic society:  
A basic value and desired goal in democratic societies and includes 
equitable and fair access to societal institutions, laws, resources [and] 
opportunities, without arbitrary limitations based on observed, or 
interpretation of, differences in age, colour, culture, physical or mental 
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disability, education, gender, income, language, national origin, race, 
religion or sexual orientation (1996:1). 
 
In combining all the aforementioned scholars’ application of Rawls’s principles of social justice, 
it could be argued that social justice is based on compassion for people and it aims to ensure that 
all persons have full and equitable access to opportunities and services in a society (Long et al, 
2006; Mullaly, 2010). A social justice approach to any public policy arena is thus alert to 
conditions which make it likely that legal or institutional benefits and opportunities are 
distributed unfairly such that for instance, those with means, status or resources can access the 
benefits that the democratic state provides to a greater extent than those who do not.  
 
In the field of health, one of the most prominent applications of Rawls comes from influential 
American philosopher, ethicist, and bioethicist Norman Daniels,  and particularly his (1985) 
book Just Health Care, in which he addresses the unfair allocation of medical resources. Daniels 
is credited with formulating a ‘theory of just health care’. Drawing on Rawls’s theory of 
distributive justice, Daniels has argued that a theory of justice in health care requires the state to 
implement health policies which provides patients with fair equality of opportunity to access 
health care services in order to reduce health inequities and social harms among members of 
society (1985).  Daniels’s application of social justice theory in health care largely stems from 
his belief that “health care is of special moral importance, because it helps to preserve [people’s] 
status as fully functioning citizens” (2001:4). For this reason, he views health as an important 
“special social good” (Daniels, 1985:56) because of its crucial role in maintaining human being’s 
normal functioning. By ‘primary goods’ I mean “things that every rational person would want 
because they are needed to carry out a personal life plan” (Macklin, 2001:375).  
 
Daniels is of the opinion that health and opportunity are directly related in the sense that meeting 
people’s health needs promotes their equality of opportunity (1981; see also Daniels, 1985). 
Daniels’s fair equality of opportunity argument for justice in health care derives from his belief 
that people have “rights and entitlements [to health care that are] defined within a set of basic 
institutions governed by the fair equality of opportunity principle” (1985:54). Daniels also 
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suggests that justice in health care could also be achieved through equitable distribution of the 
social determinants of health, such as education and income, using Rawls’s principles of social 
justice (2008). Daniels further points out that justice requires guaranteeing fair equality of 
opportunity to members of a society and could feasibly be achieved if health care institutions are 
to be governed by Rawls’s principle of fair equality of opportunity as this principle give citizens 
their rights and entitlements to health care in practice (1985:41). 
 
In most of his work Daniels has advocated for an equality of opportunities approach in health 
care which gives complete prioritisation “to treating the worst off patients in terms of those who 
are the most sick or disabled” (2001:9), chiefly HIV/AIDS infected and elderly patients  
(Daniels, 2003). He also emphasises that in order to protect and achieve fair equality of 
opportunity for poor people, health care should not be distributed according to one’s ability to 
pay, and the burden of payment should also not fall disproportionately on the ill (Daniels, 1985; 
Daniels, 1995; Daniels et al, 1996).  
 
While termination of pregnancy and related medical services are often framed in terms of 
women’s rights for instance to bodily integrity and freedom of choice, more recently scholars 
have turned to theories of justice to reframe the abortion debate in ways that recognise that a 
discourse of rights and choice does not necessarily address the context of social inequality in 
which such rights and choices must inevitably be exercised. As Chrisler and Garrett put it: 
If women are not able to exercise their rights, it does them little good to 
know that the government guarantees their right to make their own 
‘choices.’ Rights + resources + accessibility = justice (2010:130). 
 
Joan Chrisler defines ‘reproductive justice’ as a framework which “addresses aspects of 
women’s social status that promote or interfere with their power in relationships, bodily 
integrity, and ability to engage in family planning and reproductive decision-making” (2013:4). 
The origins of the term date back to the 1990s when it was first introduced by a group of 
American Women of colour, particularly delegates who had attended the 1994 Cairo Conference 
(Silliman et al, 2004). Loretta Ross who is the co-founder and coordinator of a social movement 
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called SisterSong is credited with coining the term ‘reproductive justice’. Ross defines 
reproductive justice as an “intersectional theory emerging from the experiences of women of 
colour in the United States whose multiple communities experience a complex set of 
reproductive oppressions” (2006). Reproductive oppression is “the controlling and exploiting of 
women, girls, and individuals through [their] bodies, sexuality, labour, and reproduction (both 
biological and social) by families, communities, institutions and society” (Asian Communities 
for Reproductive Justice, 2005; see also Ross, 2006). The reason why members of SisterSong 
particularly advocate for the reproductive justice framework in their activism stems primarily 
from the fact that “[o]ur ability to control what happens to our bodies is constantly challenged by 
poverty, racism, environmental degradation, sexism, homophobia, and injustice….” (Ross, 2006 
cited in Silliman et al, 2004:4). 
 
As pointed out by Ferree et al, the ‘women’s rights frame’ puts emphasis on the woman’s right 
to control her own body which affects other rights such as participation in the labour force and in 
political life (2002:106-107), as such, it takes “a pro-choice perspective which holds that women 
have the right to dispose of their bodies as they choose” (van Bogaert, 2002:139). Some have 
argued that despite the progressive recommendations proposed at the Cairo Conference, the 
‘women’s rights frame’ has failed to feasibly provide for poor women’s access to TOP services. 
This is because, in reality, a woman with an unwanted pregnancy living in a country with liberal 
abortion legislation cannot necessarily practically exercise her right to readily access a TOP 
service “if she lacks the financial resources to pay for reproductive health services or the 
transport to reach them…” (Petchesky, 2000:13; see also Chrisler, 2012). 
 
In many countries with liberal abortion legislation which affords women the right to TOP 
services, research has shown that despite this many poor women, particularly those living in rural 
areas face challenges in accessing TOP services for a variety of reasons including for instance 
transportation, lack of medical facilities and personnel. This lack of access to abortion services, 
especially for marginalised women, entrenches abortion as a social justice issue (Shaw, 2013:3).  
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The social justice framework is of particular relevance to our consideration of conscientious 
objection because research has shown that where health professionals are unwilling to provide 
TOP services the negative effects are differentially felt by poorer women living in rural areas, 
particularly those with inadequate financial means to travel to access these procedures in urban 
areas or in neighbouring countries (McCafferty, 2010). Poverty also affects women’s ability to 
practically exercise their reproductive rights in other ways (Silliman et al, 2004:4). In the context 
of the United States, for example, women’s rights activist, Loretta Ross, has argued that many 
poor women of colour’s abilities to control what happens to their bodies is constantly challenged 
by poverty (Silliman et al, 2004:4).  
 
One of the most important goals of the reproductive justice framework is to highlight the ways in 
which poverty and lack of social status for instance due to racism or other forms of 
discrimination often disenables many women from practically exercising their individual rights 
to abortion. This is done by understanding women’s access to abortion in the social context in 
which the right is being exercised and stressing that in many cases social factors particularly 
those resulting from social inequalities often play an important role in determining women’s 
access to safe abortion care, regardless of the legality of the procedure (Cook, 2006:6). In other 
words, the reproductive justice approach confirms the fact that women make their reproductive 
decisions within a social context rather than merely as socially disembodied, rationally choosing 
free agents. As such, it is important to take seriously individuals’ context or social positions in 
trying to understand their welfare (Di Chiro, 2008:284). 
 
Seen in this light, reproductive justice then takes a holistic approach which seeks to address 
social root causes or iniquities which heavily affect disadvantaged poor women by preventing 
them from fully exercising their rights to access TOP services. This holistic approach critiques 
the framing of termination of pregnancy as a matter of ‘rights’ and individual ‘choice’. The 
language of ‘choice’ it is argued, disregards the differential pressures that individuals face and 
the many constraints on the freedom to make a genuine choice (British Medical Association 
Views, 2007:4). As Silliman et al, have argued, the dominant ‘choice’ framework ignores “the 
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fact that for women of colour, economic and institutional constraints often restrict their choices” 
(2004:5; see also Ross, 2006). 
 
For some, the unequal context in which individual rights are exercised implies a special burden 
on the state to ensure the realisation of these rights in practice. Callahan and Robert thus propose 
“a feminist social justice approach [which] calls for state assistance of women’s right to an 
abortion because the abortion right is essential to eliminating women’s social subordination and 
to ensuring that a woman’s choice not to be a parent can always be realised” (1996:1234). For 
others see (Hartung and Blustein, 2002; McWhirter, 1998), the emphasis is on the special 
responsibility of health professionals that is implied when termination of pregnancy is 
understood as having social justice ramifications. Drawing on Miller’s work on social justice 
(1999), Jessica Shaw has for instance exhorted social workers to work towards achieving social 
justice for abortion-seeking patients in Canada who are facing challenges from inequitable access 
to TOP services because some health professionals invoke CO to the provision of TOP services 
(2013:2-3). 
 
The social justice framing which emphasises the importance of equal access to opportunities 
with regards to accessing TOP services was recognised by the American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynaecologists, (ACOG) Committee Opinion in 2007 as part of its recommendations to 
solve women’s inequitable access to TOP services. On this occasion it was acknowledged that  
health professionals’ right to CO may negatively impede women from exercising their rights to 
abortion, particularly in cases where CO is invoked both to the provision of the procedure and to 
the referral of the patient to willing providers. ACOG advocates the incorporation of social 
justice principles in evaluating conscientious refusals in order to prevent subsequent social harms 
resulting from unregulated exercise of health professional’s right to CO which often 
compromises the health and well-being of abortion-seeking patients (ACOG Committee 
Opinion, 2007:5). The committee argued that given that physicians are responsible for 
ministering to patients’ needs, they have a responsibility to redress social inequities and “not to 
create or reinforce racial or socioeconomic inequalities in society” through invoking CO (ACOG 
Committee Opinion, 2007:4). It was argued further that social justice requires medical 
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professionals and policy makers not only to treat individuals fairly, but also to provide medical 
services in a non-discriminatory manner (ACOG Committee Opinion, 2007:4). The ACOG 
Committee Opinion further suggests that equitable access to TOP services could effectively be 
achieved by regulating CO through the distributive paradigm approach which stresses fair 
allocation of society’s benefits and burdens in reproductive medicine (2007:4). Drawing on this 
concept of distributive justice, ACOG concluded that health professionals who invoke CO to the 
provision of TOP procedures to the most vulnerable women in the society “violate the core 
commitment to justice in the distribution of health resources” (2007:4). 
 
In contrast to those who frame abortion and conscientious objection to the provision of abortion-
related medical services as questions of individual rights, choices and harms, the social justice 
frame asks whether the costs and burdens of existing policies fall unequally on the poor and 
whether the ability to choose an abortion is unfairly dependent upon social location (Ferree et al, 
2002:106-107). Given the prominence of the challenge of inequality and a history of racism and 
discrimination in South Africa it is perhaps unsurprising that many participants in the present 
study wishing to explain why they do not invoke their right to CO to the provision of termination 
of pregnancy and MAP services, even although they may not personally feel comfortable with 
these procedures, drew heavily on ideas of social justice to frame their arguments..  
 
In the context of widespread stigmatisation of abortion and related services, the social 
circumstances of indigent women is invoked as a powerful legitimising narrative for why these 
participants believe in providing TOP services to these women whom they see not having the 
financial means to care properly for children. The social justice frame is invoked to emphasise 
the social costs and burdens of unwanted children born to poor women who are not in a position 
to care for them. Unusually, South Africa’s legislative framework specifically provides for social 
circumstances to be taken into account in the provision of abortion services. Moreover, the 
inequalities and injustices of the past which unequally distributed access to scarce abortion 
services and therefore unequally placed the burden of unsafe abortion with poor black women 
were specifically cited when the legislation was first passed as Dickson-Tetteh and Billings 
describe: 
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When the parliament passed the law in October 1996, it intended to 
ensure accessible and available abortion services for all women, 
particularly those who are poor or who were disadvantaged during 
apartheid, who are the most likely to suffer complications or die from an 
unsafe abortion (2002:144).  
 
Thus, rather than framing abortion solely in relation to individual rights or choice as is the case 
in some other contexts, notably the United States, the CTOP Act from the outset took the unusual 
approach of acknowledging social and economic circumstances as part of the framework within 
which abortion is to be understood in relation to the law in South Africa. As Cook and Dickens 
put it, the CTOP Act “addresses abortion as a matter of social equity and justice, rather than on 
health grounds alone” (1999:84).  
 
David Miller describes the idea of social justice as having to do with “how the good and bad 
things in life should be distributed among members of a human society” (2001:1). Miller 
illustrates one of the principles of social justice as follows: “we attack some policy or some state 
of affairs as socially unjust, we are claiming that a person, or more usually a category of persons, 
enjoys fewer advantages than that person or group of persons ought to enjoy” (2001:1). In sum, 
social justice takes a social approach to distribution rather than an individual rights-based, 
historical or contractual approach in seeking to decide what is just (Gamarnikov and Green, 
2003:210). 
 
Applied to reproductive health, a social justice framing seeks to address the inequitable social 
distribution of poor reproductive health outcomes. In South Africa, the historical context of 
apartheid has meant that in patterned ways, previously disadvantaged poor African women face 
the most disadvantageous health outcomes for instance with regard to maternal mortality, child 
mortality, access to appropriate contraception, the capacity to make informed decisions, coercive 
social relations, and access to termination of pregnancy services. To frame abortion as a matter 
of social justice then, is to take the interests of this most disadvantaged group as the starting 
point for social policy and health services provision. Abortion services are free of charge at all 
designated public health care facilities (Ngwena, 2004:715) and the government also earmarked 
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funds to train midwives to perform first trimester abortions so that services can also be provided 
in primary health care facilities (Varkey, 2000:87). However, in seeking just reproductive health 
provision outcomes for this most excluded of groups – that is, poor African women and rural 
women in particular – the legal framework has to be implemented by willing TOP providers. As 
Shaw points out:  
Physicians who offer abortion care are, by the very nature of the work 
that they do, key figures in promoting social justice for women. By 
participating in the highly controversial service of abortion care, 
providers become advocates for women’s rights and act as the tool 
through which social justice is enacted in the form of abortion care 
(2013:13). 
 
While the CTOP Act aims to provide every woman with “the right to choose whether to have an 
early, safe and legal termination of pregnancy according to her individual beliefs” (Republic of 
South Africa, 1996b:1) the point about understanding this right from a social justice point of 
view is to realise that access to the right is unevenly distributed across the society in patterned 
ways. While the law treats everyone equally, the social reality is that the burdens of inequalities 
of access fall unevenly on women who are poor, black and especially rural. Similarly, while on 
the one hand the individual right  to CO on the part of health care providers can be accepted the 
reality is that the outcome of the exercise of this right results in once again a greater burden of 
unequal access for poorer, black rural women. 
 
For the middle class urban woman who seeks a termination, the exercising of the right to CO on 
the part of one or more health care providers will be of little consequence to her being able to 
exercise her right to the provisions of the CTOP Act. She will have access to ready alternatives, 
to information about how and where to access them and to transport and other means that will 
make it possible for her to exercise her rights under the Act regardless of individual health 
providers objecting to provision of the service. In particular, wealthier women in urban centres 
have access to private provision of termination services rather than having to rely on a 
designated public health facility where in some cases no willing providers exist at all. 
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Both abortion and emergency contraceptive methods, specifically the MAP are controversial 
reproductive services which health professionals may conscientiously object to providing on 
religious, personal, ethical grounds even in countries where these services are legal. Dickens and 
Cook contrast this stance with what they refer to as ‘conscientious commitment’: “the reverse of 
conscientious objection, [conscientious commitment] inspires healthcare providers to overcome 
barriers to delivery of reproductive services to protect and advance women’s health” (2011:163-
164). For many providers who take this approach of ‘conscientious commitment’ the social 
injustice of unequal access to legal reproductive health services is what inspires their 
commitment rather than personally being particularly comfortable with, or in favour of, abortion. 
 
The challenge of second trimester abortion is particularly significant from a social justice point 
of view as it is often the most disadvantaged women who  for reasons of lack of proximity to a 
medical facility or for social and economic or personal reasons only seek abortion relatively late 
into pregnancy (Harries et al, 2007). Health professionals who are willing to provide these 
especially controversial services frequently frame their willingness to provide highly stigmatised 
services which many other South African doctors refuse to provide on grounds of conscience as 
a question of social justice. Rather than framing their willingness to provide these services as 
having to do with the rights of the individual woman as patient alone their responses frame the 
question as one of  social injustice occasioned by the unequal access of poorer women to 
reproductive health services. 
 
South African health professionals’ resistance especially to performing second trimester 
abortions has been confirmed in literature (van der Westhuizen, 2001; Bateman, 2011:304). In 
many provinces this has resulted in some public health care facility managers discontinuing 
second trimester TOP services altogether (Varkey, 2000:87). Thus, doctors who are willing to 
perform second trimester abortions are somewhat the exception, especially in the public health 
sector. In explaining why he takes the approach he does, the following participant focuses on the 
disadvantaged circumstances of patients which justify why they are seeking second trimester 
abortions in the first instance: 
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I feel that there is no difference as some patients are not aware that they 
are pregnant until the 2nd or even the 3rd trimester. I feel they should not 
be punished by their lack of knowledge as they will ultimately resort to 
backstreet abortion with dire consequences (Doctor Thirty-six).  
 
For this doctor denying women in these circumstances access to second trimester abortions is 
tantamount to punishing them for being poor which he is unwilling to do. 
 
The reproductive justice frame challenges the assumption that because abortion is legal it follows 
that every woman has equal access to the realisation of the right in practice. This approach was 
explicitly taken in a recent speech by South Africa’s Social Development Minister Bathabile 
Dlamini at the Ipas conference in June 2014) where she spoke at length about the need for South 
African politicians to stand up for South African women’s rights to abortion. Rather than 
employing the language of women’s ‘right to choose’, Dlamini argued that   “what we call 
‘choice’ may just become an elitist individualised response to reproductive rights which would 
still be mainly for the middle classes and the rich” (Davis, 2014).  
 
Conclusion  
 
Shannon and Winikoff have noted that “one woman dies every eight minutes from an unsafe 
abortion somewhere in the world, most likely south of the equator” (2010:149). Unsafe abortion 
has consequently been dubbed a preventable public health plague (Grimes et al, 2006:1908-
1916; see also Lisa et al, 2009:122; Shannon and Winikoff, 2010:149; Cates, 1982). For some 
commentators the centrality of the right to bodily integrity and autonomy implies that with the 
failure of health care systems to meet women’s reproductive needs amounts to denying these 
women full citizenship rights (Casas, 2009:83; Special Rapporteur Paul Hunt, 2004).  Shannon 
and Winikoff argue that these governments reduce women to “second-class citizens – either by 
law or in reality” and it is this diminished status which contributes directly to low levels of 
contraceptive use and high levels of unwanted pregnancy and unsafe abortion among these 
women (2010:155). 
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Some authors argue that governments’ failure to address the pressing issue of unsafe abortion 
and its devastating effects on women’s health and lives stems from gender inequities in access to 
health services (Ipas and IHCAR, 2002:3). This has resulted in women’s reproductive rights not 
being fully prioritised, thus jeopardising their health and lives. The former president of the 
International Federation of Gynaecology and Obstetrics (FIGO), Dr Mahmoud Fathalla has 
argued that, “Women are not dying because of diseases we cannot treat. They are dying because 
societies have yet to make the decision that their lives are worth saving” (1997:3). Dr Fathalla 
further adds that: “pregnancy related deaths…are often the outcome of cumulative denial of 
women’s human rights. Simply put, they die because they do not count” (1997:11). David 
Grimes feels the international community is not taking decisive measures to address the issue of 
high mortality and morbidity rates from complications of unsafe abortion “perhaps in part 
because the victims are all women, they are mostly of colour, and they live in developing 
countries” (2003:100). 
 
In South Africa, the apartheid government did not take any initiatives to implement any 
comprehensive reproductive health policies aimed at addressing maternal mortality among the 
marginalised African population group (Cooper et al, 2004:70). For this reason, public maternal 
health care facilities designated for black women were characterised by overcrowding, 
understaffing, and lack of privacy (Rees, 1994). The demise of apartheid saw the ANC 
government implementing progressive health legislation targeted in particular at addressing the 
needs of previously disadvantaged women. A notable example was the 1994 introduction of free 
health care for pregnant women with the aim of improving women’s access to reproductive 
health services (Cooper et al, 2004:74). Another notable achievement took place in 1997 with the 
setting up of a National Ministerial Committee on Confidential Enquiries into Maternal Deaths 
(NCCEMD) by the Department of Health. The NCCEMD was set up to improve the care of 
pregnant women and reduce maternal deaths through auditing maternal deaths in 200 hospitals 
across the country, providing information on the major causes of maternal deaths and the factors 
related to the deaths and finding feasible ways of addressing these problems through 
recommendations to the Department of Health (Benson et al, 2011:6).  
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While South Africa has a range of progressive sexual and reproductive health and rights policies 
these are not always practically implemented in the way envisioned by legislation (Stevens et al, 
2008). An indicator of policy failure is the fact that the MMR was as high as 369 per 100, 000 
live births in 2001 (Blaauw and Penn-Kekana, 2010). The 2007 Community Survey found that 
the level of MM in South Africa was 625 per 100 000 live births (Minnesota Citizens Concerned 
for Life Global Outreach, 2011:1). This level of maternal mortality is far higher than the 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target of 38 per 100 000 live births by 2015 (Stevens et 
al, 2008).  
 
In this context the ANC government made it an explicit policy goal to introduce women’s 
reproductive health legislation that would specifically impact positively on the life and well-
being of the poorest and most marginalised women in the country. However the continued 
treatment of women’s reproductive health in a framework of individual rights has failed to 
acknowledge the social, historical and economic context in which the right is exercised. In 
patterned ways poor women, black women and rural women continue to have diminished access 
to their rights. A social justice framework enables the acknowledgement of the social conditions 
that make for the realisation or non-realisation of rights on the part of certain citizens as an 
alternative to framing abortion as a question of individual choice and rights – whether the choice 
and rights of the pregnant women or the choice and rights of the objecting medical professional.  
 
 
Chapter eleven: conclusion and recommendations 
 
The present study has been interested in the role that the right to conscientious objection on the 
part of medical practitioners in South Africa plays in attenuating women’s reproductive rights in 
South Africa. Given that the absence of willing providers has been identified as one of the key 
reasons why women in South Africa continue to be denied reproductive rights afforded them in 
law, self-administered questionnaires completed by a sample of doctors and pharmacists from 
across the country were analysed in order to provide an insight into how health professionals in 
South Africa frame their willingness or unwillingness to provide TOP and MAP services.  
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The thesis describes three broad categories among the participants. The first category consists of 
those who expressed willingness to provide TOP and MAP services or to refer patients to a 
willing provider, irrespective of their right to CO which they rendered as immaterial compared to 
their patients’ well-being or right to access these services. These included health professionals 
who prioritised women’s/patients’ rights and equated providing these services with respecting 
their patient’s choices, autonomy and right to self-determination. For these participants’ the 
patient’s health care needs and right to full control over their own bodies and choices, should 
always take precedence over a health professional’s right to CO. For pharmacists drawing on this 
frame, women (including teenagers) can practically take full control of their bodies only if 
pharmacists dispense the MAP (including repeated requests) upon request. Likewise, for doctors 
drawing upon this frame, women (including teenagers) can practically take full control of their 
bodies only if they have access to both first and second trimester safe and legal abortion services 
upon request. 
 
For some, in this first category of non-objecting participants, what is paramount are their legal 
and professional obligations. Their willingness to provide these services is described as merely 
arising from the requirements of South African law or, in other cases, as part and parcel of their 
professional obligations which emanate from swearing to the Hippocratic Oath upon admission 
into medicine and pharmacy practice. While some of these participants object to the actual 
provision of TOP and MAP services, they are willing to refer their patients to non-objecting 
providers as they equate doing so with fulfilling both their legal and professional obligations. 
 
Others in the first, non-objecting category, relying on consequentialist moral reasoning, they 
regard the provision of TOP and MAP services as ethically right because to do so results in best 
or good consequences for the pregnant women and/or the unborn child. Many of these 
participants described their willingness to provide these services as stemming primarily from 
their awareness of high levels of unsafe abortion-related maternal morbidity rates in South 
Africa. As a result, they frame their willingness to provide TOP and MAP services as achieving 
the favourable consequence of protecting and saving the lives of women. Denial of these services 
 145 | P a g e  
 
is in contrast said to contribute directly to many women resorting to unsafe abortion practices. 
While some who recognise these consequences as having considerable moral weight are willing 
themselves to provide TOP and MAP services, others are willing only to refer their patients to 
non-objecting providers. Referral is seen as preventing bad consequences while not violating the 
dictates of their own consciences. 
 
Then there are those in the first, non-objecting category who draw on the ‘do no harm frame’ to 
explain why they do not object to the provision of these services, or if they do, are willing to 
refer their patients to willing providers. They regard the pregnant woman rather than the foetus 
as their patient. They fall into two groups: the first group invokes CO to the actual provision of 
TOP services, but are willing to refer their abortion-seeking patients to willing providers as they 
believe that this will avoid harm to their patients in the form forcing them to consult with ‘back 
street’ abortionists. The second group interpret and apply the principle of ‘do no harm’ to mean 
not invoking CO in cases of emergency where the pregnancy can endanger the health or life of 
the pregnant woman. These participants are willing to assist such women by completing their 
incomplete abortions as failure to do so will result in imminent harm in the form of death and 
will also constitute abandoning of their patients. 
 
Finally, participants who draw on the ‘social justice frame’ also fall in the first, non-objecting 
category. They are willing to provide second trimester abortions regardless of their consciences 
because they believe that there are many unavoidable social circumstances which push women of 
low income to acquire abortions during second trimester gestations. Their willingness to provide 
these abortions stems primarily from their belief that, unlike wealthy women, the majority of 
poor African rural women’s rights to access TOP services can practically be realised only if 
health professionals who work in the public sector are willing to provide second trimester 
abortions. 
 
The second of the three categories of participants consists of those who believe their right to CO 
is absolute and should always take precedence over other goals.  TOP and MAP services are seen 
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as facilitating murder and pharmacists in this category equate the MAP with abortifacients. 
Health professionals who draw on the ‘foetal life frame’ have based their objections to the 
provision of these services on the respect and value which they attach to the sacredness of human 
life. For this reason, they feel justified to invoke CO to the provision of TOP and MAP services 
as they regard the end result of both services as violating the rights of foetuses by intentionally 
killing them. Health professionals who draw on the ‘moral absolutism frame’ typically invoke 
religious beliefs-based CO to the provision of TOP and MAP services.  
Some restrict their objection to performing second trimester abortions. Many who draw on the 
‘moral absolutism frame’ believe they have an absolute right to invoke CO even when it comes 
to treating incomplete abortions in emergency cases as they equate doing so with the performing 
of abortion itself which is viewed as the deliberate killing of the innocent. For these participants, 
life begins at conception and referral is morally impermissible because it amounts to complicity: 
the facilitation of the killing of innocent foetuses. For these participants ‘doing no harm’ is 
interpreted from the perspective of the foetus, not the pregnant woman. In some cases this 
extends even to cases of emergency where the health or life of the pregnant woman would be 
endangered by the continuance of the pregnancy. While these participants accept the dictates of 
the Hippocratic Oath, they regard foetuses as the patients that they ought not to harm. Their 
obligation is therefore to always unconditionally protect the foetus’s right to life at all gestational 
stages of the pregnancy as well as in whatever circumstances, including rape or incest. 
 
Some participants in this second category who invoke CO to the provision of TOP and MAP 
services do not necessarily believe that human life begins at conception nor do they equate the 
MAP with abortifacients. Rather, their grounds for CO stems from their desire to prevent future 
negative consequences which they see as likely to ensue if these services were to be easily 
available for women and for this reason, they suggest the need to limit the provision of these 
services in certain circumstances. For instance pharmacists argue that invoking CO to the 
provision of repeated requests for MAPs will result in the preservation of patients’ health. 
Likewise, doctors who draw on the ‘consequences frame’ invoke CO to the provision of second 
trimester abortions in particular because they associate these abortions with negative health 
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consequences in the form of long-term psychological effects for the women who obtain them – 
and in some cases negative psychological impacts on the providing doctor. 
 
A third category of respondents consists of health professionals who take a moderated approach, 
evincing mixed feelings towards invoking or not invoking CO. They see themselves as endorsing 
women’s rights but violate Ronald Dworkin’s notion of rights as ‘trumps’ (1984). They do 
acknowledge women’s right to access TOP services, but impose restrictions on the exercise of 
the right. Some confine the applicability of this right to abortion in the first trimester of gestation. 
As a pregnancy advances to the second trimester of gestation, they believe that this right ought to 
come to be shared with the rights of the foetus. CO to the provision of second trimester abortion 
is justified on grounds of ‘foetal viability’.  
 
While both the CTOP Act and the 2000 SAMCC policy take an expansive and progressive 
approach with respect to women’s reproductive justice, many of the participants in the present 
study do not fully endorse this approach. Several participants are influenced by their own 
particular moral point of view concerning, essentially, sexuality and what constitutes responsible 
and appropriate sexual behaviour. For instance, while both the CTOP Act and the 2000 SAMCC 
policy do not discriminate on the grounds of age with regards to the right to access TOP and 
MAP services, some participants are loathe to provide these services to teenagers without parental 
authorisation even though the law does not impose this requirement. Legal prescriptions 
notwithstanding, these participants construct teenagers as lacking the capacity to make informed 
decisions. Some refuse to dispense the MAP to teenagers, preferring to refer them to clinics 
where they will be counselled to abstain from engaging in sexual intercourse despite the fact that 
the law does not require such referral for those seeking the MAP.   
 
Some participants who  at first glance seemed to draw on the ‘women’s rights frame’ because they 
support the passage of the 2000 SAMCC policy as a good policy, on closer inspection were seen 
to be invoking ‘hierarchies of legitimacy and deservingness’, taking it upon themselves to 
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate circumstances for the provision of TOP and MAP 
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services. Pharmacists who view the MAP as an ‘emergency’ remedy for circumstances such as 
rape, condom failure and rare human error are willing to provide this medication only once or 
twice in a lifetime to their clients thus emptying the idea of a ‘right’ of its meaning and force. 
Repeated requests for MAPs are associated with ‘irresponsible’ sexual behaviour and the misuse 
of medication in the form of using the MAP as a form of regular contraception. Some proposed 
the need for strict monitoring and surveillance of women’s behaviour in order to ensure that only 
the deserving, legitimate MAP request (that is requesting the MAP once in one’s life time) is 
complied with. 
 
‘Hierarchies of legitimacy and deservingness’ were also invoked by some doctors who, although 
drawing on the ‘women’s rights frame’ drew a distinction between patients whom they regard as 
fully deserving to be provided with an abortion and others whom they regard as undeserving. 
Those repeatedly seeking abortion are constructed as illegitimately using abortion as a form of 
contraception. On the contrary, women who seek TOP services for medical reasons (where the 
life or health of the mother can be endangered by the continuation of pregnancy or where there is 
foetal malformation) are seen as having legitimate reasons for seeking a termination of 
pregnancy procedure. The decision to provide the service then rests not on a deeply-held moral 
conviction that all abortion is murder but rather on a subjective evaluation of the reasons why 
someone wishes to have an abortion.  
 
Recommendations 
 
These research findings have shown that despite the legalisation of both TOP and MAP services, 
many South African women continue to face barriers in accessing these services because of 
health professionals’ right to CO. Previous research has demonstrated that the high rate of 
second trimester abortions in South Africa is of particular concern (Harries et al, 2009:9). The 
findings of the present study confirm this and link this challenge to the reluctance of some 
medical practitioners to comply with their legal and professional obligations. Given this, the 
recruitment of South African doctors who are willing to provide second trimester abortions could 
viably reduce unsafe abortion-related morbidity and mortality rates (Mbele et al, 2006:1197). 
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Such recruitment could feasibly be implemented if the South African government were to follow 
the example of other countries which have effectively dealt with the issue of CO. 
 
Most notable in this regard is Sweden which deals with the issue of CO in a way which 
prioritises women by granting them the right to abortion upon their own request and provides 
services to implement that choice (Berer, 2002:34). Medical personnel’s right to conscientious 
objection to abortion is not recognised under Swedish abortion law (O’Rourke et al, 2012:91). 
Rather, under the Swedish legal system, all medical personnel are contractually bound to assist in 
the termination of pregnancy services (van Bogaert, 2002:136; see also Berer, 2002:34; Heino et 
al, 2013). Berer argues that Sweden’s approach “reflects the country’s high level of commitment 
to equitably providing abortion through preventing medical professionals from becoming 
‘gatekeepers’ to women’s sexual and reproductive rights through invoking conscience clauses” 
(2002:34). In Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, and Iceland medical practitioners are also 
not legally permitted to conscientiously object to providing abortion services, whereas in 
Norway, employers can refuse to hire objectors and employment advertisements may require 
performance of abortion as a condition for employment (Heino et al, 2013).  
 
The present study shows that South African teenagers face particular barriers to accessing TOP 
and MAP services as a result of health provider attitudes towards youth sexuality. Respondents 
expressed concerns about the easy availability of these services as encouraging irresponsible 
sexual behaviour or promiscuity and also causing long term negative health and psychological 
outcomes for teenagers. Some participants selectively invoked CO in relation to teenagers based 
on their expectation that teenagers should be asexual and should require parental notification to 
access these services.  
 
According to Boonstra, approximately “25% of sexually active teens do not use any method of 
contraception at first intercourse, and many find it difficult to take oral contraceptives every day 
or to consistently use intercourse-related methods, such as the condom or diaphragm” (2002:13). 
Thus, making TOP and MAP services more readily available to teenagers could make a positive 
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impact  of reducing levels of unwanted pregnancies “for sexually active teens, who may have sex 
only sporadically, and also are more likely than older, married women to experience 
contraceptive failure” (Boonstra, 2002:13). The South African government could draw on 
practices in such countries as France which have “taken extraordinary steps to ensure that 
adolescents in particular have access to emergency contraceptive methods” (Boonstra, 2002:12). 
This has been the case in France since December 2000 following the passage of a law allowing 
public and parochial high school nurses to provide emergency contraception at no charge and 
without requiring authorisation from a parent (Boonstra, 2002:12). Not only that, but the French 
law also provides no right to CO on the part of pharmacists; rather they “are required to counsel 
young women and provide them with information about other forms of birth control” (Boonstra, 
2002:12). Commenting on the positive impact of this approach on the part of the French 
government, the president of the French Association for Contraception, Elizabeth Aubeny argues 
that it has resulted in “more open discussion—among pharmacists, nurses in school, across all 
society—about what to do to prevent pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases… and the 
more you talk about contraception, the more women use it and the fewer abortions there are” 
(Boonstra, 2002:12). 
 
The South African government can also draw on some European countries with a reliable 
induced abortion surveillance system such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and the 
Nordic countries (Lazdane, 2005:5). Norway has established a comprehensive regulatory and 
oversight framework on conscientious objection to abortion, which includes ensuring the 
availability of providers.42 Given that the South African Constitution recognises health 
professionals’ right to CO to the provision of contested reproductive services, it would be fruitful 
if the South African government were to put in place an oversight mechanism which ensures that 
conscientiously objecting health professionals do refer their TOP and MAP-seeking patients to 
willing providers as mandated by the CTOP Act. This oversight mechanism should be aimed at 
holding accountable health professionals who conscientiously object to referring their TOP and 
MAP-seeking patients to willing providers. In this regard, South Africa could draw on the 
approach taken by other countries in solving the issue of CO with regards to health 
                                                 
42 Health Services Act, Art. 56, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia (Slovenia). 
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professionals’ obligation to refer their TOP-seeking patients that they cannot treat on the grounds 
of conscience. A notable example to draw upon in this regard would be the Australian state of 
Victoria’s Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) which contains a clause which obliges a 
conscientiously objecting medical practitioner to refer a woman seeking an abortion procedure 
to another non-objecting provider.43  In order to ensure that conscientiously objecting medical 
practitioners honour their obligation to refer, the country subsequently took the law a step 
further by creating an oversight and monitoring mechanism known as the Australian Health 
Practitioner Regulation Agency (AHPRA) (Smith, 2013). The AHPRA follows up and 
investigates cases reported by patients who have been denied referrals by conscientiously 
objecting doctors in order to take judicial disciplinary action against such doctors (Smith, 2013). 
Commenting on the disciplinary measures taken by the AHPRA against medical practitioners 
who refuse to refer, Andrew Smith argues that “penalties for failing to follow the law in Victoria 
can include the loss of their medical registration [which] “would prevent a doctor from practicing 
anywhere in Australia” (2013). In October 2013, a Melbourne city-based, Victoria doctor, Mark 
Hobart was faced with losing his medical registration for refusing to refer a couple for a sex-
selective abortion who subsequently reported the case to the AHPRA (Smith, 2013). 
 
A further recommendation relates to the present study’s inclusion of pharmacists among the 
participants. The latter are often overlooked in the debate concerning women’s reproductive 
rights. However pharmacists have an enormous contribution to make to the realisation of 
women’s reproductive justice as they directly interact with patients. Research in other settings 
has demonstrated that the effective provision of emergency contraceptive methods by 
pharmacists may help lessen the burden of high levels of women seeking TOP services. In Spain, 
for instance, the switching of emergency contraceptive methods to being dispensed OTC reduced 
abortion rates. This is evidenced by the fact that “in 2008, there were 115,000 abortions 
according to the Ministry of Health but since the morning after pill became available without 
prescription on January 2010, there has been a decrease of 9% in the abortion rate” (Lalanda, 
2010). Likewise, data from the Alan Guttmacher Institute indicates that the use of emergency 
contraceptive methods has played a significant role in reducing abortion rates in the United 
                                                 
43 8(1) (b) of the Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic). 
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States. For instance, according to the 2000 to 2001 national surveys conducted by the Alan 
Guttmacher Institute, “an estimated 51,000 abortions were averted by women’s use of 
emergency contraceptives in 2000; moreover, emergency contraceptives accounted for up to 
43% of the decrease in total abortions between 1994 and 2000” (Boonstra, 2002:13; see also 
Jones et al, 2002). 
 
While it is evident that easy access to emergency contraceptive methods plays an important role 
in the reduction of abortion rates, however, it should be pointed out that many women are most 
likely to face barriers to access the MAP within the required 72 hours’ time frame. Thus, the 
second option for such women would be to terminate the established pregnancy and the 
availability of non-objecting doctors is and will always be important in this regard. Not only that, 
but the recruitment of non-objecting doctors has a positive impact not only for the lives of 
women who may risk their health and lives through seeking unsafe abortion procedures, but may 
also positively impact the public health budget which is often drained by the management of 
incomplete abortions. This is evidenced by a 1997 South African study which estimated that “the 
total yearly cost of treating unsafe abortion morbidity in public hospitals was ZAR 9.74 million 
(about US$1.4 million)” (Kay et al, 1997 cited in Grimes et al, 2006:1914; see also Moodley and 
Akinsooto, 2003:35). 
 
A final recommendation relates to the question of mid-level providers (MLPs). Conscientious 
objection and women’s reproductive rights are thus an exemplar of rights in tension with one 
another such that to exercise the one might be to negate the other. The question then becomes 
one of what to do in a case of conflicting rights. ‘Clear and present danger’ was a term used by 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. concerning the right of the government to regulate speech. 
‘Clear and present danger’ has become a common standard for judging cases in which normal 
rights and freedoms might justifiably be abridged. While in the normal course of things the right 
to conscience of medical personnel is upheld as a justifiable right, within this view that right 
could legitimately be suspended when it conflicts with the right to life of the pregnant woman. 
So if, for instance, by not providing referral to an abortion clinic or not admitting a woman to a 
hospital bed or not providing information, on grounds of conscientious objection to abortion, that 
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woman’s life is placed in danger then the health professional would be falling foul of the clear 
and present danger moral test. Likewise those health professionals, consulting their conscience, 
this argument suggests, would necessarily weigh the clear and present danger to the patient’s life 
more heavily than their own right to freedom of conscience. For this reason, in cases of 
emergency, usually when continuation of pregnancy poses a serious danger to the life or health 
of the woman, it is argued that  healthcare professionals have an unconditional obligation to 
terminate a pregnancy regardless of their personal beliefs (Dickens and Cook, 2000:72; see also 
Naylor and O’Sullivan, 2010:15; McCafferty, 2010:6). This standard, however, does not solve 
the problem of the more routine cases of requests for abortion. Nor does it offer a solution in 
those circumstances in which the life of the foetus is regarded, in the moral view of the 
physician, as bearing equal weight to the life of the pregnant woman.  
 
Given the intractability of this debate and the resultant paucity of medical practitioners 
particularly in the public health sector and particularly in developing nations, who are willing to 
provide legal termination of pregnancy services, since the beginning 1990s, emphasis has been 
placed on the important role that mid-level health care providers (MLPs) could play in reducing 
morbidity and mortality related to unsafe abortion:  
…. a [1990] recommendation made jointly by the International 
Confederation of Midwives (ICM), the World Health Organisation 
(WHO), and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) encouraged 
midwives’ participation in abortion care as a solution to address limited 
access to services” (Miller et al, 2002:247).  
 
According to Warriner et al, MLPs may include “health-care providers who are not doctors, such 
as registered nurses, midwives, and doctor-assistants trained to undertake first-trimester induced 
abortions” (2006:1965). In the wake of this recommendation, research emerged showing the 
potential significance of the role of MLPs in abortion care (Fullerton et al, 2011:146-147; 
Grimes, 1992; Darney, 1993; Taylor et al, 2009 cited in Goldberg et al, 2013:454; McKee and 
Adams, 1994; Lieberman and Lalwani, 1994 cited in Goldman et al, 2004:1352; Ipas and 
IHCAR, 2002:3; Dickson-Tetteh and Billings, 2002:149), particularly with respect to first 
trimester abortions (Goldberg et al, 2013:458; Jones and Kooistra, 2011). 
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MLPs are potentially significant also in the context of the new emphasis on medical abortion 
(Yanda et al, 2003:279; Cooper et al, 2005:36; Creinin, 2000; Willmott et al, 2008; Goyal, 2009; 
Baggaley et al, 2010; Pollack and Pine, 2000; Coyaji, 2000; Winikoff et al, 1997) which 
proponents see as a safe and effective method of abortion particularly for women with early 
pregnancies (Creinin, 2000; see also Abuabara and Blum, 2004). MLPs can play an important 
role in distributing drugs for inducing abortion chiefly in resource-poor areas with scarce or no 
doctors and this may positively result in making abortion safe, effective and accessible to many 
more woman (Yanda et al, 2003:279; see also Cooper et al, 2005:36). Medical abortion requires 
minimal medical attention as the pregnant woman can self-induce abortion at home using drugs: 
either misoprostol or mifepristone (Bateman, 2011:304). MLPs without a professional 
background in surgical abortion can be trained to provide early medical abortion services 
(ICMA, 2004). 
 
The key challenge is that few women present for TOP before eight weeks, which is the preferred 
time for medical termination (Fawcus, 2008:541). In 2001 the Medicines Control Council 
(MCC) of South Africa approved mifepristone as a safe and effective agent when used in 
conjunction with misoprostol for the termination of early pregnancy (National Abortion 
Federation, 2013). However, unlike in countries like Brazil (De Zordo and Mishtal, 2011:34; 
Yanda et al, 2003:279) where medical abortion through the use of misoprostol has reduced the 
rate of serious complications from unsafe abortion, in South Africa medical abortion has not 
yielded positive benefits for the majority of poor African women in need of abortion services. 
This is because while many abortions occur in public hospitals (Varkey, 2000:87), there is no 
formal national policy which permits the provision of medical abortion in these facilities 
(National Abortion Federation, 2009) As such, medical abortion is only available in private 
health care facilities which charges fees for TOP services that are unaffordable for most women. 
In South Africa, moreover, MLPs are no less likely than other health practitioners to invoke CO 
to the provision of abortion services.  
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MLPs and new generation abortion drugs do not solve the problem of second trimester abortions 
which require the intervention of willing, skilled physicians and a reasonable level of 
infrastructure. MLPs also cannot treat women experiencing complications from unsafe abortion 
(Miller et al, 2002:247). In South Africa research points to many reasons why women present for 
abortion only in the second trimester of pregnancy. In some cases this is itself a result of the 
absence of local facilities or health care professionals’ refusals to provide abortion services. 
Other factors include poor knowledge about the legality of abortion among many women 
(Chelsea et al, 2006:3; Engelbrecht et al, 2000; Morroni et al, 2006:7), long waiting periods in 
some locations (Harries et al, 2007:7; Henshaw and Finer, 2003:22), initial delays or problems in 
suspecting a pregnancy primarily among young women with little awareness of pregnancy 
symptoms (Berer, 2008:3; Harries et al, 2007:7; Drey et al, 2006; Finer et al, 2006; Cooper et al, 
2005; Varkey, 2000:87; Gallo et al, 2007). Not only do these factors force women to seek 
abortion services when the pregnancy has advanced to the second trimester (Turner et al, 
2008:108-113; Naylor, 2004), but also force many women to resort to unsafe services outside 
designated health care facilities, which may result in death or severe medical complications 
(Turner et al, 2008:113; Mbele et al, 2003:1198; Walker et al, 2004; Skuster, 2012:1).  
 
Globally, the continuing unsafe abortion-related mortality and morbidity rates in countries which 
have liberalised abortion has resulted in the emergence of recent scholarship stressing the need to 
train and equip willing medical personnel in order to achieve comprehensive provision of 
abortion services by health care systems (Healy, 2013:1; Erdman, 2012:85; Ngwena, 2004:716; 
Gasman et al, 2006:311). Gasman and colleagues enjoin obstetricians and gynaecologists to use 
their elitist and privileged positions for the benefit of women (Gasman et al, 2006:311). The 
former President of the International Federation of Gynaecology and Obstetrics (FIGO), Dr 
Mahmoud Fathalla is on record saying that, given that women in many societies are voiceless in 
issues pertaining to their reproductive rights because of gender inequalities, rather than being 
neutral, medical personnel ought to “stand beside women and behind women” (Fathalla, 1994) 
rather than regarding their own privileged, empowered access to ‘choice’ and ‘freedom of 
conscience’ as paramount. Dr Fathalla goes on to argue that medical personnel need “to speak 
for women’s rights, because we know more than others that the powerlessness of women is a 
 156 | P a g e  
 
serious health hazard” (Fathalla, 1994). As the former President of FIGO (2006-2009), Dr 
Dorothy Shaw has argued: 
As professionals, our privileged position in society obliges us to advocate 
for improvement of health services for women and to reflect on how best 
to collaborate with others to bring about the necessary changes so that 
women will be valued equally to men and will be able to exercise their 
sexual and reproductive rights as enshrined in human rights laws… 
(2004:198) 
 
The ideals cited in the above quote cannot be realised until we see this as a matter of social 
justice and find ways of serving the poorest and most marginalised with policy rather than 
pretending that good policies impact equally on everyone regardless of their class, race or age.
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Appendix one: Doctors self-administered questionnaire 
 
A. Please could you start by saying a bit about yourself - I am asking for this information 
because  I want to  make  sure  that I get views from as diverse a group of doctors as 
possible. 
1. What is your age?                                                                      Click here to enter text. 
2. What is your language?                                                              Click here to enter text. 
3. What is your gender?                                                                 Click here to enter text. 
4. Where did you study?                                                                Click here to enter text. 
5. How long have you been practicing?                                         Click here to enter text. 
6. Which town do you practice in?                                                Click here to enter text. 
7.  What are the different contexts in which you have practiced?  Click here to enter text. 
B. The  South  African  Choice  on  Termination of Pregnancy  Act since  1997  provides  for 
every woman’s right to safe and legal abortion on request.   Because abortion is controversial  
in  every  society,  medical  professionals  might  have  moral,  religious  or cultural reasons 
for not wanting to perform abortions. On the other hand it is the law of the land. 
1. Can  you  provide  your  professional  and  personal  insight  into  how  you  think  we  should 
negotiate  this dilemma  in South Africa and your personal approach as a doctor within  that? 
Cl ick h ere to en ter te xt. 
2. Do  you  think  that  there  is a relevant moral distinction to  be made between clinical abortion and  
abortion  provision  through  the  distribution  of drugs  such  as  mifepristone  or  misoprostol or the 
prescription  of the “morning  after pill”? 
Cl i ck h ere to en ter te xt. 
3. Some doctors who object to being involved with the provision of abortion services also would 
refuse to attend to a patient seeking an abortion in cases of emergency? What is your view on this? 
Cl i ck h ere to en ter te xt. 
4. Do you feel that doctors who have a serious moral objection to abortion are obligated to refer 
a patient to another willing provider or not? Could you discuss your approach to this issue? 
Cl i ck h ere to en ter te xt. 
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5. Unlike registered midwives and nurses, doctors (perhaps including you) are qualified to provide 
second trimester abortions.  I understand that rates of second trimester abortions in South Africa 
are quite high.  Could you tell me your view on doctors performing second trimester abortions? 
Cl i ck h e re to e n te r te xt. 
6. Is there anything more you would like to say or comment about this subject that would help me to 
deepen my understanding of the issue seen through the eyes of a medical professional? Please feel 
free to share your experiences and insights in as much detail as possible. 
Cl i ck h e re to e n te r te xt. 
C. Additional information 
1. If you would like to speak to me in person about the issues of my study please indicate here. 
Cl i ck h e re to e n te r te xt. 
2. I would love to include as many doctors as possible in my study. If you have emails of other 
doctors whom you think wouldn’t mind hearing from me could you please add them here. 
C i ck h e re to e n te r te xt. 
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Appendix two: Doctors consent form 
 
Department of Political and  
International Studies 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN AN EMAIL 
INTERVIEW 
 
A study in conscientious objection to lawful termination of pregnancy services in South Africa 
You have been asked to participate in a research study conducted by Desire Chiwandire 
g09c5390@campus.ru.ac.za from the Department of Political and International Relations at Rhodes 
University. The purpose of the study is to investigate South Africa’s doctors’ opinions on abortion 
and the provisions of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. The results of this 
study will be included in my thesis research for Master’s Degree which will be completed in 
December 2014. In keeping with the ethical procedures, please read the information below, and ask 
questions about anything you do not understand before deciding whether or not to participate. 
 This email interview is voluntary. You have the right not to answer any question and you are 
also free to withdraw from the study at any stage if you so desire. 
 Upon receiving your email, for purposes of analysing data, I assure you that I will delete all 
self-identifying information that you would have provided as well as your email address. 
    You will not receive monetary compensation for this interview. 
I assure you of confidentiality as this interview response will be printed, transcribed and then 
deleted from my email inbox account. The printed version of this interview will then be stored in a 
secure work space for 6 months. The printed emails will then be destroyed. 
Please note that by replying this email you consent to the following: 
That you understand the procedures described above: 
    All questions have been clarified you have responded to your satisfaction. 
    You have agreed to participate in this study and you have been given a copy of this form. 
 You have given permission for this interview to be printed and then used in my thesis 
research project. 
    You have given permission for the following information to be included in publications 
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resulting from this study, for instance, your direct quotes from this interview.  
Please contact Desire Chiwandire (Cell: 0737543556) with any questions or concerns. 
My Supervisor: Prof Louise Vincent, louise.dorothy.vincent@ru.ac.za (27 (0) 46 603 8353). 
Department of Political & International Studies, Rhodes University.
   
206 | P a g e  
 
Appendix three: Pharmacists self-administered questionnaire 
 
A.  Please could you start by saying a bit about yourself - I am asking for this information 
because I want to make sure that I get views from as diverse a group of pharmacists as 
possible. 
1.   What is your age?                                                                      Click here to enter text. 
2.   What is your language?                                                             Click here to enter text. 
3.   What is your gender?                                                                 Click here to enter text. 
4.   Where did you study?                                                                Click here to enter text. 
5.   How long have you been practicing?                                         Click here to enter text. 
6.   Which town do you practice in?                                                Click here to enter text. 
7.   What are the different context in which you have practiced?   Click here to enter text. 
B.  The South African Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act since 1997 provide s for every 
woman’s right to safe and legal abortion on request. Because abortion is controversial in 
every society, health professionals might have moral, religious or cultural reasons for not 
wanting to perform abortions. On the other hand it is the law of the land. 
1.   In  2000, the  South  Africa  Medicines  Control  Council  approved  the  dispensing   of emergency  
contraception  by pharmacists  to women  of any  age without  a doctor’s prescription. What are 
your personal views regarding this policy? 
Click here to enter text. 
2.   In the international  debate on pharmacists’  rights  to conscientious  objection  to the dispensing  
of emergency  contraception,   some  prefer  to see the pill  as delaying  or inhibiting  ovulation  
whereas others equate it to an abortion pill  which  does the same work as other ‘abortifacients’  like 
mifepristone  and misoprostol.  What is your personal approach  as a pharmacist  to  this  question  
and  how  do  you  interact  with  women requesting  the morning  after pill? 
Click here to enter text. 
3.   Given  that emergency  contraception  is legally  available  in South African  pharmacies through  
over-the-counter  distribution,   should  pharmacists  have  a right  to  refuse  to dispense emergency 
contraception if this is against their religious,  ethical,  personal and moral beliefs? 
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Click here to enter text. 
4.   Some pharmacists  find  repeated  requests for the morning-after-pill  on the part of a single  
patient  troubling  for various  reasons while  other pharmacists  do not.  Please 
describe your own response. 
Click here to enter text. 
5.   Do you think  those pharmacists  who refuse to dispense  emergency  contraception  on grounds  of 
conscience  should  refer  the woman  to another  willing  provider  or non- objecting pharmacist  – 
or does this constitute collusion  in a practice that the pharmacist may find morally  reprehensible? 
Click here to enter text. 
6.   In the pharmacy practice, what do you think should take precedence: the pharmacist’s professional 
role in patient care (through the lawful distribution of emergency contraception) or the pharmacist’s 
right to practice according to his or her conscience? 
Click here to enter text. 
7.   If you do/do not believe in  dispensing emergency contraception, please explain the reasons for 
your approach. 
Click here to enter text. 
C.  Additional Information 
1.   If you would like to speak to me about issues concerning my study please indicate here. 
Click here to enter text. 
2.   I would like to include as many pharmacists as possible in my study. If you have other emails  of 
pharmacists  whom you think  would  whom you think  wouldn’t  hearing  from me could you please 
forward them both attachments  or add the emails  here. 
Click here to enter text. 
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Appendix four: Pharmacists consent form 
 
Department of Political and  
International Studies 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN AN EMAIL  
INTERVIEW 
 
A study in conscientious objection to lawful provision of Emergency Contraception/the 
morning -after- pill in South Africa 
 
You have been asked to participate in a research study conducted by Desire Chiwandire  
g09c5390@campus.ru.ac.za from the Department of Political and International Relations at 
Rhodes University. The purpose of the study is to investigate South Africa’s pharmacists’ 
knowledge, perceptions and opinions on the morning-after-pill and the provisions of the South 
African Medicines Control Council which approved the dispensing of emergency 
contraception by pharmacists to women of any age without a doctor’s prescription in 2000. In 
keeping with the ethical procedures, please read the information below, and ask questions 
about anything you do not understand before deciding whether or not to participate. 
 
 This email interview is voluntary. You have the right not to answer any question and 
you are also free to withdraw from the study at any stage if you so desire. 
 Upon receiving your email, for purposes of analysing data, I assure you that I will 
delete all self-identifying information that you would have provided as well as your 
email address. 
    You will not receive monetary compensation for this interview. 
 
I assure you of confidentiality as this interview response will be printed, transcribed and then 
deleted from my email inbox account. The printed version of this interview will then be 
stored in a secure work space for 6 months. The printed emails will then be destroyed. 
Please  note that  by replying  this  email  you  consent  to  the  following:  That  you  
understand  the procedures described above: 
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   All questions have been clarified you have responded to your satisfaction. 
 
   You have agreed to participate in this study and you have been given a copy of this 
form. 
 
 You have given permission for this interview to be printed and then used in my thesis 
research project. 
 You  have given  permission  for  the  following  information  to  be  included  in  
publications resulting from this study, for instance, your direct quotes from this 
interview. 
Please contact Desire Chiwandire (Cell: 0737543556) with any questions or concerns or my 
Supervisor:   Prof   Louise   Vincent,   louise.dorothy.vincent@ru.ac.za   (27   (0)   46   603   
8353).  
Department of Political & International Studies, Rhodes University. 
